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Abstract
A number of applications involve sequential arrival of users, and require showing each user an ordering of items. A
prime example (which forms the focus of this paper) is the bidding process in conference peer review where reviewers
enter the system sequentially, each reviewer needs to be shown the list of submitted papers, and the reviewer then
“bids” to review some papers. The order of the papers shown has a significant impact on the bids due to primacy
effects. In deciding on the ordering of papers to show, there are two competing goals: (i) obtaining sufficiently
many bids for each paper, and (ii) satisfying reviewers by showing them relevant items. In this paper, we begin by
developing a framework to study this problem in a principled manner. We present an algorithm called SUPER∗,
inspired by the A∗ algorithm, for this goal. Theoretically, we show a local optimality guarantee of our algorithm and
prove that popular baselines are considerably suboptimal. Moreover, under a community model for the similarities,
we prove that SUPER∗ is near-optimal whereas the popular baselines are considerably suboptimal. In experiments on
real data from ICLR 2018 and synthetic data, we find that SUPER∗ considerably outperforms baselines deployed in
existing systems, consistently reducing the number of papers with fewer than requisite bids by 50-75% or more, and
is also robust to various real world complexities.
1 Introduction
It is well known that peer review is essential for ensuring the quality and scientific value of research (Black et al.,
1998; Thurner and Hanel, 2011; Bianchi and Squazzoni, 2015). A fundamental challenge in peer review is matching
or assigning papers to qualified and willing reviewers. Common methods to deal with this problem often rely on
access to a similarity matrix containing scores for each paper-reviewer pair expressing the estimated match quality
between them. The similarity matrix is often obtained using feature-based or profile-based matching mechanisms that
leverage keywords and available reviewer publications (Charlin and Zemel, 2013; Price and Flach, 2017). A number of
automated methods to match papers with reviewers using similarity scores have been proposed that optimize objectives
such as cumulative similarity or fairness notions (Karimzadehgan et al., 2008; Garg et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2010; Long
et al., 2013; Stelmakh et al., 2019b).
A shortcoming of automating the paper matching process stems from the failure to actively incorporate reviewers
within the paper assignment phase of the review process. The outright dependence on the similarity scores can be
problematic since the preferences of reviewers can change frequently and the similarity scores themselves can be
noisy. Bidding has emerged as an important mechanism for aiding in and improving the peer review process under
the guise that active engagement of the reviewer leads to assignments more aligned with their preferences and hence,
enhanced review quality (Di Mauro et al., 2005).
In typical peer review process, when the bidding process opens, reviewers enter the system in an arbitrary sequen-
tial order. Upon entering, a list of papers is shown to them and they are asked to place bids on papers they would prefer
to review. Following the bidding process, bids can be incorporated into the reviewer-paper assignment mechanism. It
is known that the order of papers presented to reviewers in the bidding stage can greatly impact the number of bids that
a paper receives (Cabanac and Preuss, 2013). From the perspective of the platform, there are two competing goals:
(i) ensure that each paper has a sufficient number of bids, and (ii) ensure individual reviewer satisfaction by showing
relevant papers.
With regard to goal (i), the platform aims to select a display order for each reviewer such that at the end of the
bidding process, each paper has at least a certain number of bids. The main objective of ensuring a minimum number
of bids on each paper is to improve review quality for all papers (Shah et al., 2018b). The well-documented primacy
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effect (Murphy et al., 2006) suggests that papers shown on top of the ordering are the ones on which reviewers are
more likely to bid. Consequently, this objective strongly suggests that papers with few bids should be placed higher in
the list. Indeed, Cabanac and Preuss (2013) make the following remark:
“It is advised to counterbalance order effects during the bidding phase of peer review by promoting the
submissions with fewer bids to potential referees. This manipulation intends to better share bids out
among submissions in order to attract qualified referees for all submissions. ”
With regard to goal (ii), the platform aims to display ‘well-matched’ papers to each reviewer. That is, the set of
papers to be displayed is composed of papers on which the reviewer is most likely to bid. There are several reasons
to select well-matched papers. It is generally assumed that reviewers are more likely to place bids on papers they are
qualified to review (Rodriguez et al., 2007). Furthermore, reviewers that place positive bids on papers are more likely
to give a review with high confidence and voice sharp opinions of acceptance or rejection that help guide final decisions
on papers (Cabanac and Preuss, 2013). A number of comprehensive surveys also indicate that a primary motivation of
reviewers is the ability to help and contribute to the work of colleagues (Mulligan et al., 2013; Ware, 2008). Failing
to display relevant papers to reviewers can result in several unintended negative consequences. If irrelevant papers are
shown early in the order to a reviewer, it may cause the reviewer to opt-out and disengage with the system even if
further down the list there was an option that they would have happily bid on. Similarly, a poorly selected ordering
may result in significantly fewer bids from a reviewer.
Competing objectives of this form are not unique to peer review systems and they appear in a number of applica-
tions. A fitting example is an intermediary between distinct user groups that seeks to facilitate interactions and satisfy
each party. For example, in online labor markets, the platform must ensure each job obtains a sufficient number of
applicants and that workers are presented with tasks they are qualified enough for to be considered. Similarly, in online
e-commerce marketplaces, as the platform decides how to show products to users, there is a definite trade-off between
satisfying merchants offering products that need to be sold and users that want to be shown relevant items. In this
paper, we maintain peer review as a running example and comment further on relevant applications of our work in a
concluding discussion section.
In peer review, it is recognized that actively engaging reviewers in the paper assignment process via bidding can
greatly improve the review process. If administered inadequately, bidding can in fact have a significant negative impact
on the quality of the review process. In the words of Rodriguez et al. (2007),
“Since bidding is the preliminary component of the manuscript-to-referee matching algorithm, sloppy
bidding can have dramatic effects on which referees actually review which submissions.”
A study on the 2016 Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS) conference revealed the distribution of bids
arising from a typical bidding process leaves significant challenges to match papers with reviewers (Shah et al., 2018b).
It was observed that a considerable number of reviewers do not place a sufficient number of bids and papers commonly
fail to obtain as many bids as the number of reviewers needed. This phenomenon is detailed in Shah et al. (2018b)
amongst the 3,200 reviewers and 2,400 papers.
“Moreover, there are 148 reviewers with no (positive or negative) bids and 1201 reviewers with at most
2 positive bids... We thus observe that a large number of reviewers do not even provide positive bids
amounting to the number of papers they would review. As a consequence of the low number of bids by
reviewers, we are left with 278 papers with at most 2 positive bids and 816 papers with at most 5 positive
bids... There is thus a significant fraction of papers with fewer positive bids than the number of requisite
reviewers.”
The study also found that there were 1090 papers with no positive bids from the area chairs. The inability to elicit
meaningful bidding information in NeurIPS is far from an aberration. In a study of the 2005 Joint Conference on
Digital Libraries, 146 out of the 264 submissions did not obtain any bids (Rodriguez et al., 2007). The shortfalls
of existing bidding systems shift the onus of the reviewing assignments away from the participants and to the paper
matching mechanisms.
Despite the importance of the bidding process in peer review, there is not yet much fundamental research on
the problem of optimizing the display order during the bidding process, and much less so in consideration of the
two objectives identified in this paper. In practice, the display order is typically determined via heuristics such as a
fixed ordering (e.g., order of submission), or in decreasing order of the relevance of the papers to that reviewer, or in
increasing order of the number of bids received by the paper until then.
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A key reason that bidding can fail is that papers are suboptimally displayed to the reviewers. Consider a paper that
is not an ideal match for any reviewer in the system. If papers are ranked for display simply by how well-matched
they are to reviewers, this particular paper may be shown far down in the ranking for each reviewer and hence, not
receive many, if any, bids. The risk of this scenario is elevated for interdisciplinary research, which is know to face
significant impediments as a consequence of the lack of ideally matched peers (Travis and Collins, 1991; Porter and
Rossini, 1985).
On the other hand, if papers are inversely ranked by the number of bids they have obtained, then papers with fewer
bids are more likely to be shown higher on the list regardless of how well-matched they are to any particular reviewer.
This display order may cause reviewer dissatisfaction, which in the worst case could result in zero bids. Similarly,
ordering heuristics that are based on a fixed baseline may lead to bias in the review process. Indeed, in the report
of a study of 42 peer-reviewed conferences in Computer Science, it was observed that under a fixed ordering (based
on the submission time), the number of bids on papers is heavily influenced by the order of submission times of the
papers (Cabanac and Preuss, 2013). It was concluded that the later the paper is submitted, the fewer bids it will receive.
Given the flaws of existing peer review bidding systems, we study the important problem of selecting the ordering
of papers to display to each arriving reviewer in a principled manner.
1.1 Our contributions
The key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
Problem identification and formulation (Section 2). The bidding process is highly consequential, yet one of the
most understudied components of the conference peer-review process. We identify a key source of unfairness and
inefficiency in the bidding process, and develop principled methods to address it. A key challenge is suitably for-
malizing the peer review bidding process, for which to the best of our knowledge there are no prior formulations.
We formulate an objective function that captures the competing goals of the platform while reflecting the underlying
decision-making process of reviewers. The framework developed in this paper to analyze the problem is an important
step toward future improvements on bidding systems.
Algorithm design (Section 3). We present a sequential decision-making algorithm called SUPER∗ to address this
problem. The algorithm takes as input the “similarities” between each reviewer-paper pair and the bids made by all
past reviewers, and outputs the ordering of papers to show to any current reviewer.
Theoretical results (Section 4). We show two sets of theoretical results. We first consider a notion of ‘local’ per-
formance: the performance with respect to a single reviewer. We prove that SUPER∗ is locally optimal whereas all
popular baselines are considerably suboptimal. Our second set of theoretical results are based on a community model,
where we prove that SUPER∗ is near-optimal (globally) and all popular baselines are considerably suboptimal.
Experiments on real and synthetic data (Section 5). We run extensive experiments using similarity scores from
ICLR 2018 and on synthetic data. The experiments reveal that the SUPER∗ algorithm outperforms all popular base-
lines. For instance, it consistently reduces the number of papers with fewer than requisite bids by 50-75% while
maintaining individual reviewer satisfaction. In addition, we see that SUPER∗ is very robust to model mismatches and
complexities of the real-world review process.
The code for the algorithm is available at github.com/fiezt/Peer-Review-Bidding.
1.2 Related Work
The paper ordering problem for the bidding process in peer review bears a strong resemblance to the learning to rank
problem (Singh and Joachims, 2019; Yadav et al., 2019; Svore et al., 2011; Momma et al., 2019; Aslanyan and Porwal,
2019; Cao et al., 2007). Typically, the goal of learning to rank is to learn an overall ranking of items via supervised
methods or by querying users, where the latter provides further information on the relative ranking of items. In peer
review, the objective of finding a ranking most suitable for an arriving reviewer during the bidding process is analogous
to learning to rank methods that consider the utility of rankings for users along with the impact on the items being
ranked (Singh and Joachims, 2019; Yadav et al., 2019). Moreover, the bidding model considered in this work is
motivated from that which is commonly adopted in learning to rank models (Aslanyan and Porwal, 2019).
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As formulated in this paper, the goal for the design of the bidding process in peer review is to optimize for multiple
criteria reflecting the objectives of the reviewers and the papers, respectively. This is not unlike the methods of Singh
and Joachims (2019) and Yadav et al. (2019), which consider a fairness objective in combination with a ranking quality
objective, or the multi-objective learning to rank problems studied by Svore et al. (2011) and Momma et al. (2019).
In the works of Singh and Joachims (2019) and Yadav et al. (2019), the objective of ensuring fairness is encoded as
a constraint in the optimization problems. Similarly, Svore et al. (2011) optimize a linear combination of ranking
measures referred to as a ‘graded measure’ and Momma et al. (2019) convert a constrained optimization problem into
an unconstrained problem by penalizing constraint violations in the objective. In each of the aforementioned works,
the ranking measures are separable in the arriving users, meaning that the contribution of any individual user to the
overall objective is independent of the other users.
The problem of paper ordering in peer review given multiple objectives is also abstractly similar to online rec-
ommendation systems similarly facing competing objectives (Rodriguez et al., 2012; Agarwal et al., 2011; Jambor
and Wang, 2010). However, a prevailing approach is to convert the multi-objective problem to a constrained opti-
mization problem (Rodriguez et al., 2012; Jambor and Wang, 2010). Both the approach of incorporating objectives
as constraints in the optimization problem formulations and combining objectives in a linear fashion is considered
by Agarwal et al. (2011). Analogous to the learning to rank problem, the objectives are separable in the users.
The objective in the peer review problem as formulated in this paper presents unique challenges not addressed in
the aforementioned works on learning to rank and recommendation systems. Notably, it is not separable between the
reviewers since it depends on the number of bids on each paper after each reviewer has arrived and placed bids on the
papers. Being applicable to more general multi-criteria settings, our approach to the design of the bidding processes
in peer review may also be applied to the learning to rank problem. This is a direction worthy of further study.
Our work also contributes to a growing literature on improving various aspects of the peer review process such as
reviewer assignment (Charlin and Zemel, 2013; Garg et al., 2010; Lian et al., 2018; Stelmakh et al., 2019b; Kobren
et al., 2019), biases (Tomkins et al., 2017; Stelmakh et al., 2019a), subjectivity (Noothigattu et al., 2018), miscali-
bration (Roos et al., 2012; Wang and Shah, 2019), strategic behavior (Aziz et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2019), and oth-
ers (Church, 2005; Wing, 2011; Lawrence and Cortes, 2014; Shah et al., 2018a; Kang et al., 2018; Jecmen et al., 2020;
Ding et al., 2020; Stelmakh et al., 2020a,b). The present paper addresses the bidding process in conference peer re-
view, which has largely been unexplored in past literature. The concurrent work of Meir et al. (2020), which appeared
after an initial workshop version of our work (Fiez et al., 2019), is the only work besides our own that we are aware of
to focus on methods for improving bidding in peer review. However, their approach is to design a market for bidding,
which is entirely different from ours.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider d ≥ 2 papers and n ≥ 2 reviewers indexed as {1, . . . , d} and {1, . . . , n} respectively.1 For each reviewer-
paper pair, we have access to a similarity score that captures the similarity between the reviewer and the paper. We
use the notation Si,j ∈ [0, 1] to denote the given similarity between any reviewer i ∈ [n] and paper j ∈ [d]. A higher
similarity score indicates a greater relevance of the paper to that reviewer. There are several systems in use today that
compute similarities (Price et al., 2010; Charlin and Zemel, 2013), and in our work, we treat them as being given.
In the bidding period, reviewers sequentially arrive into the system and place bids on the papers. In our work, for
any reviewer and paper, we only consider the existence of a bid or not, and do not consider the possibility of multiple
bidding options. We assume for simplicity that all n reviewers arrive exactly once, and that a reviewer arrives after the
previous reviewer has completed their bidding.2 We do not make any assumptions on the arrival order of the reviewers.
The problem is to determine the ordering of papers to show each reviewer on arrival in the interest of influencing the
papers they decide to bid on while ensuring individual satisfaction. When deciding the paper ordering for any reviewer,
the bids made by all reviewers who arrived in the past along with the paper orderings presented to them are known, but
the bids made by the current or future reviewers are unknown. Let Πd denote the set of all possible d! permutations
of the d papers. In what follows, for any reviewer i ∈ [n], we let pii ∈ Πd denote the ordering (permutation) of the
papers shown to reviewer i. We also use the notation pii(j) to denote the position of paper j ∈ [d] in the ordering pii.
Gain function (objective). Any algorithm to determine the ordering of papers must trade-off between two competing
objectives: ensuring each paper receives a sufficient number of bids and ensuring each reviewer gets to see relevant
1Henceforth, for any positive integer κ, we will use the standard shorthand [κ] to denote the set {1, . . . , κ}.
2However, in Section 5.1, we show that our algorithm is empirically robust to violations of these assumptions.
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papers early in the ordering. A combination of the objectives comprise our “gain function,” which is the objective we
aim to optimize. We begin by discussing each objective component.
Paper-side gain: The paper-side gain is associated with a given function γp : R≥0 → R≥0. At the end of the
entire bidding process, the paper-side gain Gp is
Gp =
∑
j∈[d]
γp(gj),
where gj is the number of bids received by paper j ∈ [d]. We assume the function γp is non-decreasing and concave.
The non-decreasing property represents an improved gain if there are more bids, and the concavity property captures
diminishing returns.3 An example of a choice for the paper-side gain is the square-root function γp(x) =
√
x. This
function is increasing, smooth, and captures the diminishing returns property. The reader may keep this function in
mind as a running example for concreteness. A second example is γp(x) = min{x, r} for a given parameter r ≥ 1,
which emphasizes having at least r bids per paper.
Reviewer-side gain: This objective captures the desideratum that the reviewers should be shown papers with
high relevance early in the paper ordering. The reviewer-side gain is associated with some predetermined function
γr : [d]× [0, 1]→ R≥0. Given this function, the reviewer-side gain Gr is defined as:
Gr =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j).
The function γr is assumed to be non-increasing in the position (its first argument) and non-decreasing in the similarity
(its second argument). One example choice of this function, which the reader may choose to keep in mind as a running
example, is the Discounted Cumulative Gain or DCG used commonly in data mining (Ja¨rvelin and Keka¨la¨inen, 2000).
In our setting, the function is given by
γr(pii(j), Si,j) =
2Si,j − 1
log2(pii(j) + 1)
, (1)
where we have set the “relevance” parameter in DCG to be the similarity Si,j .
Overall gain function: Finally, we assume there is a trade-off parameter λ ≥ 0, chosen by the program chairs,
which trades off between these two objectives so that the overall gain function is given by
G = Gp + λGr. (2)
The goal is to determine the orderings of papers to show each reviewer to maximize the expected overall gain, E
[G],
where the expectation is taken over the randomness in the bids made by the reviewers (see reviewer bidding model
below) and any randomness in the algorithm.4
Reviewer bidding model. An important aspect of any system that displays a list to users is the presence of primacy
effects. In the context of our problem, the primacy effect means a reviewer is more likely to bid on a paper shown
at the top of the list rather than later (Murphy et al., 2006). A second aspect of bidding is that a reviewer is more
likely to bid on papers with greater similarity, although the reviewer may not bid on exactly the papers with the highest
similarity since the similarities are noisy representations of their reviewing interests.
Thus in order to model reviewer bidding, we revert to literature on position-based click models that have a nearly
identical setting (where clicks are analogous to our bids). We model the bidding via a given function f : [d] ×
[0, 1] → [0, 1], where f(pii(j), Si,j) is non-increasing in the position that a paper is shown (the first argument) and
non-decreasing in the similarity score (the second argument). Any reviewer i ∈ [n] bids on paper j ∈ [d] independently
with probability
pi,j = f(pii(j), Si,j).
3Our algorithm easily adapts to paper-side gains that may also be a function of the similarity scores of the reviewers who bid; for example, a
higher gain for bids from expert reviewers. We omit this detail for sake of brevity.
4For the pedantic reader, a (deterministic) algorithm is a mapping from [0, 1]n×d× ([n]× 2[n] × {0, . . . , n}d)n to (Πd)n. In this representa-
tion, the first input argument is the similarity matrix. The second argument represents, for each of the arriving reviewers, the identity of the current
reviewer, the identities of the past reviewers, and the number of bids so far for each paper. The output space is simply an ordering of the d papers
for each reviewer. A stochastic algorithm outputs a probability distribution over the output space.
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As a running example throughout the paper, note that in position-based click models, the click probability decomposes
into a product of relevance and position bias (Chuklin et al., 2015). Moreover, the literature considers the click
probability to decay logarithmically as a function of the position (Aslanyan and Porwal, 2019). The translation of
these models into our setting gives rise to the example bidding function
f(pii(j), Si,j) =
Si,j
log2(pii(j) + 1)
. (3)
Baselines. We consider the following three methods of ordering papers as baselines.
Random baseline (RAND): A commonplace practice (Cabanac and Preuss, 2013) is to show papers to reviewers
in some fixed order, such as in order of submission of the papers. As a baseline, we consider a better variant of this
practice, in which each reviewer is shown an independently and randomly selected paper ordering.
Similarity baseline (SIM): A second common practice, followed in several conference management systems
today, is to order the papers according to their similarities. In other words, any reviewer i ∈ [n] is shown the papers in
order of the values in {Si,j}j∈[d] (where the paper with maximum similarity is shown at the top, and so on). Any ties
are broken by showing papers with fewer bids higher, and further ties are broken uniformly at random.
Bid baseline (BID): A third baseline shows papers to greedily optimize the minimum bid count. Each reviewer is
shown papers in increasing order of the number of bids received so far (from the reviewers who arrived previously).
Any ties are broken in favor of the paper with a higher similarity, and further ties are broken uniformly at random.
3 Algorithm
The key challenge in designing a suitable algorithm for the problem at hand stems from the fact that the paper-side gain
is coupled (non-separable) across the orderings of papers presented to all reviewers so the impact of each individual
paper ordering cannot be fully realized until the entire bidding process is complete. Conversely, the reviewer-side gain
is decoupled (separable) across reviewers. This means the reviewer-side gain that can be obtained from any given
reviewer is independent of the ordering of papers presented to any other reviewer. Thus, an algorithm for this problem
is required to make local decisions, where the effect of the decision on the global gain (or cost) is only partially known.
This perspective is reminiscent of the classical A∗ algorithm (Hart et al., 1968), and using A∗ as an inspiration, we
now present an algorithm which we call SUPER∗ for our problem5.
The A∗ algorithm operates with a goal of finding the minimum cost path between a pair of vertices in a cost-
weighted graph. For any node in consideration, it considers two functions: a function which captures the cost so far
and a second function—called the “heuristic”—which captures some estimate of the cost from the current node to
the destination. The A∗ algorithm then finds a path based on these two functions. Before moving to a description of
SUPER∗, we discuss such a heuristic in the context of the problem at hand.
3.1 Heuristic for Future Bids
In a manner analogous to the A∗ algorithm, at any point in time SUPER∗ keeps track of the gains so far and also takes
as input a heuristic that captures the “unseen” events. The heuristic in A∗ provides, for every vertex in the given graph,
an estimate of the cost incurred in the future. Analogously, the heuristic in SUPER∗ provides, for every arrival of a
reviewer, an estimate of the number of bids each paper will receive in the future. Formally, let us index the reviewers
as i ∈ [n] in the order of arrival (note that this order is unknown a priori). The heuristic comprises a collection of
vectors {h1, . . . , hn}, where each hi ∈ [0, n − i]d represents an estimate of the number of bids each of the d papers
will receive from all future reviewers {i + 1, . . . , n}. The vector hi is provided to the SUPER∗ algorithm on arrival
of the ith reviewer. Two examples of heuristic functions that we consider in the subsequent narrative are described as
follows.
• Zero heuristic: hi = 0 for every i ∈ [n].
• Mean heuristic: This function computes the expected number of bids each paper will receive if the permu-
tations shown to all future reviewers are chosen independently and uniformly at random. Formally: hi,j =
1
d
∑n
i′=i+1
∑
j′∈[d] f(j
′, Si′,j) ∀ i ∈ [n− 1], j ∈ [d].
5The name SUPER∗ stands for SUperior PERmutations and also indicates the inspiration from A∗.
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We set hn = 0 for any heuristic, implying there are no bids placed after the last reviewer. This is analogous to setting
the heuristic value to zero for the target vertex in the A∗ algorithm.
3.2 Intuition Behind the Algorithm
We first provide some intuition about the SUPER∗ algorithm, and subsequently present a formal description. Since a
primary impediment to designing an algorithm is the inability to fully realize the impact of a paper ordering on the
paper-side gain until the end of the bidding process, we begin by considering the scenario where (n − 1) reviewers
have already departed, and the problem is to determine the ordering of papers to show the final reviewer. In this
scenario, we have access to the bids of all (n − 1) reviewers that have already arrived and the orderings of papers
presented to them. We use the notation gn−1,j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} to denote the number of bids received by any paper
j ∈ [d] at the time of arrival of the last reviewer. The values {gn−1,1, . . . , gn−1,d} are thus known at the time when the
final reviewer arrives. As a result, we can formulate an optimization problem for the final reviewer n to maximize the
expected gain from (2) in the following manner. For every j ∈ [d], let Bn,j denote a Bernoulli random variable with
mean pi,j = f(pin(j), Sn,j), independent of all else. The random variable Bn,j represents the bid of the final reviewer
on paper j ∈ [d]. The optimization problem can be written as
max
pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gn−1,j + Bn,j)] + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pin(j), Sn,j), (4)
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of the random variables Bn,1, . . . ,Bn,d.
Observe that the constraint set for the optimization problem in (4) is the set Πd of all permutations. This set is, in
general, not very well behaved (Ailon et al., 2008; Shah et al., 2016), which makes even this one-step optimization a
challenge. As we discuss later in the formal algorithm description along with Theorem 1 and its proof, SUPER∗ for the
final reviewer optimally solves (4) and it is computationally efficient manner (see Proposition 1 in Appendix B.1). The
aforementioned subproblem forms the starting point for the SUPER∗ algorithm. Now that we know to handle a single
(last) reviewer in an optimal fashion, we now describe the SUPER∗ algorithm for a general reviewer, say, i ∈ [n].
When reviewer i arrives, we have access to the number of bids made by all past reviewers on any paper j ∈ [d], which
we denote by gi−1,j ∈ {0, . . . , i− 1}.
We now recall the A∗ algorithm: for any vertex, A∗ considers the cost “g” so far and a heuristic estimate “h” of
the subsequent cost. Then, considering the cost of any vertex as “g + h”, the A∗ algorithm takes the one-step optimal
action given by selecting the neighboring vertex with the smallest value of “g+ h”. In an analogous fashion, SUPER∗
considers the number of bids so far (gi−1) and takes as input a heuristic (hi) for the number of bids in the future. Then,
considering the number of bids from all other reviewers as “gi−1 + hi”, the SUPER∗ algorithm takes the action which
is the one-step optimal action. In other words, SUPER∗ solves for each paper ordering using:
max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gi−1,j + hi,j + Bi,j)] + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j), (5)
where Bi,j is a Bernoulli random variable with mean pi,j = f(pii(j), Si,j) and is independent of all else. As for the
final reviewer, SUPER∗ solves this problem in an efficient manner for any arbitrary reviewer (see Proposition 1 in
Appendix B.1).
3.3 Formal Algorithm Description
The SUPER∗ algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. To determine a paper ordering to show any reviewer, SUPER∗
calls a procedure to efficiently solve (5). We give a general method in Algorithm 2 and a faster method in Algorithm 3
that is applicable for a special class of reviewer-side gain and bidding functions.
General version. In the general version of SUPER∗, Algorithm 2 is called to return a paper ordering that is a
solution to (5) each time a reviewer arrives. In the proof of Theorem 1, we show that the optimization problem over
the set of permutations given in (4) to find the optimal paper ordering for the final reviewer can be reformulated as
an integer linear programming problem with a totally unimodular constraint set. The totally unimodular property of
the constraint set guarantees that the solution of a relaxed linear program is in fact the integer optimal solution. The
application of this reduction from an optimization problem over permutations to a linear programming problem for any
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Algorithm 1: SUPER∗
Input: γp : R≥0 → R≥0, paper-side gain function
γr : [d]× [0, 1]→ R≥0, reviewer-side gain function
f : [d]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1], bidding model
λ ≥ 0, trade-off parameter
S ∈ [0, 1]n×d, similarity matrix.
Algorithm:
1. Initialize bids on each paper to zero: g0 ← 0d
2. For each reviewer arrival i ∈ [n]
(a) Compute or input heuristic hi ∈ [0, n− i]d
(b) pii ← FindPaperOrder
(c) Present papers in the order pii and observe bids bi ∈ {0, 1}d
(d) Update paper bid counts: gi = gi−1 + bi
Algorithm 2: FindPaperOrder
1. Compute weight matrix w ∈ Rd×d such that
wj,k = λγr(k, Si,j) + f(k, Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + hi,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j + hi,j)) ∀ j ∈ [d], k ∈ [d]
2. Solve linear program to obtain x∗ ∈ Rd×d:
x∗ ∈ arg max
x∈[0,1]d×d
∑
j∈[d]
∑
k∈[d]
wj,kxj,k
s.t.
∑
k∈[d]
xj,k = 1 ∀ j ∈ [d],
∑
j∈[d]
xj,k = 1 ∀ k ∈ [d]
with ties broken arbitrarily between the set of maximizing solutions
3. pii(j) = k such that x∗j,k = 1 for each j ∈ [d]
Output: pii
Algorithm 3: FindPaperOrderEfficient
1. Compute weights for each j ∈ [d]:
αi,j = f
S(Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + hi,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j + hi,j)) + λγSr (Si,j)
2. pii = σ(αi), where σ : Rd → [d]d returns the rank from maximum to minimum of each input in place and
breaks ties arbitrarily.
Output: pii
given reviewer forms the technique given in Algorithm 2 to efficiently obtain a solution to (5). Finally, the per-reviewer
time complexity of the general version of SUPER∗ given the evaluations of the heuristic is O(d3) (see Proposition 1
in Appendix B.1) as a consequence of the call to solve a linear assignment problem in Algorithm 2.
Faster specialized version. Given a bidding model that can be decomposed as f(pii(j), Si,j) = fS(Si,j)fpi(pii(j))
where fS : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is non-decreasing and fpi : [d] → [0, 1] is non-increasing, along with a reviewer-side gain
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function that can be decomposed as γr(pii(j), Si,j) = γSr (Si,j)f
pi(pii(j)) where γSr : [0, 1]→ R≥0 is non-decreasing,
SUPER∗ calls Algorithm 3 to return a paper ordering that is a solution to (5) each time a reviewer arrives. In the proof
of Proposition 1 in Appendix B.1, we show for this model class that the problem from (4) to find the optimal paper
ordering for the final reviewer after evaluating the expectation can be reformulated as
max
pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
αn,jf
pi(pin(j)) (6)
for some non-negative weights {αn,j}j∈[d]. The problem in (6) admits a simple solution: fpi is non-increasing on the
domain, so the objective is maximized by presenting papers in decreasing order of the weights {αn,j}j∈[d]. Obtaining
this solution only requires sorting the weights, which has a time complexity of O(d log(d)). The application of this
problem reformulation for the given model class and any reviewer forms the technique given in Algorithm 3 to obtain
a solution to (5).
Before moving on to present our theoretical results, we comment on the relevance of this model class. Importantly,
the DCG reviewer-side gain function and bidding model f(Si,j , pii(j)) = Si,j/ log2(pii(j) + 1), which we have men-
tioned as running examples that can be kept in mind, satisfy the decomposition for which SUPER∗ is computationally
efficient. This choice of functions is standard in the past literature on ranking models and click behavior (Ja¨rvelin and
Keka¨la¨inen, 2000; Aslanyan and Porwal, 2019), meaning that the time complexity result for this model class is quite
relevant.
4 Theoretical Results
We now present the main theoretical results of this paper. Complete proofs of all results are in Appendix A.
4.1 Local Optimality
The property of local optimality, as the name suggests, means that the algorithm is optimal with respect to the reviewer
under consideration. Achieving even a good local performance in a computationally efficient manner is challenging
due to the optimization over permutations in (4). The following results show that SUPER∗, which is computationally
efficient, is locally optimal.
The result is first presented in terms of the final reviewer for simplicity and extended to a general reviewer sub-
sequently. In the following theorem, since we consider only the final reviewer, note that the heuristic for SUPER∗ is
irrelevant because the heuristic value for the final reviewer is always set to zero.
Theorem 1. Given any history of paper orderings and bids from reviewers that arrived previously, the paper ordering
given by SUPER∗ to the final reviewer maximizes the expected gain conditioned on the history.
In other words, the expected amount by which the gain is increased from the final reviewer is maximized. To
generalize the previous result to a local optimality result for any reviewer, let the immediate gain from a reviewer be
defined as the difference between the gain after and before the reviewer arrived.
Corollary 1. Given any history of paper orderings and bids from reviewers that arrived previously, the paper ordering
given to any reviewer by SUPER∗ with zero heuristic maximizes the expected immediate gain from that reviewer
conditioned on the history.
The property of local optimality also implies optimality of SUPER∗ (with any heuristic) when the paper-side gain
function is linear. We refer the reader to Appendix B.2 for more details.
We now show that an analogous statement cannot be made regarding the other baseline methods. In fact, in contrast
to SUPER∗, all the popular baselines are considerably suboptimal.
Theorem 2. Consider a model with the paper-side gain function γp(gj) =
√
gj , the reviewer-side gain function
γr(pii(j), Si,j) = (2
Si,j −1)/ log2(pii(j) + 1), and the bidding function f(pii(j), Si,j) = Si,j/ log2(pii(j) + 1). There
exists a constant c > 0 such that for every d ≥ 2 and λ ≥ 0, in the worst case for the final reviewer:
(a) SIM is suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cd/ log22(d);
(b) BID is suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cdmax{1, λ}/ log22(d);
(c) RAND is suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cdmax{1, λ}/ log22(d).
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Theorems 1 and 2 in tandem show that SUPER∗ not only is locally optimal but can outperform currently popular
algorithms by a wide margin.
4.2 Global Optimality Under a Community Model
We now transition to consider the global performance of the algorithms. Given our focus on the application of peer
review, we are motivated to give guarantees on the performance of SUPER∗ for similarity matrix classes that would be
encountered in a real conference.
A common characteristic of networks is community structure (Newman and Girvan, 2004; Porter et al., 2009),
where nodes can be grouped into clusters and links between groups are not as common. This phenomena has been
documented in social and biological networks among others (Girvan and Newman, 2002). Pertinent to this work,
empirical investigations have revealed community structures in scientific collaboration networks (Newman, 2001).
Given this close connection, and the fact that scientific research is highly specialized, it is intuitive that communities
exist in major conferences pertaining to different subtopics.
We explore the possible existence of such structure in the ICLR 2018 similarity matrix that was reconstructed by Xu
et al. (2019) and is of size n = 2435 and d = 935. Recall that the ICLR similarity matrix is of size (2435× 935). To
begin, we investigate the spectral properties of the similarity matrix from ICLR 2018, and in particular, whether it is
low rank. We plot the singular values of the similarity matrix in Figure 1a, where the (heuristic) elbow method suggests
a low rank (≈ 10). In Figure 1b we plot the entries of the similarity matrix after permuting its rows and columns
according to the spectral co-clustering algorithm (Dhillon, 2001). The result suggests the ICLR 2018 similarity matrix
exhibits some characteristics of a noisy block diagonal structure.
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Figure 1: (a) The 50 singular values (excluding the maximum singular value) of ICLR 2018 similarity matrix, which shows
low-rank structure. (b) Similarity scores of the permuted ICLR matrix as a heatmap indicating the block diagonal structure.
In what follows, we now perform an associated theoretical analysis of the algorithms under such community
structures of the similarity matrix. We begin by proposing a simple model which we call the ‘noiseless community
model’.
Noiseless community model. Informally, the noiseless community model we study is a set of similarity matrices
that up to a permutation of rows and columns belong to a subclass of block diagonal matrices. Formally, let 0q×q and
1q×q denote q × q matrices of all zeros and all ones respectively. Define an mq ×mq block diagonal matrix B as:
B =

1q×q 0q×q · · · 0q×q
0q×q 1q×q · · · 0q×q
...
...
. . .
...
0q×q 0q×q · · · 1q×q
 .
Finally, denote by Pmq×mq the set of all mq ×mq permutation matrices. Recall that a permutation matrix is a matrix
obtained by permuting the rows of an identity matrix. Also recall that left multiplying a matrix by a permutation matrix
permutes the rows of the matrix and right multiplying a matrix by a permutation matrix permutes the columns of the
matrix. With this background, the noiseless community model is defined as the following set of similarity matrices for
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m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2:
Noiseless Community Model = {S ∈ Rmq×mq : S = P (sB)P˜ , s ∈ [0.01, 1], P, P˜ ∈ Pmq×mq}. (7)
The number of reviewers is given by n = mq and the number of papers is by d = mq. In words, this is the set of all
similarity matrices obtained via a permutation of the rows and columns of the block matrix B.
We begin our theoretical results for this section by showing that under the noiseless community formulation, both
SUPER∗ and SIM are optimal, whereas BID and RAND fare poorly.
Theorem 3. Consider a model with a paper-side gain function γp(gj) =
√
gj , the reviewer-side gain function
γr(pii(j), Si,j) = (2
Si,j−1)/ log2(pii(j)+1), and the bidding function f(pii(j), Si,j) = 1{pii(j) = 1}1{Si,j > s/2}.
Then, under the noiseless community model from (7), for all m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2 and λ ≥ 0:
(a) SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is optimal;
(b) SIM is optimal.
In contrast, there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2 and λ ≥ 0:
(c) BID is suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cλmq/ log22(mq);
(d) RAND is suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cmq.
Although SIM is optimal in the noiseless community model, this optimality turns out to be quite brittle. As we
show below, even an infinitesimally small amount of noise makes SIM considerably suboptimal. In contrast, SUPER∗
is robust enough and suffers by only a small amount.
Noisy community model. More formally, we first define a ‘noisy community model’. Under this model, we assume
that the similarity matrix is generated by first selecting any similarity matrix S′ from the noiseless community model
defined in (7), and then adding noise to its entries as:
Si,j =
{
s− νi,j if S′i,j = s
νi,j if S′i,j = 0,
(8)
where νi,j is drawn independently and uniformly from (0, ξ) for each reviewer-paper pair, for some small value ξ to
be defined subsequently.
The next result shows that even under an arbitrarily small perturbation ξ from a noiseless community model, the
baselines become significantly suboptimal. In contrast, SUPER∗ is robust to the noise and is near-optimal.
Theorem 4. Consider the gain and bidding functions from Theorem 3 and the noisy community model given in (8)
with any noise bound satisfying ξ ≤ (1 + λ)−1e−emq . Then, for all m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0:
(a) SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is within at least an additive factor of 0.0001 of the optimal.
Moreover, there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, with respect to SUPER∗ with
zero heuristic:
(b) SIM is suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cmq;
(c) BID is suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cλmq/ log22(mq);
(d) RAND is suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cmq.
This result thus establishes the global optimality of the proposed SUPER∗ algorithm under the community model,
while in contrast all popular baselines are considerably suboptimal.
5 Experimental Results
We now empirically evaluate SUPER∗ (with zero and mean heuristics) and compare it with the baselines SIM, BID,
and RAND (discussed earlier in Section 2). The experimentation methodology is as follows for any chosen set of model
parameters including the gain functions, bidding probability, trade-off parameter, and number of reviewers and papers.
Given a fixed similarity matrix, we shuffle the rows of the matrix to randomize the sequence of reviewer arrivals
and simulate each of the algorithms. Then, for each algorithm, we record the gain along with the number of papers
that end up with bid counts in the intervals {0, 1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {6, 7, 8}, and {9+}. We repeat this process 20 times
for a given similarity matrix if it is fixed and draw a similarity matrix at random for each run if the score structure
being simulated is a distribution. To evaluate performance, we show the means of the relative gains (additive gains
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Figure 2: ICLR experiment with the default model configuration.
relative to the gain of a baseline) across the runs and include error bars representing the standard error of the mean.
Moreover, we present the mean number of papers across the repeated simulations that finish with bid counts in each
of the previously given bid count intervals. The code and data to reproduce each of the experiments is available at
github.com/fiezt/Peer-Review-Bidding.
5.1 ICLR Similarity Matrix
To begin our experiments, we perform evaluations on a similarity matrix from the ICLR 2018 conference discussed
earlier in Section 4. Recall that the similarity matrix consists of n = 2435 reviewers and d = 935 papers. In
the following experiments, we run a simulation using a default model configuration, then we explore the impact of
changing components of the model, and we finish by exploring the robustness of the algorithm to various real-world
complexities.
Default model configuration. We begin by evaluating a default model configuration that is considered throughout
the the remainder of the experiments unless otherwise specified. The model consists of the paper-side gain function
γp(gj) = min{gj , 6}, the reviewer-side gain function γr(pii(j), Si,j) = (2Si,j − 1)/ log2(pii(j) + 1), and the bidding
probability model f(pii(j), Si,j) = Si,j/ log2(pii(j) + 1). We remark that the paper-side gain function is a natural
choice given that conferences often assign three reviewers to each paper and as such they may seek twice the number
of bids per paper. Moreover, recall that for this pair of reviewer-side gain and bidding functions, the efficient routine
in Algorithm 3 can be called in place of Algorithm 2 in SUPER∗ to retrieve a paper ordering, which is what we
implement.
The results of the experiment are presented in Figure 2. In Figures 2a–2b we compare SUPER∗ to each baseline
and in Figures 2c–2d we zoom in and only show the results for SUPER∗ and SIM. In terms of the gain results shown
in Figures 2a and 2c, each version of SUPER∗ outperforms the baseline algorithms, while BID outperforms SIM when
minimal weight λ is given to the reviewer-side gain and vice versa when a significant amount of weight λ is given to
the reviewer-side gain. In Figures 2b and 2d, the distribution of the bid counts obtained for the algorithms are shown
with λ = 0.8, which was chosen since this parameter choice gave nearly equal paper-side and weighted reviewer-side
gain for RAND. While BID has a similar number of papers with fewer than the minimum number of desired bids as
each version of SUPER∗, the gain demonstrates why it is not a generally adopted method. As a result of showing
papers of limited relevance early in the paper orderings to elicit bids on papers with few bids, the overall gain is
significantly smaller than SIM and SUPER∗ since the reviewer-side gain is worse. The distributions also illustrate that
both versions of SUPER∗ end the bidding process with approximately a 60% reduction of the number of papers with
fewer than the desired minimum number of bids compared to SIM and RAND.
Varying model parameters. We now consider variations of the default model consideration. In Figures 3a–3d,
results are shown when the paper-side gain function is changed from γp(gj) = min{gj , 6} to γp(gj) = √gj . In
Figures 3a–3b we compare SUPER∗ to each baseline and in Figures 3c–3d we zoom in and only show the results for
SUPER∗ and SIM. In Figures 3b and 3d, the distribution of the bid counts obtained for the algorithms are shown with
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Figure 3: ICLR 2018 experiment with variations of the default model configuration. In Figures 3a–3d, the paper-side gain function
is changed. In Figures 3e–3h, the reviewer-side gain and bidding function are changed.
λ = 0.4, which was chosen since this parameter choice gave nearly equal paper-side and weighted reviewer-side gain
for RAND. For this model configuration, BID and RAND are significantly suboptimal in terms of the gain. SUPER∗
with the mean heuristic outperforms SIM by a marginal amount in terms of the gain, while SIM outperforms SUPER∗
with the zero heuristic by a marginal amount in terms of the gain. The bid distributions show that each version of
SUPER∗ ends the bidding process with a smaller number of papers obtaining fewer than six bids compared to SIM.
Compared to the default paper-side gain function, the discrepancy is not as significant since SUPER∗ is optimizing an
objective that rewards getting more than five bids per paper even though the returns are diminishing.
In Figures 3a–3d, the default paper-side gain function is considered, but the reviewer-side gain function is changed
to γr(pii(j), Si,j) = (2Si,j − 1)/
√
pii(j) and the bidding function is changed to f(pii(j), Si,j) = Si,j/
√
pii(j). The
effect of this change is that the probability of obtaining a bid on a paper from a reviewer decays faster with the position
the paper is shown and similarly the reviewer-side gain from a paper diminishes faster as a function of the position the
paper is shown to a reviewer. In Figures 3e–3f we compare SUPER∗ to each baseline and in Figures 3g–3h we zoom
in and only show the results for SUPER∗ and SIM. In Figures 3f and 3h, the distribution of the bid counts obtained
for the algorithms are shown with λ = 1.2, which was chosen since this parameter choice gave nearly equal paper-
side and weighted reviewer-side gain for RAND. For this model configuration, each version of SUPER∗ significantly
outperforms each of the baselines in terms of the gain. The bid count distributions show SUPER∗ with zero and mean
heuristic reduce the number of papers with fewer than three bids by 35% and 60% compared to SIM, respectively.
Moreover, both versions of SUPER∗ end up with half as many papers obtaining fewer than six bids compared to BID.
Robustness to real-world complexities. The previous experiments were performed under settings faithful to the
model described earlier in Section 2. We now evaluate the robustness of SUPER∗ to the models by evaluating the
performance under various vagaries and complexities of real-world peer review. For this set of experiments, we
consider that SUPER∗ is optimizing the default model configuration described previously in this section. The results
of the following simulations that consider deviations from the model being optimized are given in Figure 4. For each
experiment we show the gains of each of the algorithms relative to RAND across a sweep of the parameter λ and the
bid count distributions for each of algorithms with λ = 0.8 as selected for the default model previously.
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Figure 4: ICLR 2018 experiments of robustness to real-world complexities.
We begin looking at model mismatch for the bidding function. In Figures 4a and 4e, the situation is considered
in which the actual bids are performed under the bidding function f(pii(j), Si,j) = Si,j/
√
pii(j), whereas SUPER∗
assumes f(pii(j), Si,j) = Si,j/ log2(pii(j) + 1). The results show each version of SUPER
∗ is robust to this deviation
and outperforms the baselines in terms of the gain. Moreover, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is especially robust since it is
not as dependent on the model of bids as SUPER∗ with mean heuristic. The bid count distributions show that SUPER∗
with mean heuristic reduces the number of papers with fewer than three bids by 85% relative to SIM, and SUPER∗
with zero heuristic reduces the number of papers with fewer than six bids by 50% compared to BID. In Figures 4b
and 4f, we consider that the probability of a reviewer bidding on a paper is actually given by f(pii(j), Si,j) = (Si,j +
N (0, σ2))/ log2(pii(j) + 1) where σ = 0.01 and we remark that the mean of the similarity scores is approximately
0.03 so the noise magnitude is not insignificant. We clip the noisy bid probabilities to guarantee that they remain in
the interval [0, 1]. We observe that SUPER∗ is again robust to this model mismatch and outperforms the baselines
in terms of the gain and each version ends up reducing the fewer the number of papers having below the minimum
desired number of bids by approximately 60% compared to SIM and RAND.
In practice, not all reviewers may participate in the bidding process. We consider that only three quarters of the
reviewers arrive, but this is unknown a priori to the algorithms. This proportion is roughly based on the number of
reviewers that were found to not place any positive bids during the NeurIPS 2016 review process (Shah et al., 2018b).
The results under this real-world complexity are shown in Figures 4c and 4g. Moreover, reviewers may not actually
arrive sequentially. Figures 4d and 4h consider the setting where Poisson(1) reviewers arrive at each time, and the
algorithm must present paper orderings to all these reviewers simultaneously. For this pair of real-world complexities,
SUPER∗ remains quite robust and generally performs favorably compared to the baselines in terms of both the gain
and the bid count distributions. It is worth noting that when not all reviewers arrive, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic
outperforms SUPER∗ with zero heuristic since it does attempt to account for bids that may come from reviewers that
have not arrived.
14
Homogeneous Low rank Community Interdisciplinary
250 500 750 1000
Number of reviewers and papers
0
500
1000
1500
R
el
at
iv
e
ga
in
(a)
250 500 750 1000
Number of reviewers and papers
0
200
400
600
R
el
at
iv
e
ga
in
(b)
250 500 750 1000
Number of reviewers and papers
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
R
el
at
iv
e
ga
in
(c)
250 500 750 1000
Number of reviewers and papers
0
200
400
600
800
R
el
at
iv
e
ga
in
(d)
{0,1,2} {3,4,5} {6,7,8} {9+}
Number of bids
0
100
200
300
400
500
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
ap
er
s
(e)
{0,1,2} {3,4,5} {6,7,8} {9+}
Number of bids
0
100
200
300
400
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
ap
er
s
(f)
{0,1,2} {3,4,5} {6,7,8} {9+}
Number of bids
0
100
200
300
400
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
ap
er
s
(g)
{0,1,2} {3,4,5} {6,7,8} {9+}
Number of bids
0
20
40
60
80
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
ap
er
s
(h)
Figure 5: Experiments on synthetic similarity scores under the default model configuration.
5.2 Synthetic Similarities
We perform several simulations on synthetic similarity scores comparing the algorithms as presented in Figure 5.
For this set of simulations, we consider the default model configuration from the previous section. Moreover, for
each similarity structure we let the number of reviewers and the number of papers (n, d) be among the set of pairs
{(250, 250), (500, 500), (750, 750), (1000, 1000)} and fix the trade-off parameter to be λ = 0.8 since this gave
roughly equal paper-side and weighted reviewer-side gains for RAND with n = d = 750.
Homogeneous similarity scores. We consider a synthetic similarity matrix structure where each entry is drawn
from at random from a Beta distribution with parameters α = 1 and β = 15. This distribution is highly skewed and
the expected value of a draw from it is 0.0625. The results of this experiment are given in Figures 5a and 5e. The
gain of SUPER∗ with each heuristic exceeds that of each of the baselines and similarly the bid count distributions
show SUPER∗ with each heuristic ends up with at least 50% fewer papers obtaining under the minimum desired by the
paper-side gain function compared to the baselines. We tried other homogeneous similarity structures and observed
similar trends throughout.
Low rank structure. We experimented with the following low rank structure to generate the similarity scores. The
similarity matrix is split into 10 groups of reviewers which correspond to a block of rows in the matrix. The similarity
scores for block ` ∈ {1, . . . , 10} are given by the rank-1 matrix u(v`)> where u is a n/10-dimensional vector of ones
and v` is a d-dimensional vector with each entry drawn at random from a Beta distribution with parameters α = `
and β = 60. This set of parameter choices for the distribution was made so that the scores were near the scale of the
ICLR similarity matrix and to create a disparity in similarity scores between the blocks. Combining the blocks forms a
similarity matrix of rank 10 where within each block the reviewers are identical and between the blocks the similarity
score distribution changes. The structure can be viewed as if there are 10 types of reviewers with varying levels of
relevance to the papers. The result of the experiment with this similarity matrix structure is shown in Figures 5b
and 5f. We again see that SUPER∗ with each heuristic outperforms the baselines in terms of the gain and they obtain
a favorable distribution of the bid counts with a 50% reduction in the number of papers with fewer than six bids
compared to SIM and RAND.
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Community model structure. We now consider a community model type block structure as motivated in Sec-
tion 4. To form this similarity matrix, we create a block matrix where each submatrix is of dimension 25 × 25. The
similarity score of each entry in the submatrix (`, k) is 0 if ` 6= k and 0.7 if ` = k. In other words the matrix is block
diagonal. We then add noise to each similarity score drawn uniformly at random from the interval [0, 0.05]. The results
are given in Figures 5c and 5g. BID and RAND are highly suboptimal in terms of the gain and bid count distribution
since they end up showing papers with similarity scores near zero early in the paper orderings even if later on there
are reviewers to arrive which are closely matched to the papers. Remarkably, SUPER∗ with each heuristic reduces the
number of papers with fewer than the minimum number of desired bids by at least 90% compared to BID and RAND.
Moreover, SUPER∗ with each heuristic outperforms SIM in terms of the gain and reduces the number of papers with
fewer than six bids by over 60%. This happens since for papers with close similarity scores, SUPER∗ shows the paper
with fewer bids ahead if the similarity score is only marginally smaller.
Interdisciplinary papers. To conclude our simulations, we consider the impact our algorithm could have on
interdisciplinary papers. As mentioned in Section 1, such papers face additional challenges in the peer review process
owing to the lack of ideally matched peers. To simulate this phenomena, we consider a similarity matrix structure
where there are two groups of reviewers of equal size and then three groups of papers which make up 40%, 40%,
and 20% of the papers, respectively. Each reviewer in group one has similarity scores of 0.17, 0.005, and 0.085 with
the respective paper groups and each reviewer in group two has similarity scores of 0.005, 0.17, and 0.085 with the
respective paper groups. This reflects a scenario where the reviewer pool has two distinct areas of expertise and there
is a set of interdisciplinary papers (paper group with similarity score of 0.075 with all reviewers). We show the results
of the experiment in Figures 5d and 5h. In terms of the gain, SUPER∗ and SIM perform significantly outperform BID
and RAND. For the bid count distribution in Figure 5h, we only consider the interdisciplinary papers. SUPER∗ with
each heuristic mitigates negative impacts on the interdisciplinary papers as the number with an insufficient number
of bids is curtailed by 65% and 50% compared to SIM and RAND. This is a result of the fact that SUPER∗ works to
trade-off the paper-side and reviewer-side objectives so the interdisciplinary papers end up not always being shown
after the papers matching the reviewers expertise as occurs for SIM.
6 Discussion
This work develops a principled framework to improve bidding in peer review. We develop a sequential decision-
making algorithm called SUPER∗ to optimize the process and show that it empirically outperforms baseline methods
on real conference data and has several compelling theoretical guarantees.
This work leads to several interesting and potentially impactful open problems:
• An obvious open problem is that of developing an online algorithm that is globally optimal for every similarity
matrix. Conversely, showing possible computational hardness of the problem as a negative result could be a
path of future work.
• In several automated reviewer-paper assignment methods, bids and and similarities are combined to form the
scores used to compute the assignment (Shah et al., 2018b). Given the tight connection between the bidding
and matching systems, it is natural to design methods for jointly optimizing the components that govern the
assignment process.
• Finally, given the online nature of reviewer arrivals and the need to immediately show the paper ordering to
an arriving reviewer, it is of interest to solve the passive problem. That is, develop an algorithm which selects
the paper orderings to present to each reviewer before any of the reviewers arrive, which can be presented to a
reviewer in the event of insufficient computational time. We also think that a solution to the passive problem
would serve as an effective heuristic function for SUPER∗.
Although our work primarily focuses on peer review, there are a number of other applications for which this work
is relevant. One such application is crowdsourcing, where a common goal of the crowdsourcing platform is to ensure
that each task gets sufficiently many qualified workers. From the perspective of the worker, it has been documented
quite extensively that workers put a non-trivial emphasis on a task if it is of interest to them (Kaufmann et al., 2011;
Hossain, 2012). This means there is a trade-off of ensuring each worker is satisfied while ensuring a minimum
number of workers for each job. As such, it is reasonable to formulate the crowdsourcing problem as a multi-objective
optimization problem using analogous approach to the one presented in this paper for the bidding process in peer
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review. Indeed, the crowdsourcing platform in this formulation seeks to optimize both for a task-side objective, which
ensures each task gets a sufficient number of workers selecting it, and for a user-side objective, which is to present
relevant tasks to users.
Another potentially viable application is crowdfunding and microlending platforms such as Kiva or KickStarter. In
crowdfunding, users pledge toward funding a project, and the project is only funded if the cumulative contributions of
the crowd meet a known target threshold. The platforms seek to maximize the number of funded projects by deciding,
when, how often, and to which users the projects are displayed. Past work (Jain and Jamieson, 2018) has modeled
the optimization as a multi-armed bandit problem where the goal is to maximize the number of funded projects with
a minimum amount of user impressions. This problem has a fundamental trade-off between showing relevant projects
to users while ensuring that the projects themselves are given a fair shot to be funded. As such, a model-dependent
approach such of ours could be of potential interest.
A final potential application outside of peer review for our work is in recommender systems and online advertising
where there is the common trade-off between exploration (gaining sufficient feedback on all items) and exploitation
(showing the most relevant items to users). In recommender systems, the cold start problem refers to the situation
where the system is just beginning to interact with users or items are freshly included in the catalogue and no past user
interaction information is available. The common trade-off arises again where there is a need to show relevant items
to users, while the system benefits from gaining feedback on items for which the utility is unknown. Our framework
easily adapts to a changing action set and could be relevant to this task.
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A Proofs
In this section, we present proofs of the theoretical results presented in the main text. We begin by formally defining
the history of information available to an algorithm when a reviewer arrives and restating important notation that will
be found throughout the proofs.
Definition 1 (History). The history of information available to an algorithm when reviewer i ∈ [n] arrives is defined
as Hi−1 = {pi`, b` : ` = 1, . . . , i − 1}, where pi` ∈ Πd is the paper ordering that was presented to reviewer ` and
b` ∈ {0, 1}d contains the bid realizations on each paper from reviewer `.
Notation. We let d ≥ 2 denote the number of papers and n ≥ 2 denote the number of reviewers. We use the notation
Si,j ∈ [0, 1] to denote the given similarity score between any reviewer i ∈ [n] and paper j ∈ [d]. In general, we let i
index a reviewer and j index a paper. We commonly use the set notation [κ] = {1, 2, . . . , κ} for any positive integer
κ. Πd denotes the set of d! permutations of d papers. For any reviewer i ∈ [n], we let pii ∈ Πd denote the ordering
(permutation) of the papers shown to reviewer i. We use the notation pii(j) to denote the position of paper j ∈ [d] in
the ordering pii. The notation Bi,j represents the random variable of reviewer i ∈ [n] biding on paper j ∈ [d] which
follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter pi,j = f(pii(j), Si,j). We use the notation gi−1,j ∈ {0, . . . , i − 1} to
denote the number of bids received by any paper j ∈ [d] at the time of arrival of reviewer i ∈ [n] and gj to denote the
number of bids at the end of the bidding process on paper j ∈ [d]. The heuristic estimating the number of bids paper
j ∈ [d] will obtain from reviewers {i + 1, . . . , n} is denoted as hi,j and it is provided to the SUPER∗ algorithm on
arrival of reviewer i ∈ [n]. Finally, we abbreviate ‘with probability’ by w.p and use the terminology almost surely to
mean with probability one and almost never to mean with probability zero.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1: Local Optimality of SUPER∗ for Final Reviewer
In this proof, we show that selecting the optimal ordering to present to the final reviewer can be simplified to a tractable
optimization problem. The SUPER∗ algorithm solves exactly this problem to determine an ordering of papers to
present the final reviewer, and is hence an optimal algorithm for the final reviewer.
The optimization problem for the final reviewer n to maximize the expected gain conditioned on the history is
max
pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)|Hn−1] + λ
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
E[γr(pii(j), Si,j)|Hn−1] (9)
where the expectation is taken over the randomness in the bid to be placed by the reviewer. Conditioned on the history
Hn−1, the final number of bids on any paper j ∈ [d] given by gj is the sum of the deterministic number of bids prior
to the final reviewer denoted as gn−1,j and a Bernoulli random variable Bn,j with parameter pn,j = f(pin(j), Sn,j)
representing the random bid of the final reviewer. We incorporate this fact and remove terms independent of the
optimization variable from the problem in (9) to equivalently obtain
max
pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gn−1,j + Bn,j)] + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pin(j), Sn,j) (10)
where the expectation on the reviewer-side gain is removed as it is independent of the random reviewer bids.
We now simplify the paper-side gain term by expanding the expectation for each j ∈ [d]. Observe that
γp(gn−1,j + Bn,j) =
{
γp(gn−1,j + 1) w.p. f(pin(j), Sn,j)
γp(gn−1,j) w.p. 1− f(pin(j), Sn,j).
Therefore,
E[γp(gn−1,j + Bn,j)] = f(pin(j), Sn,j)(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + γp(gn−1,j). (11)
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Substituting (11) into (10) and removing the term independent of the optimization variable gives the problem
max
pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
f(pin(j), Sn,j)(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pin(j), Sn,j). (12)
We now reformulate (12) into the following equivalent integer linear programming problem:
max
x∈Rd×d
∑
j∈[d]
∑
k∈[d]
f(k, Sn,j)(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j))xj,k + λ
∑
j∈[d]
∑
k∈[d]
γr(k, Sn,j)xj,k
s.t.
∑
k∈[d]
xj,k = 1 ∀ j ∈ [d],
∑
j∈[d]
xj,k = 1 ∀ k ∈ [d], xj,k ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j, k ∈ [d].
In this formulation, x is a d× d matrix for which xj,k is an indicator of paper j ∈ [d] being shown at position k ∈ [d].
The constraint
∑
k∈[d] xj,k = 1 ∀ j ∈ [d] ensures each paper is included strictly once in the ordering shown to the
reviewer. The constraint
∑
j∈[d] xj,k = 1 ∀ k ∈ [d] ensures strictly one paper is selected to be shown at each position.
The final constraint ensures that each index of x is integer valued. This integer linear programming problem is known
as a linear sum assignment problem.
The key step of this proof is to recall that the linear sum assignment problem can be solved as a linear program.
Indeed, the final constraint ensuring an integer solution can be relaxed to 0 ≤ xj,k ≤ 1 ∀ j, k ∈ [d] and the optimal
solution of the relaxed linear program will be the integer optimal solution. This property of the linear sum assignment
problem is a consequence of the relaxed linear program containing a totally unimodular constraint set which guarantees
the optimal solution to be the integral solution (see, e.g., Chapter 4 in Burkard et al., 2012).
The optimization problem arising from recognizing that the integer constraint can be relaxed is given by
max
x∈Rd×d
∑
j∈[d]
∑
k∈[d]
wj,kxj,k
s.t.
∑
k∈[d]
xj,k = 1 ∀ j ∈ [d],
∑
j∈[d]
xj,k = 1 ∀ k ∈ [d], 0 ≤ xj,k ≤ 1 ∀ j, k ∈ [d],
(13)
where
wj,k = f(k, Sn,j)(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + λγr(k, Sn,j) ∀ j, k ∈ [d]. (14)
This formulation shows that the paper ordering for the final reviewer that maximizes the expected gain conditioned on
the history can be obtained efficiently by solving a linear program.
Local optimality of SUPER∗ for final reviewer. To determine the ordering of papers to show any reviewer i ∈ [n]
for the general class of assumed gain and bidding functions, SUPER∗ calls Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 solves the
optimization problem in (13) using the weights
wj,k = f(k, Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + hi,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j + hi,j)) + λγr(k, Si,j) ∀ j, k ∈ [d]. (15)
Given any heuristic function, the heuristic for the final reviewer is such that hn = 0. This means SUPER∗ selects
the paper ordering for the final reviewer by solving the optimization problem from (13–14) to maximize the expected
gain conditioned on the history. As a result, we conclude SUPER∗ is locally optimal for the final reviewer with any
heuristic function.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1: Local Optimality of SUPER∗ for Any Reviewer
The immediate gain from any reviewer i ∈ [n] is the difference between the gain after and before the reviewer arrived.
Formally, the immediate gain from any reviewer i ∈ [n] is given by the quantity
Gi =
∑
j∈[d]
(
γp
(∑
`∈[i]
B`,j
)
− γp
( ∑
`∈[i−1]
B`,j
))
+ λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j),
where B`,j is a Bernoulli random variable representing the random bid of a reviewer ` ∈ [n] on a paper j ∈ [d] that
depends on the position the paper was shown to the reviewer.
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The optimization problem to maximize the immediate expected gain from reviewer i ∈ [n] conditioned on the
history (see Definition 1) is thus given by
max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
E
[
γp
(∑
`∈[i]
B`,j
)
− γp
( ∑
`∈[i−1]
B`,j
)∣∣Hi−1]+ λ∑
j∈[d]
E[γr(pii(j), Si,j)].
Since
∑
`∈[i−1] B`,j is the deterministic bid count gi−1,j conditioned on the history Hi−1 for each paper j ∈ [d] and
the reviewer-side gain from reviewer i ∈ [n] is deterministic given a fixed paper ordering pii ∈ Πd, the previous
optimization problem is equivalently given by
max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gi−1,j + Bi,j)− γp(gi−1,j)] + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j). (16)
We now evaluate the expectation in (16) using (11) and then simplify to obtain the optimization problem
max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
f(pii(j), Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j). (17)
The problem in (17) is equivalent to that given in (12) from the proof of Theorem 1 up to the reviewer index. Conse-
quently, we follow the steps after (12) in the proof of Theorem 1 to simplify (17) into a tractable representation. In
doing so, we get that the problem in (17) is equivalent to the linear program in (13) with the weights
wj,k = f(k, Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)) + λγr(k, Si,j) ∀ j, k ∈ [d].
Local optimality of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic for any reviewer. To determine the ordering of papers to show any
reviewer i ∈ [n] for the general class of assumed gain and bidding functions, SUPER∗ calls Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2
solves the optimization problem in (13) using the weights
wj,k = f(k, Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + hi,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j + hi,j)) + λγr(k, Si,j) ∀ j, k ∈ [d].
For any reviewer i ∈ [n], given the zero heuristic function, hi = 0 by definition. This means SUPER∗ with zero
heuristic selects the paper ordering for any reviewer by solving the optimization problem to maximize the immediate
expected gain conditioned on the history, so we conclude it is locally optimal for any reviewer.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2: Suboptimality of Baselines for Final Reviewer
The organization of this proof is as follows. In Section A.3.1, we present notation and preliminary information com-
mon to the analysis for each of the baselines. We prove the suboptimality bounds for the SIM, BID, and RAND
baselines separately in Sections A.3.2, A.3.3, and A.3.4, respectively. Combining the results for each of the baselines
proves the theorem statement. We conclude in Section A.3.5 with proofs of technical lemmas invoked in the analysis
of the baselines.
A.3.1 Notation and Preliminaries
We denote the gain from the final reviewer n of an arbitrary algorithm ALG presenting a potentially random paper
ordering piALGn to the reviewer as
GALGn = GALGp,n + λGALGr,n .
The paper-side gain from the final reviewer GALGp,n is given by
GALGp,n =
∑
j∈[d]
(
γp
( ∑
i∈[n]
Bi,j
)
− γp
( ∑
i∈[n−1]
Bi,j
))
,
where again Bi,j is a Bernoulli random variable representing the random bid of a reviewer i ∈ [n] on a paper j ∈ [d]
that depends on the position the paper was shown to the reviewer. The reviewer-side gain from the final reviewer GALGr,n
is given by
GALGr,n =
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pi
ALG
n (j), Sn,j).
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Accordingly,
GALGn =
∑
j∈[d]
(
γp
( ∑
i∈[n]
Bi,j
)
− γp
( ∑
i∈[n−1]
Bi,j
))
+ λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pi
ALG
n (j), Sn,j).
The expected gain from the final reviewer conditioned on the history of bids and paper orderings Hn−1 (see Defini-
tion 1) is given by
E[GALGn |Hn−1] = E[GALGp,n |Hn−1] + λE[GALGr,n |Hn−1]
where the expectation is with respect to the randomness in the algorithm and the bids from the final reviewer. Observe
that
E[GALGp,n |Hn−1] = EpiALGn
[ ∑
j∈[d]
f(piALGn (j), Sn,j)(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j))
]
since
∑
i∈[n−1] Bi,j is the deterministic quantity gn−1,j for each j ∈ [d] conditioned onHn−1 and Bn,j is a Bernoulli
random variable with parameter pn,j = f(piALGn (j), Sn,j) for each j ∈ [d] given the fixed paper ordering piALGn .
Moreover,
E[GALGr,n |Hn−1] = EpiALGn
[ ∑
j∈[d]
γr(pi
ALG
n (j), Sn,j)
]
.
It follows that
E[GALGn |Hn−1] = EpiALGn
[ ∑
j∈[d]
f(piALGn (j), Sn,j)(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pi
ALG
n (j), Sn,j)
]
.
The given biding function can be decomposed into the form
f(pii(j), Si,j) =
Si,j
log2(pii(j) + 1)
= Si,jf
pi(pii(j)) (18)
where
fpi(pii(j)) =
1
log2(pii(j) + 1)
denotes the component of the bidding function f that only depends on the paper ordering and is independent of the
similarity score. The reviewer-side gain function can similarly be decomposed into the form
γr(pii(j), Si,j) = (2
Si,j − 1)fpi(pii(j)). (19)
Using the decomposed forms of the bidding function and the reviewer-side gain function from (18) and (19), the
expected gain from the final reviewer n of an arbitrary algorithm ALG is given by
E[GALGn |Hn−1] = E[GALGp,n |Hn−1] + λE[GALGr,n |Hn−1]
= EpiALGn
[ ∑
j∈[d]
Sn,j(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j))fpi(piALGn (j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
(2Sn,j − 1)fpi(piALGn (j))
]
. (20)
The optimal paper ordering for the final reviewer is thus given by the solution to the following optimization problem
pi∗n = arg max
pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
αn,jf
pi(pin(j)) (21)
where
αn,j = Sn,j(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + λ(2Sn,j − 1) ∀ j ∈ [d]. (22)
The optimal solution to (21) ranks papers in a decreasing order of their corresponding values in {αn,j}j∈[d] since the
function fpi is decreasing in the decision variable. This observation will be used to obtain an explicit form of pi∗n for
each problem we subsequently construct to show the suboptimality of the baselines. From Theorem 1, SUPER∗ with
any heuristic is optimal for the final reviewer, which means piSUPER
∗
n = pi
∗
n. See that pi
SUPER∗
n is a non-random quantity
given a deterministic tie-breaking mechanism and the expected gain is independent of the tie-breaking mechanism.
Thus, without loss of generality, we assume ties are broken by the paper indexes in favor of j < j′ for SUPER∗.
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We need to compare the expected gain obtained from the final reviewer using the SUPER∗ algorithm presenting the
optimal paper ordering piSUPER
∗
n = pi
∗
n with any baseline ALG ∈ {SIM,BID,RAND} presenting a potentially random
ordering piALGn . Therefore, we analyze the quantity
E[GSUPER∗n − GALGn |Hn−1] = E[GSUPER
∗
p,n − GALGp,n |Hn−1] + λE[GSUPER
∗
r,n − GALGr,n |Hn−1]
= EpiALGn
[ ∑
j∈[d]
Sn,j(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j))(fpi(piSUPER∗n (j))− fpi(piALGn (j)))
+ λ
∑
j∈[d]
(2Sn,j − 1)(fpi(piSUPER∗n (j))− fpi(piALGn (j)))
]
(23)
for each baseline ALG ∈ {SIM,BID,RAND}. The SIM and BID algorithms are deterministic for the final reviewer
conditioned on the history, up to the tie-breaking mechanism. The RAND algorithm is random, so the expectation over
the paper ordering in (23) is necessary when analyzing RAND. In the remainder of the proof, we analyze SIM, then
BID, and finish with RAND.
A.3.2 Suboptimality of SIM for Final Reviewer
In this section, we prove the worst case performance of the SIM baseline for the final reviewer.
Intuition. The SIM algorithm directly optimizes the expected reviewer-side gain since it shows papers in a decreas-
ing order of the similarity scores. Consequently, it obtains the maximum expected reviewer-side gain that can be
achieved. However, the algorithm gives no attention to the number of bids on each paper, which play an important
role in the expected paper-side gain that can be obtained upon the arrival of the final reviewer. This point suggests that
SIM may be suboptimal for the combined objective.
To build intuition for when this can occur, consider that there is only a pair of papers j and j′. Moreover, suppose
paper j has only marginally higher similarity score than paper j′, but paper j has significantly more bids than paper
j′. In this scenario, the expected reviewer-side gain of any paper ordering is nearly equal. However, showing paper
j′ ahead of paper j results in significantly higher expected paper-side gain owing to the diminishing returns of bids
from the paper-side gain function. Since SIM instead shows paper j ahead of paper j′, it would be suboptimal. The
following construction now generalizes this observation.
Construction. We now construct a problem instance that will be used to prove SIM is significantly suboptimal for
the final reviewer in the worst case. Consider the similarity scores for the final reviewer to be Sn,j = 1 − 1/(j) for
each paper j ∈ [d], where  = (1 + λ)eee and λ ≥ 0 is the fixed and given trade-off parameter. In this construction,
the similarity scores for the final reviewer are nearly equal, but they are increasing in the paper index. For the time
being, assume the number of papers d is even. At the end of this section, we handle when the number of papers d is
odd. Let the number of bids on the papers from previous reviewers be
gn−1,j =
{
0, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2}
1, if j ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}.
The bid counts are such that papers among the top half of the similarity scores obtained a bid in the past, and papers
among the bottom half of the similarity scores did not obtain any bids from previous reviewers.
We now derive the explicit form of the optimal paper ordering for the final reviewer. Recall from (22) that the
weights of the optimization problem for the final reviewer given in (21) are defined by
αn,j = Sn,j(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + λ(2Sn,j − 1) ∀ j ∈ [d]. (24)
Moreover, from the structure of the optimization problem in (21), if αn,j > αn,j′ , then piSUPER
∗
n (j) < pi
SUPER∗
n (j
′) so
that paper j is shown ahead of paper j′ in the ranking. Observe that αn,j is increasing in the similarity score Sn,j and
decreasing in the number of bids gn−1,j for each j ∈ [d]. Consequently, if a pair of papers j, j′ ∈ [d] are such that
gn−1,j = gn−1,j′ and Sn,j > Sn,j′ , then αn,j > αn,j′ and in turn, piSUPER
∗
n (j) < pi
SUPER∗
n (j
′).
We now show that in the optimal ordering for this instance, each paper with zero bids is shown ahead of each paper
with a non-zero number of bids. Among the set of papers with zero bids, namely those indexed by {1, . . . , d/2}, the
minimum similarity score Sn,j and minimum weight αn,j occur at j = 1. Among the set of papers with a non-zero
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number of bids, namely those indexed by {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}, the maximum similarity score Si,j′ and maximum weight
αn,j′ occur at j′ = d. Thus, if αn,1 − αn,d > 0, then we can conclude each paper with zero bids is shown ahead of
each paper with a non-zero number of bids. To prove this, we need the following lemma, the proof of which can be
found in Section A.3.5.1.
Lemma 1. For γp(x) =
√
x, any λ ≥ 0, d ≥ 2, and  = (1 + λ)eee , it must be that
(γp(1)− γp(0))(1− 1/)− (γp(2)− γp(1))(1− 1/(d)) + λ(2(1−1/) − 2(1−1/(d))) ≥ 1/2. (25)
From the given similarity scores and bid counts, and then applying Lemma 1, we obtain
αn,1 − αn,d = (γp(1)− γp(0))(1− 1/)− (γp(2)− γp(1))(1− 1/(d)) + λ(2(1−1/) − 2(1−1/(d))) ≥ 1/2.
Therefore, the optimal paper ordering shows all papers with zero bids ahead of every paper with a non-zero number of
bids. Moreover, recall if a pair of papers j, j′ ∈ [d] are such that gn−1,j = gn−1,j′ and Sn,j > Sn,j′ , then αn,j > αn,j′ .
This fact allows us to determine that among each group of papers (zero and non-zero bids), the optimal paper ordering
presents the papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores.
Combining the previous conclusions, SUPER∗ shows the optimal paper ordering
piSUPER
∗
n (j) =
{
d/2− j + 1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2}
d+ d/2 + 1− j, if j ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}. (26)
The SIM algorithm shows papers in a decreasing order of the similarity scores so that piSIMn (j) = d− j+ 1 for j ∈ [d].
Observe that for this problem, SUPER∗ shows the papers with zero bids much earlier in the paper ordering than SIM.
We now move on to lower bounding (23) for this construction and begin by considering the expected paper-side gain.
Bounding the expected paper-side gain. Substituting the similarity scores, the number of bids on each paper, and
the (deterministic) paper orderings presented by each algorithm for this construction into the paper-side component
of (23), we obtain
E[GSUPER∗p,n − GSIMp,n |Hn−1] = (γp(1)− γp(0))
d/2∑
j=1
(1− 1/(j))(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1))
+ (γp(2)− γp(1))
d∑
j=d/2+1
(1− 1/(j))(fpi(d+ d/2 + 1− j)− fpi(d− j + 1)).
Manipulating the indexing of the sum over the last half of the papers gives
E[GSUPER∗p,n − GSIMp,n |Hn−1] = (γp(1)− γp(0))
d/2∑
j=1
(1− 1/(j))(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1))
+ (γp(2)− γp(1))
d/2∑
j=1
(1− 1/((j + d/2)))(fpi(d− j + 1)− fpi(d/2− j + 1)).
Noting that (fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1)) = −(fpi(d− j + 1)− fpi(d/2− j + 1)), we obtain
E[GSUPER∗p,n − GSIMp,n |Hn−1] = (γp(1)− γp(0))
d/2∑
j=1
(1− 1/(j))(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1))
− (γp(2)− γp(1))
d/2∑
j=1
(1− 1/((j + d/2)))(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1)).
For every j ∈ [d/2], we have fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1) > 0 since d/2− j + 1 < d− j + 1 and fpi(pii(j)) =
1/ log2(pii(j) + 1) is a decreasing function on the domain R>0. Moreover, for every j ∈ [d/2], 1− 1/(j) ≥ 1− 1/
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and 1 − 1/((j + d/2)) ≤ 1 − 1/(d), and the given paper-side gain function γp is increasing on the domain R≥0.
Thus,
E[GSUPER∗p,n − GSIMp,n |Hn−1] ≥ ((γp(1)− γp(0))(1− 1/)− (γp(2)− γp(1))(1− 1/(d)))
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1)).
Finally, manipulating the indexing of the sum gives
E[GSUPER∗p,n − GSIMp,n |Hn−1] ≥ ((γp(1)− γp(0))(1− 1/)− (γp(2)− γp(1))(1− 1/(d)))
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)).
(27)
We now bound the expected reviewer-side gain including the trade-off parameter λ from (23). The steps that follow
are analogous to those exercised in bounding the expected paper-side gain.
Bounding the expected reviewer-side gain. Substituting the values of the similarity scores, the number of bids
on each paper, and the (deterministic) paper orderings presented by each algorithm into the reviewer-side component
of (23), we obtain
λE[GSUPER∗r,n − GSIMr,n |Hn−1] = λ
d/2∑
j=1
(2(1−1/(j)) − 1)(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1))
+ λ
d∑
j=d/2+1
(2(1−1/(j)) − 1)(fpi(d+ d/2 + 1− j)− fpi(d− j + 1)).
Manipulating the indexing of the sum over the last half of the papers results in
λE[GSUPER∗r,n − GSIMr,n |Hn−1] = λ
d/2∑
j=1
(2(1−1/(j)) − 1)(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1))
+ λ
d/2∑
j=1
(2(1−1/((j+d/2))) − 1)(fpi(d− j + 1)− fpi(d/2− j + 1)).
Noting that fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1) = −(fpi(d− j + 1)− fpi(d/2− j + 1)), we obtain
λE[GSUPER∗r,n − GALGr,n |Hn−1] = λ
d/2∑
j=1
(2(1−1/(j)) − 1)(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1))
− λ
d/2∑
j=1
(2(1−1/((j+d/2))) − 1)(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1)).
For every j ∈ [d/2], we have fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1) > 0 since d/2− j + 1 < d− j + 1 and fpi(pii(j)) =
1/ log2(pii(j) + 1) is a decreasing function on the domain R>0. Furthermore, observe that for every j ∈ [d/2],
1− 1/(j) ≥ 1− 1/() and 1− 1/((j + d/2)) ≤ 1− 1/(d). This set of facts leads to the bound
λE[GSUPER∗r,n − GSIMr,n |Hn−1] ≥ λ
(
2(1−1/) − 2(1−1/(d))) d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(d/2− j + 1)− fpi(d− j + 1)).
To finish this sequence of steps, we manipulate the indexing of the sum to conclude
E[GSUPER∗r,n − GSIMr,n |Hn−1] ≥ λ
(
2(1−1/) − 2(1−1/(d))) d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)). (28)
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Completing the lower bound. Combining the bounds on the expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain terms
from (27) and (28), we obtain an initial lower bound given by
E[GSUPER∗n − GSIMn |Hn−1] ≥ C
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)), (29)
where for ease of notation we define
C = (γp(1)− γp(0))(1− 1/)− (γp(2)− γp(1))(1− 1/(d)) + λ(2(1−1/) − 2(1−1/(d))). (30)
We apply Lemma 1 to get that C ≥ 1/2. The following lemma, the proof of which can be found in Section A.3.5.2,
provides a bound on the sum in (29).
Lemma 2. Let fpi(x) = 1/ log2(x+ 1). Fix d to be an even integer such that d ≥ 2. Then,
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)) ≥ d
16 log22(d)
.
From (29) along with the fact that C ≥ 1/2 and Lemma 2, we obtain
E[GSUPER∗n − GSIMn |Hn−1] ≥
d
32 log22(d)
. (31)
Lemma 2, and consequently the bound in (31), are applicable when d is even. The following lemma shows that
an equivalent result (up to constants) holds when the number of papers d is odd. The bound is obtained by looking at
an identical problem construction for d′ = d − 1 papers, and then including an additional paper that has a similarity
score of zero with the final reviewer and one previous bid. This change is such that both SUPER∗ and SIM show the
additional paper last, and moreover, the expected gain from paper d is zero since the similarity score is zero.
Lemma 3. If d is odd, then in the worst case for the final reviewer under the assumptions of Theorem 2,
E[GSUPER∗n − GSIMn |Hn−1] ≥
d
64 log22(d)
.
The proof of Lemma 3 is in Section A.3.5.3.
Combining the bound from (31) which holds for d even with the bound from Lemma 3 which holds for d odd, we
find that for every d ≥ 2 and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗n − GSIMn |Hn−1] ≥
d
64 log22(d)
.
This proves the claim in Theorem 2 stating that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every d ≥ 2 and λ ≥ 0, SIM
is suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cd/ log22(d) in the worst case for the final reviewer.
A.3.3 Suboptimality of BID for Final Reviewer
In this section, we prove the worst case performance of the BID baseline for the final reviewer.
Intuition. The BID algorithm greedily optimizes the minimum bid count since it shows papers in an increasing
order of the number of bids received previously. The underlying problem with this method is that the paper ordering
selected for any reviewer is independent of the similarity scores for that reviewer (up to serving as a tie-breaking
mechanism). Since the paper-side gain function and the reviewer-side gain function both depend on the similarity
scores, this property of BID leads to suboptimality in terms of both the expected paper-side gain and the reviewer-side
gain.
To build some intuition for when BID is suboptimal, consider there is only a pair of papers j and j′. Moreover,
suppose paper j has a much higher similarity score than paper j′ and paper j has only one more bid than j′. In this
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scenario, the expected reviewer-side gain from showing paper j ahead of paper j′ is significantly higher than showing
paper j′ ahead of paper j. Moreover, since the probability of obtaining a bid on paper j is significantly higher at
a given position in the paper ordering than for paper j′ and the number of bids on the papers are nearly equal, the
expected paper-side gain is also maximized if paper j is shown ahead of paper j′. Since BID instead shows paper j′
ahead of paper j, it would be suboptimal for both paper-side and reviewer-side gain. The following construction now
generalizes this observation.
Construction. We now construct a problem instance that will be used to prove BID is significantly suboptimal for
the final reviewer in the worst case. Consider the similarity scores for the final reviewer as
Sn,j =
{
1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2}
0, if j ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}.
For now, assume the number of papers d is even. We handle when the number of papers d is odd at the end of this
proof. Let the number of bids on the papers from previous reviewers be such that
gn−1,j =
{
1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2}
0, if j ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}.
In words, half of the papers have a similarity score of one and have recieved bids, and the other half of the papers have
a similarity score of zero and have obtained no bids.
We now derive the optimal paper ordering for the final reviewer. Recall from (22) that the weights of the optimiza-
tion problem for the final reviewer given in (21) are defined by
αn,j = Sn,j(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + λ(2Sn,j − 1) ∀ j ∈ [d].
Moreover, from the structure of the optimization problem in (21), if αn,j > αn,j′ , then piSUPER
∗
n (j) < pi
SUPER∗
n (j
′) so
that paper j is shown ahead of paper j′ in the ranking. Observe that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2}, αn,j is a fixed number.
Similarly, for each j′ ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}, αn,j′ is a fixed number. If αn,j − αn,j′ > 0 for any j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2} and
j′ ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}, then we can conclude each paper with a bid is shown ahead of each paper without a bid. We
consider j = 1 and j′ = d. Since γp(x) =
√
x and αn,d = 0,
αn,1 − αn,d = γp(2)− γp(1) + λ =
√
2− 1 + λ ≥ 1/3 + λ. (32)
Consequent of the fact λ ≥ 0, we conclude αn,1−αn,d > 0, which means SUPER∗ shows each paper with a bid ahead
of each paper without a bid. Finally, since αn,j is a fixed number for each j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2} and αn,j′ is a fixed number
for each j′ ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}, as long as piSUPER∗n (j) < piSUPER
∗
n (j
′) for every j, j′ pair, then the paper ordering is
optimal. In other words, any paper ordering which shows the papers with a bid in an arbitrary order followed by the
papers without a bid in an arbitrary order is optimal.
We conclude piSUPER
∗
n (j) = j for each j ∈ [d], where without loss of generality, to simplify the analysis, we assume
if a pair of papers have equal weights in the optimization problem, then ties are broken in order of the paper indexes
since the tie-breaking mechanism will not change the expected gain the paper ordering obtains from the final reviewer.
The BID baseline will show papers in an increasing order of the number of bids so that
piBIDn (j) =
{
j + d/2, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2}
j − d/2, if j ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}.
This paper ordering is derived from recalling that BID breaks ties by the similarity scores and further ties are broken
uniformly at random. However, without loss of generality, to simplify the analysis, we assume if a pair of papers
have equal similarity scores and bid counts, then ties are broken in order of the paper indexes since the tie-breaking
mechanism among this set of papers will not impact the expected gain. We now move on to lower bounding (23) for
this construction.
Bounding the expected gain. Substituting the similarity scores, the number of bids on each paper, and the (deter-
ministic) paper orderings presented by each algorithm for this construction into (23), we obtain
E[GSUPER∗n − GBIDn |Hn−1] =
d/2∑
j=1
(γp(2)− γp(1))(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)) + λ
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2))
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where the terms for papers in the set {d/2 + 1, . . . , d} dropped out since the similarity scores are zero. Simplifying
the expression, we obtain
E[GSUPER∗n − GBIDn |Hn−1] = (γp(2)− γp(1) + λ)
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)). (33)
From (32), we get
γp(2)− γp(1) + λ ≥ 1/3 + λ. (34)
Moreover, from Lemma 2,
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)) ≥ d
16 log22(d)
. (35)
Combining (33), (34), and (35), we obtain
E[GSUPER∗n − GBIDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
48
+
λ
16
)( d
log22(d)
)
(36)
whenever the number of papers d is even.
Lemma 2 and the bound in (36) are applicable when d is even. The following lemma shows that an equivalent
result (up to constants) holds when the number of papers d is odd. The approach to obtain the result is similar to
that for deriving Lemma 3. We obtain the bound for an odd number of papers d by looking at an identical problem
construction for d′ = d − 1 papers, and then include an additional paper that has a similarity score of zero with the
final reviewer and one previous bid. This change is such that both SUPER∗ and BID show the additional paper last,
and moreover, the expected gain from paper d is zero since the similarity score is zero.
Lemma 4. If d is odd, then in the worst case for the final reviewer under the assumptions of Theorem 2,
E[GSUPER∗n − GBIDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
96
+
λ
32
)( d
log22(d)
)
.
The proof of Lemma 4 is in Section A.3.5.4.
Combining the bound from (36) which holds for d even with the bound from Lemma 4 which holds for d odd, we
find that for every d ≥ 2 and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗n − GBIDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
96
+
λ
32
)( d
log22(d)
)
. (37)
This proves the claim in Theorem 2 that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for all d ≥ 2 and λ ≥ 0, BID is
suboptimal by an additive factor of at least cdmax{1, λ}/ log22(d) in the worst case for the final reviewer.
A.3.4 Suboptimality of RAND for Final Reviewer
In this section, we prove the the worst case performance of the RAND baseline for the final reviewer.
Intuition. The RAND algorithm selects an ordering of papers to show a reviewer uniformly at random from the set
of permutations. Since this method is agnostic to the similarity scores and the number of bids, RAND can select highly
suboptimal paper orderings with some non-zero probability.
To see when this can occur, consider the example that provided intuition for the suboptimality of BID in Sec-
tion A.3.3 that consisted of only a pair of papers j and j′. In this example, paper j has a much higher similarity score
than paper j′ and paper j has only one more bid than j′. The expected reviewer-side gain from showing paper j ahead
of paper j′ is significantly higher than showing paper j′ ahead of paper j. Moreover, since the probability of obtaining
a bid on paper j is significantly higher at a given position in the paper ordering than for paper j′ and the number of
bids on the papers are nearly equal, the expected paper-side gain is also maximized if paper j is shown ahead of paper
j′. Since there are only two permutations of the papers that can be selected, with probability 1/2, RAND would show
paper j′ ahead of paper j and be suboptimal for both paper-side and reviewer-side gain. The problem construction
from Section A.3.3 is sufficient to generalize this observation. For completeness, we repeat the construction below.
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Construction. In the remainder of the proof, we show the problem construction from Section A.3.3 can be used to
prove RAND is significantly suboptimal for the final reviewer in the worst case. In this construction, the similarity
scores for the final reviewer are
Sn,j =
{
1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2}
0, if j ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}.
For now, assume the number of papers d is divisible by four. We deal with a number of papers d that is not divisible
by four at the end of this section. The number of bids on the papers from previous reviewers are
gn−1,j =
{
1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d/2}
0, if j ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}.
In Section A.3.3, we showed that SUPER∗ selects the optimal ordering piSUPER
∗
n (j) = j for each j ∈ [d]. The RAND
baseline will select a paper ordering piRANDn uniformly at random from the set of permutations Πd.
Bounding the expected gain. For this construction, we need to lower bound (23). As an initial step, we simplify
the quantity by substituting the similarity scores, the number of bids on each paper, and the paper ordering presented
by SUPER∗ to obtain
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] = EpiRANDn
[ d/2∑
j=1
(γp(2)− γp(1))(fpi(j)− fpi(piRANDn (j)))
+ λ
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(piRANDn (j)))
]
,
where the terms for papers in the set {d/2 + 1, . . . , d} dropped out since the similarity scores are zero. Combining the
sums and using the fact that γp(2)− γp(1) =
√
2− 1 ≥ 1/3 gives
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥ EpiRANDn
[
(1/3 + λ)
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(piRANDn (j)))
]
. (38)
Before proceeding, we provide some intuition that guides the remainder of the proof. The expression in (38)
only depends on the positions RAND shows the papers in the set {1, . . . , d/2} to the final reviewer. Recalling that
the given function fpi is decreasing on the domain R>0, we can observe that the number of positive summand in∑d/2
j=1(f
pi(j) − fpi(piRANDn (j))) increases with the number of papers from the set {1, . . . , d/2} that are not presented
in the set of positions {1, . . . , d/2} from a selection piRANDn and the remaining summand are zero. This point suggests
if with probability bounded away from zero, sufficiently many papers from the set {1, . . . , d/2} are not presented in
the set of positions {1, . . . , d/2} in the ordering selected by RAND, then it should be suboptimal in expectation.
Toward formalizing this line of reasoning, the following lemma provides a lower bound on the probability that
RAND selects a paper ordering that shows fewer than d/4 papers from the set {1, . . . , d/2} in the set of positions
{1, . . . , d/2}. The proof is given in Section A.3.5.5.
Lemma 5. Assume d is divisible by four and consider a set of papers [d]. Let E be the event that a permutation pi of
the paper set [d] drawn uniformly at random from Πd has fewer than d/4 of the papers {1, . . . , d/2} in the positions
{1, . . . , d/2}. Then, P(E) ≥ 1/6.
Define T1 ⊂ Πd as the set of paper orderings with fewer than d/4 of the papers from the set {1, . . . , d/2} in the
set of positions {1, . . . , d/2} and T2 ⊂ Πd as the set containing the remaining paper orderings so that T1 ∪ T2 = Πd.
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Now, beginning from (38), we evaluate and bound the expectation as follows:
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] = (1/3 + λ)
∑
pin∈T1
P(piRANDn = pin)
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(pin(j)))
+ (1/3 + λ)
∑
pin∈T2
P(piRANDn = pin)
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(pin(j)))
≥ (1/3 + λ)P(piRANDn ∈ T1) min
pin∈T1
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(pin(j)))
+ (1/3 + λ)P(piRANDn ∈ T2) min
pin∈T2
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(pin(j))).
Observe that minpin∈T2
∑d/2
j=1(f
pi(j)− fpi(pin(j))) = 0 since the optimal paper ordering that shows each paper in the
set {1, . . . , d/2} in the set of positions {1, . . . , d/2} is contained in T2. Moreover, from Lemma 5, P(piRANDn ∈ T1) ≥
1/6. This results in the bound
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
18
+
λ
6
)
min
pin∈T1
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(pin(j))). (39)
We now need to reason about the minimizer of minpin∈T1
∑d/2
j=1(f
pi(j) − fpi(pin(j))). Equivalently, we can find the
maximizer of maxpin∈T1
∑d/2
j=1 f
pi(pin(j)). Since the given function fpi is decreasing on the domain R>0, the quantity∑d/2
j=1 f
pi(pin(j)) is maximized when the papers in the set {1, . . . , d/2} are shown the earliest in the ordering pin that
is feasible subject to the constraint that fewer than d/4 papers from the set {1, . . . , d/2} are presented in the set of
positions {1, . . . , d/2}. This means
pin(j) =

j, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d/4− 1}
j + d/4 + 1, if j ∈ {d/4, . . . , d/2}
j − d/4− 1, if j ∈ {d/2 + 1, . . . , 3d/4 + 1}
j, if j ∈ {3d/4 + 2, . . . , d}
(40)
is a minimizer of
∑d/2
j=1(f
pi(j) − fpi(pin(j))) among the set T1. Substituting the paper ordering from (40) as the
minimizer into (39), we obtain
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
18
+
λ
6
) d/2∑
j=d/4
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/4 + 1)). (41)
The following lemma provides a bound on the sum in (41).
Lemma 6. Let fpi(x) = 1/ log2(x+ 1) and fix d ≥ 4 and divisible by four. Then,
d/2∑
j=d/4
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/4 + 1)) ≥ d
32 log22(d)
.
The proof of Lemma 6 can be found in Section A.3.5.6.
Combining (41) and Lemma 6 results in the following bound whenever d is divisible by four:
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
576
+
λ
192
)( d
log22(d)
)
. (42)
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The next lemma shows that if the number of papers d is not divisible by four, an equivalent result (up to constants)
holds. For d ∈ {2, 3}, the bound is rather immediate since we can compute the probability that RAND selects the paper
ordering BID shows for this construction and then apply the bound from (37) on the suboptimality of BID that holds
for any d. For d > 3 and not divisible by four, the bound is obtained by looking at an identical problem construction
for the maximum d′ < d divisible by four and then including d − d′ papers with a similarity score of zero and one
previous bid. This change is such that the bound from (42) applies as a function of d′, so the result then follows
immediately.
Lemma 7. If d is not divisible by four, then in the worst case for the final reviewer under the assumptions of Theorem 2,
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
1728
+
λ
576
)( d
log22(d)
)
.
The proof of Lemma 7 can be found in Section A.3.5.7.
Combining the bound from (42) which holds for d divisible by four with the bound from Lemma 7 which holds
for d not divisible by four, we find that for every d ≥ 2 and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
1728
+
λ
576
)( d
log22(d)
)
.
This proves there is a constant c > 0 such that for all d ≥ 2 and λ ≥ 0, RAND is suboptimal by an additive factor of at
least cdmax{1, λ}/ log22(d) in the worst case for the final reviewer as claimed in Theorem 2.
A.3.5 Proofs of Lemmas 1–7
In this section, we present the proofs of technical lemmas stated in the primary proof of Theorem 2.
A.3.5.1 Proof of Lemma 1. Recall from the lemma statement, γp(x) =
√
x. Moreover, the fixed and given
quantities are λ ≥ 0, d ≥ 2, and  = (1 + λ)eee . We derive the following bound justified below:
(γp(1)−γp(0))(1− 1/)− (γp(2)− γp(1))(1− 1/(d)) + λ(2(1−1/) − 2(1−1/(d)))
≥ (γp(1)− γp(0))(1− 1/)− (γp(2)− γp(1)) + λ(2(1−1/) − 2) (43)
= (γp(1)− γp(0))(1− ((1 + λ)eee)−1)− (γp(2)− γp(1)) + λ(2(1−1/((1+λ)ee
e
) − 2) (44)
≥ (0.99)(γp(1)− γp(0))− (γp(2)− γp(1))− 0.01 (45)
≥ 1/2. (46)
We obtain (43) using the fact that (1−1/(d)) ≤ 1 for any given d. Equation (44) follows from plugging in the explicit
form of  = (1 + λ)ee
e
. To see the inequality in (45), observe that (1− ((1 + λ)eee)−1) is an increasing function of
λ. Consequently, (1− ((1 + λ)eee)−1) ≥ (1− (eee)−1) ≥ 0.99. Furthermore, the quantity λ(2(1−1/((1+λ)eee )) − 2)
is a decreasing function of λ, from which we determine
λ(2(1−1/((1+λ)e
ee )) − 2) ≥ lim
λ′→∞
λ′(2(1−1/((1+λ
′)ee
e
)) − 2) = −e−ee log(4) ≥ −0.01.
Then, we obtain the final bound in (46) as follows:
(0.99)(γp(1)− γp(0))− (γp(2)− γp(1))− 0.01 = 0.99− (
√
2− 1)− 0.01 ≥ 1/2.
A.3.5.2 Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that fpi(x) = 1/ log2(x+ 1). Fixing d = 2, we obtain
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)) = fpi(1)− fpi(2)
=
1
log2(2)
− 1
log2(3)
≥
(1
4
)( 1
log22(2)
)
(47)
=
(1
8
)( d
log22(d)
)
. (48)
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The inequality in (47) follows from the fact that log2(3)− 1 ≥ 1/2 and log2(3) ≤ 2 log2(2).
Now consider d ≥ 4 and d even. We derive a bound as follows that is justified below:
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)) ≥
bd/4c∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)) (49)
≥
(⌊d
4
⌋)
(fpi(bd/4c)− fpi(d/2)) (50)
=
(⌊d
4
⌋)( 1
log2(bd/4c+ 1)
− 1
log2(d/2 + 1)
)
=
(⌊d
4
⌋)( log2(d/2 + 1)− log2(bd/4c+ 1)
log2(d/2 + 1) log2(bd/4c+ 1)
)
≥
(⌊d
4
⌋)( log2(3)− 1
log22(d)
)
(51)
≥
( 1
16
)( d
log22(d)
)
. (52)
The inequality in (49) follows from the fact that fpi(j) ≥ fpi(j + d/2) for every j ∈ [d/2] since fpi is a decreasing
function on the domainR>0. Similarly, we obtain (50) using the observation that fpi(j)−fpi(j+d/2) ≥ fpi(bd/4c)−
fpi(d/2) for every j ∈ [bd/4c] since fpi is a decreasing function on the domain R>0. To see how (51) is derived,
observe that
log2(d/2 + 1)− log2(bd/4c+ 1) ≥ log2(d/2 + 1)− log2(d/4 + 1) ≥ log2(3)− 1 (53)
where the final inequality in (53) follows since log2(d/2 + 1) − log2(d/4 + 1) is increasing in d and d ≥ 4 by
assumption. Moreover, log2(d/2 + 1) log2(bd/4c + 1) ≤ log22(d) for d ≥ 4. The final inequality in (52) holds since
log2(3)− 1 ≥ 1/2 and bd/4c = d/4− (d mod 4)/4 ≥ d/8 for d ≥ 4.
Combining the bound for d = 2 from (48) and the bound for d ≥ 4 and even from (52), we conclude
d/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/2)) ≥
( 1
16
)( d
log22(d)
)
,
whenever d ≥ 2 and even.
A.3.5.3 Proof of Lemma 3. In this proof, we show a simple adaptation of the problem construction from Sec-
tion A.3.2 results in a suboptimality bound on SIM for the final reviewer when the number of papers d is odd that
matches (up to constants) the bound given in (31) that holds whenever the paper count d is even.
Fix d odd and let d′ = d− 1 (and hence d′ is an even number). We consider an identical problem construction for
the papers j ∈ [d′] as from Section A.3.2 and then include a paper d that has a similarity score of zero and one bid.
This change is such that for the given class of functions in the model, SUPER∗ and SIM show the paper d after the
papers in the set [d′] and the expected gain from paper d is deterministically zero since the similarity score is zero.
In particular, let the similarity scores for the final reviewer be Sn,j = 1 − 1/(j) for each paper j ∈ [d′], where
 = (1 + λ)ee
e
and λ ≥ 0 is the fixed and given trade-off parameter. Moreover, let Sn,d = 0. Set the number of bids
on the papers from previous reviewers to be
gn−1,j =
{
0, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d′/2}
1, if j ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d}.
In Section A.3.2, we showed if a pair of papers j, j′ are such that gn−1,j = gn−1,j′ and Sn,j > Sn,j′ , then
piSUPER
∗
n (j) < pi
SUPER∗
n (j
′). Since paper j′ = d is such that for every paper j ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d′}, gn−1,j = gn−1,j′
and Sn,j > Sn,j′ , we find piSUPER
∗
n (j
′) < piSUPER
∗
n (j
′). From (26), this means for this construction piSUPER
∗
n (d) = d
and that SUPER∗ shows the paper ordering
piSUPER
∗
n (j) =

d′/2− j + 1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d′/2}
d′ + d′/2 + 1− j, if j ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d′}
j, if j ∈ {d}.
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The SIM algorithm shows papers in a decreasing order of the similarity scores so that
piSIMn (j) =
{
d′ − j + 1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d′}
j, if j ∈ {d}.
Observe that this construction is identical to the problem construction from Section A.3.2 for papers in the set [d′].
Moreover, from (20) it is clear that the expected gain from papers with zero similarity score is zero independent of
the paper ordering. This allows us to conclude that the bound given in (31) for d even applies to this construction as a
function of d′. In other words, given d odd, we obtain
E[GSUPER∗n − GSIMn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
32
)( d′
log22(d
′)
)
.
Moreover, since d′ = d− 1, whenever d is odd,
E[GSUPER∗n − GSIMn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
32
)( d− 1
log22(d− 1)
)
≥
( 1
64
)( d
log22(d)
)
,
where the final inequality follows from the facts that log22(d− 1) ≤ log22(d) and d− 1 ≥ d/2 for d ≥ 2.
A.3.5.4 Proof of Lemma 4. In this proof, we show a simple adaptation of the problem construction from Sec-
tion A.3.3 leads to a suboptimality bound on BID for the final reviewer when the number of papers is odd that matches
(up to constants) the bound given in (36) that holds whenever the number of papers d is even. This approach is analo-
gous to the method to obtain a suboptimality bound for SIM with an odd number of papers using the bound that held
for an even number of papers from Lemma 3.
Fix d odd and let d′ = d− 1 (and hence d′ is an even number). We consider an identical problem construction for
the papers j ∈ [d′] as from Section A.3.3 and then include a paper d that has a similarity score of zero and one bid.
This change is such that for the given class of functions in the model, SUPER∗ and BID show the paper d after the
papers in the set [d′] and the expected gain from paper d is deterministically zero since the similarity score is zero.
Let the similarity scores for the final reviewer be
Sn,j =
{
1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d′/2}
0, if j ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d}
and the number of bids on the papers from previous reviewers be
gn−1,j =

1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d′/2}
0, if j ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d′}
1, if j = d.
We now derive the optimal paper ordering for the final reviewer. Recall from (22) that the weights of the optimiza-
tion problem for the final reviewer given in (21) are defined by
αn,j = Sn,j(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + λ(2Sn,j − 1) ∀ j ∈ [d].
Moreover, from the structure of the optimization problem in (21), if αn,j > αn,j′ , then piSUPER
∗
n (j) < pi
SUPER∗
n (j
′) so
that paper j is shown ahead of paper j′ in the ranking. Observe that for each paper j ∈ {1, . . . , d′/2}, αn,j is a fixed
number. Similarly, for each j′ ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d′} ∪ {d}, αn,j′ is a fixed number. In Section A.3.3, we showed if a
pair of papers j, j′ are such that gn−1,j = 1 and gn−1,j′ = 0 along with Sn,j = 1 and Sn,j′ = 0, then αn,j > αn,j′
so that piSUPER
∗
n (j) < pi
SUPER∗
n (j
′). This immediately guarantees piSUPER
∗
n (j) < pi
SUPER∗
n (j
′) for each pair of papers
j ∈ {1, . . . , d′/2}, j′ ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d′} ∪ {d}. We conclude piSUPER∗n (j) = j for each j ∈ [d], where without loss
of generality, to simplify the analysis, we assume if a pair of papers have equal weights in the optimization problem,
then ties are broken in order of the paper indexes since the tie-breaking mechanism will not change the expected gain
the paper ordering obtains from the final reviewer.
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The BID baseline will show papers in an increasing order of the number of bids so that
piBIDn (j) =

j + d′/2, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d′/2}
j − d′/2, if j ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d′}
j if j = d.
This paper ordering is derived from recalling that BID breaks ties by the similarity scores and further ties are broken
uniformly at random. However, without loss of generality, to simplify the analysis, we assume if a pair of papers
have equal similarity scores and bid counts, then ties are broken in order of the paper indexes since the tie-breaking
mechanism among this set of papers will not impact the expected gain.
The construction in this proof and the paper orderings selected by SUPER∗ and BID are identical to the problem
construction and paper orderings selected by SUPER∗ and BID from Section A.3.3 for papers in the set [d′]. From (20)
it is clear that the expected gain from papers with zero similarity score is zero independent of the paper ordering. This
allows us to conclude that the bound given in (36) for d even applies to this construction as a function of d′. In other
words, given d odd, we obtain
E[GSUPER∗n − GBIDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
48
+
λ
16
)( d′
log22(d
′)
)
.
Since d′ = d− 1, whenever d is odd,
E[GSUPER∗n − GBIDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
48
+
λ
16
)( d− 1
log22(d− 1)
)
≥
( 1
96
+
λ
32
)( d
log22(d)
)
,
where the final inequality follows from the facts that log22(d− 1) ≤ log22(d) and d− 1 ≥ d/2 for d ≥ 2.
A.3.5.5 Proof of Lemma 5. Recall that from the lemma statement, the number of papers d is assumed to be
divisible by four. Let E denote the event that a permutation pi of the paper set [d] drawn uniformly at random from Πd
has fewer than d/4 of the papers from the set [d/2] in the position set [d/2].
The probability of the event E can be explained in the following manner. The number of outcomes presenting j
papers from the paper set [d/2] in the position set [d/2] consists of
(
d/2
j
)
combinations of potential papers that can be
selected from the paper set [d/2] and
(
d/2
j
)
combinations of potential positions in the position set [d/2]. Moreover,
there are j! permutations of the selected papers in the chosen positions. Given that there are j papers selected from
the paper set [d/2] placed in the position set [d/2], there are
(
d/2
d/2−j
)
combinations of papers from the paper set
{d/2+1, . . . , d} that can be placed in the remaining spots in the position set [d/2]. This set of papers can be permuted
(d/2−j)! ways in the given set of positions, and the remaining d/2 papers can be permuted (d/2)! ways in the position
set {d/2 + 1, . . . , d}. To obtain the final probability of the event E , we sum the number of outcomes for each j < d/4
and then normalize by the total number of outcomes d!. Accordingly,
P(E) = 1
d!
d/4−1∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)(
d/2
j
)
(j!)
(
d/2
d/2− j
)
(d/2− j)!(d/2)!
=
1
d!
d/4−1∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)(
d/2
j
)
(j!)
( (d/2)!
(d/2− j)!j!
)
(d/2− j)!(d/2)!
=
(d/2)!(d/2)!
d!
d/4−1∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
. (54)
We now recall some facts about the binomial coefficients. The symmetry property of the binomial coefficients
implies
(
n
k
)
=
(
n
n−k
)
for 0 ≤ k ≤ n and Vandermonde’s identity says that (m+nr ) = ∑rk=0 (mk )( nr−k) and as a
corollary
(
m
n
)
=
∑m
k=0
(
2m
n
)
. Using this set of facts, we work toward a lower bound on P(E) by obtaining a simplified
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form of the sum
∑d/4−1
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
. Observe that
d/4−1∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
=
d/4∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
−
(
d/2
d/4
)2
=
1
2
d/4∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
+
1
2
d/4∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
−
(
d/2
d/4
)2
.
From the symmetry property,
(
d/2
j
)2
=
(
d/2
d/2−j
)2
, so we get
d/4−1∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
=
1
2
d/4∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
+
1
2
d/4∑
j=0
(
d/2
d/2− j
)2
−
(
d/2
d/4
)2
.
Manipulating the indexing of the sum
∑d/4
j=0
(
d/2
d/2−j
)2
, we obtain
d/4−1∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
=
1
2
d/4∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
+
1
2
d/2∑
j=d/4
(
d/2
j
)2
−
(
d/2
d/4
)2
.
Now, moving the term 12
(
d/2
d/4
)2
out of the sum 12
∑d/2
j=d/4
(
d/2
j
)2
results in
d/4−1∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
=
1
2
d/4∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
+
1
2
d/2∑
j=d/4+1
(
d/2
j
)2
− 1
2
(
d/2
d/4
)2
.
Furthermore,
d/4−1∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
=
1
2
d/2∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
− 1
2
(
d/2
d/4
)2
.
Finally, applying Vandermonde’s identity as given above, we get
d/4−1∑
j=0
(
d/2
j
)2
=
1
2
(
d
d/2
)2
− 1
2
(
d/2
d/4
)2
. (55)
Combing (54) with (55) and then simplifying, we get
P(E) =
( (d/2)!(d/2)!
2d!
)(( d
d/2
)
−
(
d/2
d/4
)2)
=
( (d/2)!(d/2)!
2d!
)( d!
(d/2)!(d/2)!
)
−
( (d/2)!(d/2)!
2d!
)( (d/2)!
(d/4)!(d/4)!
)2
=
1
2
−
( (d/2)!(d/2)!
2d!
)( (d/2)!
(d/4)!(d/4)!
)2
.
The quantity
(
(d/2)!(d/2)!
2d!
)(
(d/2)!
(d/4)!(d/4)!
)2
is decreasing in d. Consequently, for every d ≥ 4,
( (d/2)!(d/2)!
2d!
)( (d/2)!
(d/4)!(d/4)!
)2
≤ 1
3
.
This allows us to conclude
P(E) ≥ 1/2− 1/3 = 1/6.
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A.3.5.6 Proof of Lemma 6. This proof follows in a similar manner to the proof of Lemma 2. Recall that fpi(x) =
1/ log2(x+ 1). Fixing d ≥ 4 and divisible by four, we obtain the following bound justified below:
d/2∑
j=d/4
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/4 + 1)) ≥
b3d/8c∑
j=d/4
(fpi(j)− fpi(j + d/4 + 1)) (56)
≥
(⌊3d
8
⌋
+ 1− d
4
)
(fpi(b3d/8c)− fpi(d/2)) (57)
=
(⌊3d
8
⌋
+ 1− d
4
)( 1
log2(b3d/8c+ 1)
− 1
log2(d/2 + 1)
)
=
(⌊3d
8
⌋
+ 1− d
4
)( log2(d/2 + 1)− log2(b3d/8c+ 1)
log2(d/2 + 1) log2(b3d/8c+ 1)
)
≥
(⌊3d
8
⌋
+ 1− d
4
)( log2(3)− log2(12/8 + 1)
log22(d)
)
(58)
=
( 1
32
)( d
log22(d)
)
. (59)
The inequality in (56) follows from the fact that fpi(j) ≥ fpi(j+d/4+1) for every j ∈ {d/4, . . . , b3d/8c} since fpi is a
decreasing function on the domainR>0. Similarly, we obtain (57) using the observation that fpi(j)−fpi(j+d/4+1) ≥
fpi(b3d/8c) − fpi(d/2) for every j ∈ {d/4, . . . , b3d/8c} since fpi is a decreasing function on the domain R>0. To
see how (58) is derived, observe that
log2(d/2 + 1)− log2(b3d/8c+ 1) ≥ log2(d/2 + 1)− log2(3d/8 + 1) ≥ log2(3)− log2(12/8 + 1), (60)
where the final inequality in (60) follows since log2(d/2 + 1) − log2(3d/8 + 1) is increasing in d and d ≥ 4 by
assumption. Moreover, log2(d/2 + 1) log2(b3d/8c+ 1) ≤ log22(d) for d ≥ 4. The final inequality in (59) holds since
log2(3)− log2(12/8 + 1) ≥ 1/4 and
b3d/8c+ 1− d/4 ≥ 3d/8− d/4 ≥ d/8.
A.3.5.7 Proof of Lemma 7. Let us begin with d ∈ {2, 3}. It is immediate that RAND selects the paper ordering
of BID with probability at least 1/6 since |Πd| ≤ 6. Moreover, any paper ordering selected by RAND cannot obtain
higher expected gain from the final reviewer than SUPER∗ since it is optimal for the final reviewer. Accordingly,
combined with the bound on BID from (37) which holds for any d ≥ 2, we obtain for d ∈ {2, 3},
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
488
+
λ
192
)( d
log22(d)
)
. (61)
We now focus on d > 3 and not divisible by four. The problem construction we consider is similar to that from
Lemma 4 where the number of papers was odd and it was derived from including a paper with zero similarity score
and a bid as an extra paper to the problem construction from Section A.3.3. We follow the same approach, but let d′ be
the maximum number divisible by four such that d′ < d and consider an identical problem construction for the papers
in the set [d′], but then include d − d′ extra papers with zero similarity and a bid. This change is such that the papers
in the set {d′ + 1, . . . , d} are shown after the papers in the set [d′] by SUPER∗ and the expected gain from them is
deterministically zero since the similarity scores are zero.
In particular, let the similarity scores for the final reviewer be
Sn,j =
{
1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d′/2}
0, if j ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d}
and the number of bids on the papers from previous reviewers be
gn−1,j =

1, if j ∈ {1, . . . , d′/2}
0, if j ∈ {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d′}
1, if j ∈ {d′ + 1, . . . , d}.
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Following the exact reasoning from the proof of Lemma 4, we conclude piSUPER
∗
n (j) = j for each j ∈ [d].
For this construction and RAND, we need to lower bound (23). We simplify the expression by substituting the sim-
ilarity scores and the number of bids on each paper, and the paper ordering presented by SUPER∗ for this construction
to obtain
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] = EpiRANDn
[
(γp(2)− γp(1) + λ)
d′/2∑
j=1
(fpi(j)− fpi(piRANDn (j)))
]
.
where the terms for papers in the set {d′/2 + 1, . . . , d} dropped out since the similarity scores are zero. From this
point, it is clear that the analysis beginning from (38) in Section A.3.4 can be repeated as a function of d′ to obtain the
bound
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
576
+
λ
192
)( d′
log22(d
′)
)
.
Since d′ ≥ d− 3, we obtain for d > 3 and not divisible by four,
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
576
+
λ
192
)( d− 3
log22(d− 3)
)
≥
( 1
1728
+
λ
576
)( d
log22(d)
)
(62)
where the final inequality follows from the facts that log22(d− 3) ≤ log22(d) and d− 3 ≥ d/3 for d ≥ 5.
Combining the bound from (61) for d ∈ {2, 3} with the bound from (62) for d > 3 and not divisible by four, we
conclude for every d ≥ 2 and not divisible by four,
E[GSUPER∗n − GRANDn |Hn−1] ≥
( 1
1728
+
λ
576
)( d
log22(d)
)
.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3: Noiseless Community Model Result
In this proof, we show for the noiseless community model defined in Section 4.2 that SUPER∗ with zero heuristic
and SIM are optimal. Moreover, we prove that BID and RAND are significantly suboptimal. The organization of
this proof is as follows. In Section A.4.1, we present additional notation that is needed in the proof. Section A.4.2
presents simplifying preliminary analysis that is needed throughout the proof to analyze the expected paper-side and
reviewer-side gains of the algorithms. In Section A.4.3, we characterize the optimal policy for the noiseless community
model. We show in Sections A.4.4 and A.4.5 that SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and SIM are equivalent to the optimal
policy, respectively. We prove the suboptimality bounds for BID and RAND in Sections A.4.6 and A.4.7, respectively.
Combining the results from the sections of this proof gives the stated result of Theorem 3. We relegate the proofs of
technical lemmas needed for this result to Section A.4.8.
A.4.1 Notation
Theorem 3 holds for any similarity matrix S belonging to the noiseless community model defined in Section 4.2 and
formally in (7). From this point on in the proof, any reference to a similarity matrix S is such that it belongs to the
noiseless community model. Recall that the number of reviewers is given by n = mq and the number of papers is
given by d = mq where m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2.
We now state some additional notation for the proof and recall the class of gain and bidding functions assumed in
this claim. Let us define for each reviewer i ∈ [n] the set
Di = {j ∈ [d] : Si,j = s}, (63)
which comprises the papers on the block diagonal of the noiseless community model similarity matrix for the reviewer
up to a permutation of rows and columns. Similarly, define for each paper j ∈ [d] the set
Dj = {i ∈ [n] : Si,j = s}, (64)
which comprises the reviewers on the block diagonal of the noiseless community model similarity matrix for the paper
up to a permutation of rows and columns. Observe that |Di| = q for each reviewer i ∈ [n] and |Dj | = q for each
paper j ∈ [d]. In the remainder of the proof, we simply refer to the set Di as the papers on the block diagonal for a
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reviewer i ∈ [n] and the set Dj as the reviewers on the block diagonal for a paper j ∈ [d], and omit the wording of up
to a permutation of rows and columns for brevity. Similarly, if a reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is such that Si,j = s so that
i ∈ Di and j ∈ Di, we say the reviewer-paper pair is on the block diagonal and omit that this is up to a permutation of
rows and columns. Moreover, we denote by Dci the complement of the set Di for any reviewer i ∈ [n], which contains
each paper j ∈ [d] not in the setDi and corresponds to the papers not on the block diagonal for the reviewer. Similarly,
we let Dcj denote the complement of the set Dj for any paper j ∈ [d], which contains each reviewer i ∈ [n] not in the
set Dj and corresponds to the reviewers not on the block diagonal for the paper. Finally, if a reviewer-paper pair (i, j)
is such that Si,j = s so that i ∈ Dci and j ∈ Dci , we say the reviewer-paper pair is off the block diagonal. For each
complement set, we again omit the wording of up to a permutation of rows and columns.
We denote the expected gain of any algorithm ALG presenting a potentially random sequence of paper orderings
piALG1 , . . . , pi
ALG
n as
E[GALG] = E[GALGp ] + λE[GALGr ],
where the expectation is with respect to the randomness in the bids placed by reviewers and any randomness in the
algorithm and λ ≥ 0 is the trade-off parameter. The expected paper-side gain is given by the quantity
E[GALGp ] = E
[ ∑
j∈[d]
γp(gj)
]
, (65)
where gj =
∑
i∈[n] Bi,j is random the number of bids on paper j ∈ [d] at the end of the bidding process and the
paper-side gain function for this result is γp(x) =
√
x. Recall that Bi,j is a Bernoulli random variable denoting the
random bid of reviewer i ∈ [n] on paper j ∈ [d]. From the assumptions of Theorem 3, the success probability of Bi,j
for any reviewer i ∈ [n] and paper j ∈ [d] is given by the bidding function
f(piALGi (j), Si,j) = 1{piALGi (j) = 1}1{Si,j > s/2}. (66)
In the remainder of the proof, if piALGi (j) = 1, we often say the paper is shown in the highest or top position of the
paper ordering. The expected reviewer-side gain is given by
E[GALGr ] = E
[ ∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pi
ALG
i (j), Si,j)
]
, (67)
where for this result the reviewer-side gain function is
γr(pi
ALG(j), Si,j) =
2Si,j − 1
log2(pi
ALG
i (j) + 1)
= (2Si,j − 1)γpir (piALGi (j)). (68)
We let
γpir (pi
ALG
i (j)) =
1
log2(pi
ALG
i (j) + 1)
(69)
denote the component of the reviewer-side gain function that only depends on the position the paper is in.
A.4.2 Preliminaries
The focus of this section is to simplify the expressions for the expected paper-side gain and expected reviewer-side
gain from (65) and (67) respectively, using the similarity matrix structure and the given class of gain and bidding
functions. There are several immediate characteristics of the reviewer bidding behavior and the relation between the
similarity scores as a result of the given bidding function from (66) and the noiseless community model similarity
score structure from (7) that we reference throughout the proof:
• If the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is on the block diagonal of the noiseless community model similarity matrix S
so that i ∈ Dj and j ∈ Di, then paper j ∈ [d] is bid on almost surely by reviewer i ∈ [n] when piALGi (j) = 1 and
almost never when piALGi (j) 6= 1.
• If the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is not on the block diagonal of the noiseless community model similarity matrix
S so that i ∈ Dcj and j ∈ Dci , then paper j ∈ [d] is bid on almost never by reviewer i ∈ [n] independent of
piALGi (j).
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• If the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is on the block diagonal of the noiseless community model matrix S so that
i ∈ Dj and j ∈ Di, and the reviewer-paper pair (i, j′) is not on the block diagonal of the noiseless community
model matrix S so that i ∈ Dcj′ and j′ ∈ Dci , then Si,j > Si,j′ .
Observe that the statements above further imply that each reviewer bids on at most one paper almost surely.
We now show that the expected paper-side gain from any paper j ∈ [d] only depends on the positions it is shown
to reviewers i ∈ [n] by some algorithm ALG for which the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is on the block diagonal of the
similarity matrix. Indeed, the expected paper-side gain for any paper j ∈ [d] simplifies to be
E[γp(gj)] = E
[
γp
( ∑
i∈[n]
Bi,j
)]
= E
[
γp
( ∑
i∈Dj
Bi,j
)]
=
q∑
`=0
P
(
` =
∑
i∈Dj
1{piALGi (j) = 1}
)
γp(`). (70)
The preceding equation follows from the fact that the the bid from any reviewer i ∈ Dcj on paper j ∈ [d] is zero almost
surely independent of the position the paper is shown, and since any reviewer i ∈ Dj bids on the paper j ∈ [d] almost
surely if piALGi (j) = 1 and almost never if pi
ALG
i (j) 6= 1.
To obtain a final simplified version of the expected paper-side gain given in (65), we sum (70) over the paper set
[d] and get that
E[GALGp ] =
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)] =
∑
j∈[d]
q∑
`=0
P
(
` =
∑
i∈Dj
1{piALGi (j) = 1}
)
γp(`). (71)
It is now clear from (71) that to analyze the expected paper-side gain of any algorithm ALG, we only need to determine
the distribution on the number of times each paper is shown in the highest position to reviewers for which the reviewer-
paper pair is on the block diagonal of the similarity matrix.
We now turn to deriving a simplified form of the expected reviewer-side gain given in (67). Beginning from (67),
we substitute in the form of the reviewer-side gain function from (68) and then plug in the similarity scores of the
noiseless community model matrix to obtain
E[GALGr ] = E
[ ∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
(2Si,j − 1)γpir (piALGi (j))
]
= E
[
(2s − 1)
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈Di
γpir (pi
ALG
i (j))
]
. (72)
To be clear, the final equality above follows from the facts that Di ∪ Dci = [d] for each reviewer i ∈ [n] and Si,j = s
for j ∈ Di and Si,j′ = 0 for j′ ∈ Dci . It is now evident that the expected reviewer-side gain only depends on the
positions the papers on the block diagonal for each individual reviewer are presented.
A.4.3 Optimal Policy
In this section, we characterize the optimal policy for the noiseless community model and the given class of gain
and bidding functions. To do so, we independently explain how the expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain are
maximized. Then, we show that they can be simultaneously maximized to obtain the optimal policy.
Policy to maximize the expected paper-side gain. The expected paper-side gain is maximized by any policy that
shows a paper among the set with the minimum number of bids within Di in the highest position to each reviewer
i ∈ [n]. We now characterize the maximum expected paper-side gain that can be obtained and then show that the
aforementioned policy achieves it.
From the characteristics of the reviewer bidding behavior given in Section A.4.2, each reviewer bids on at most
one paper almost surely. This means that the maximum number of bids that can be obtained by any policy is equal to
the number of reviewers n = mq almost surely. The expected paper-side gain from (65) for the given paper-side gain
function is the sum of the expected value of a strictly concave function of the number of bids on a paper over each the
d = mq papers. Consequently, since the maximum number of bids that be obtained by any algorithm is equal to the
number of papers almost surely, the expected paper-side gain is maximized if the bids are evenly distributed among the
papers so that each paper has exactly one bid almost surely. It then immediately follows that the maximum expected
paper-side gain that can be obtained from any algorithm ALG is
E[GALGp ] =
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)] =
∑
j∈[d]
γp(1) = mq. (73)
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We now show that any policy presenting a paper among the set with a minimum number of bids within Di in the
highest position to each reviewer i ∈ [n] maximizes the expected paper-side gain. For any given reviewer i ∈ [n], the
q papers in Di are each in Di′ for q − 1 other reviewers i′ ∈ [n] and also in Dci′′ for each of the remaining reviewers
i′′ ∈ [n]. If a paper from Di is shown in the highest position to reviewer i ∈ [n], then it is bid on almost surely.
Moreover, any paper that is not shown in the highest position to the reviewer is bid on with probability zero. Together,
this means that upon the arrival of each reviewer i ∈ [n], there is a paper in Di with zero bids that has not been shown
in the highest position to any reviewer previously almost surely. Consequently, each paper j ∈ [d] is shown exactly
once almost surely in the highest position to some reviewer i ∈ Dj . It then follows from the decomposition in (70)
that the expected paper-side gain of this policy ALG is
E[GALGp ] =
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)] =
∑
j∈[d]
γp(1) = mq. (74)
We conclude that the policy maximizes the expected paper-side gain since it was shown in (73) that the maximum
expected paper-side gain that can be obtained is mq.
Policy to maximize the expected reviewer-side gain. The expected reviewer-side gain as given in (72) is decoupled
between each of the reviewers. Moreover, the expected reviewer-side gain from any reviewer i ∈ [n] only depends on
the positions that papers in the set Di are shown. Since the function γpir as given in (69) is decreasing on the domain
R>0, as long as each paper in the set Di is shown before the papers in the set Dci , then the expected reviewer-side gain
from any reviewer i ∈ [n] is maximized. This means that if a policy shows papers this way for each reviewer i ∈ [n],
then the expected reviewer-side gain is maximized.
Overall optimal policy. The expected paper-side and reviewer-side gains can be simultaneously maximized. Indeed,
if a paper among the set with the minimum number of bids from Di is shown in the highest position to each reviewer
i ∈ [n], then the expected paper-side gain is maximized. Furthermore, if the remaining papers in Di are shown ahead
of each paper in Dci for each reviewer i ∈ [n], then the expected reviewer-side gain is maximized. It then follows that
this is the optimal policy. We refer to such a policy as OPT in the remainder of the proof.
A.4.4 Optimality of SUPER∗ with Zero Heuristic
We show in this section that SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is equivalent to the optimal policy under the noiseless
community model for the given class of gain and bidding functions.
Informal description of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic policy. Recall that as explained in Section 3 and formally
characterized in Section 4, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is designed to maximize the immediate expected gain from
each reviewer conditioned on the history. We show that the immediate expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain
from any reviewer i ∈ [n] are both maximized by showing a paper with the minimum number of bids among Di in the
highest position, followed by the remaining papers in Di in any order, and then the papers from Dci in any order.
The immediate expected paper-side gain from any reviewer i ∈ [n] is maximized by showing a paper with the
minimum number of bids among Di in the highest position in the paper ordering. To see why, observe that the im-
mediate expected paper-side gain from any paper that is not shown in the highest position is zero since the probability
of it being bid on is zero. Moreover, the probability of a paper being bid on that is shown in the highest position is
only non-zero if it is in the set of papers Di. Then, since the given paper-side gain function is strictly concave so the
returns of bids are diminishing, we determine that the immediate expected paper-side gain from the paper shown in
the highest position of the ordering is maximized if it is a paper with the minimum number of bids among Di.
The expected reviewer-side gain from any reviewer i ∈ [n] is maximized as long as papers in Di are shown ahead
of Dci . This follows from the fact that the expected reviewer-side gain as given in (72) is decoupled between the
reviewers. Furthermore, the expected reviewer-side gain from any reviewer i ∈ [n] only depends on the positions that
papers in the setDi are shown. Since the function γpir as given in (69) is decreasing on the domainR>0, as long as each
paper in the set Di is shown before the papers in the set Dci , then the expected reviewer-side gain from the reviewer is
maximized.
Formal description of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic policy. We now formally state the policy of SUPER∗ with zero
heuristic policy for the noiseless community model and the given gain and bidding functions. The proof of Lemma 8
is given in Section A.4.8.
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Lemma 8. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows a paper among the set with the
minimum number of bids from Di in the highest position to each reviewer i ∈ [n]. Moreover, the remaining papers
in Di are shown in an arbitrary order ahead of the papers in Dci which are also shown in arbitrary order to each
reviewer i ∈ [n].
The policy of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic given in Lemma 8 is equivalent to the optimal policy derived in Sec-
tion A.4.3. We conclude SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is optimal for the noiseless community model with the given
class of gain and bidding functions.
A.4.5 Optimality of SIM
The SIM policy shows papers to each reviewer in decreasing order of the similarity scores with ties between a pair
of papers broken in favor of the paper with fewer bids and any remaining ties are broken uniformly at random. The
similarity score of each paper j ∈ Di is greater than the similarity score of each paper j′ ∈ Dci for each reviewer. By
definition of the policy, the previous fact immediately implies that for each reviewer i ∈ [n], SIM shows each paper
in Di ahead of each paper in Dci . Moreover, the tie-breaking mechanism of SIM guarantees that a paper with the
minimum number of bids among Di is shown in the highest position of the paper ordering to each reviewer i ∈ [n].
This policy is equivalent to the optimal policy given in Section A.4.3, and hence SIM is optimal for the noiseless
community model with the given class of gain and bidding functions.
A.4.6 Suboptimality of BID
We now prove the suboptimality of BID for the noiseless community model.
Intuition and BID policy. The BID algorithm presents papers in an increasing order of the number of bids and ties
between papers are broken in favor of the paper with the higher similarity score. In this section, we go on to show that
this policy maximizes the expected paper-side gain. This follows from the fact that almost surely a paper with zero
bids and a similarity score exceeding the threshold necessary for a reviewer to bid on a paper is shown in the highest
position to each reviewer and bid on. However, for the noiseless community model similarity class, the algorithm is
suboptimal for the combined objective since the expected reviewer-side gain obtained is suboptimal. The fundamental
problem with BID is that, except for as a tie-breaking mechanism, the similarity scores are ignored by the algorithm.
For the given bidding model, papers which are not shown in the highest position are bid on with probability zero.
Consequently, showing papers with fewer bids closer, but not in the highest position, cannot improve the expected
paper-side gain and reduces the expected reviewer-side gain.
Bounding the expected paper-side gain. Recall from Section A.4.3 that any policy presenting a paper among the
set with a minimum number of bids within Di in the highest position to each reviewer i ∈ [n] maximizes the expected
paper-side gain. We now follow similar arguments from Section A.4.3 to determine that BID shows a paper among
the set with a minimum number of bids among Di in the highest position to each reviewer i ∈ [n] almost surely so
that is maximizes the expected paper-side gain.
For any given reviewer i ∈ [n], the q papers in Di are in Di′ for the same q− 1 other reviewers i′ ∈ [n] and also in
Dci′′ for each of the remaining reviewers i′′ ∈ [n]. For any reviewer i ∈ [n], any paper j ∈ Dci is bid on almost never
and any paper j ∈ Di is only bid on with non-zero probability if shown in the highest position to the reviewer. This
means that upon the arrival of each reviewer i ∈ [n], there is a paper in Di with zero bids almost surely. Furthermore,
the similarity score of any paper in Di is greater than the similarity score of any paper in Dci for each reviewer i ∈ [n].
Hence, BID shows a paper in Di with zero bids in the highest position to each reviewer i ∈ [n] almost surely since
papers are shown in increasing order of the number of bids and ties are broken in favor of the paper with the higher
similarity score. The structure of the bidding function guarantees that if a paper in Di is shown in the highest position
of the paper ordering to reviewer i ∈ [n], then it is bid on by the reviewer almost surely. Consequently, each paper
j ∈ [d] is shown exactly once almost surely in the highest position to some reviewer i ∈ Dj . It then follows from the
decomposition in (70) that the expected paper-side gain of BID for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, is given by
E[GBIDp ] =
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)] =
∑
j∈[d]
γp(1) = mq.
From the expected paper-side gain of OPT given in (74), we conclude that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
E[GOPTp ]− E[GBIDp ] = 0. (75)
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Bounding the expected reviewer-side gain. We now show that the optimal policy OPT obtains significantly more
expected reviewer-side gain than BID. This requires deriving a suitable lower bound on the following expression based
on (72):
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] = λE
[ ∑
i∈[n]
(2s − 1)
∑
j∈Di
(γpir (pi
OPT
i (j))− γr(piBIDi (j)))
]
. (76)
Let us begin by defining a “good event” for any reviewer and paper under which if the paper has probability zero of
being bid on then it is not bid on and if the paper has probability one of being bid on then it is bid on. Formally, for
any reviewer k ∈ [n], paper j ∈ [d], and paper ordering piALGk given by an algorithm ALG, we define
EALGk,j ={piALGk (j) = 1, Sk,j > s/2,Bk,j = 1} ∪ {piALGk (j) 6= 1,Bk,j = 0} ∪ {Sk,j < s/2,Bk,j = 0}.
Moreover, for each reviewer i ∈ [n], define the following event Ei = ∪i−1k=1 ∪dj=1 {EOPTk,j ∪ EBIDk,j } which says the good
event held for each reviewer that arrived previously for every paper and observe that the complement of this event
occurs on a measure zero space by the structure of the bidding function given in (66). Consequently, from the law of
total expectation, an equivalent form of (76) is given by
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] = λE
[ ∑
i∈[n]
(2s − 1)E
[ ∑
j∈Di
(γpir (pi
OPT
i (j))− γr(piBIDi (j)))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (77)
Recall from the derivation of the expected paper-side gain of OPT in Section A.4.3 and BID in this section that
each algorithm obtains exactly one bid almost surely from each reviewer and on each paper. Define F as the set of
initial bmq/4c reviewers for which upon arrival of such a reviewer i ∈ F at least one paper on the block diagonal for
the reviewer given by Di has received a bid previously. Observe that OPT obtains at least as much expected reviewer-
side gain as BID from each reviewer since it was shown in Section A.4.3 that the policy maximizes the expected
reviewer-side gain from each individual reviewer. As a result, we get the following lower bound on (77):
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
(2s − 1)E
[ ∑
j∈Di
(γpir (pi
OPT
i (j))− γr(piBIDi (j)))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (78)
We now separate papers into relevant groups defined upon arrival for each reviewer i ∈ F given the event Ei.
Let Ti,1 be the set of papers in Di with zero bids and Ti,2 be the set of papers in Di with one bid. Denote by Ti,3
the set of papers in Dci with zero bids and Ti,4 as the papers in Dci with one bid. Moreover, we let Ni,k = |Ti,k|
for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} denote the number of papers in each set and define `i = Ni,1 + 1. Using this notation, (78) is
equivalently
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
(2s − 1)E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,1∪Ti,2
(γpir (pi
OPT
i (j))− γr(piBIDi (j)))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (79)
As shown in Section A.4.3, OPT shows a paper with the minimum number of bids amongDi in the highest position
of the paper ordering to each reviewer i ∈ F . Again, this paper corresponds to a paper in the set Ti,1 with zero bids.
After this paper, the remaining papers in Di are shown in any arbitrary order. This group of papers contains papers
among Ti,1 ∪ Ti,2. Since it has no impact on the expected gain in the analysis that follows, without loss of generality,
consider that OPT shows the papers in Ti,1 ahead of the papers in Ti,2.
The BID policy shows a paper with the minimum number of bids among Di in the highest position of the paper
ordering to each reviewer i ∈ F almost surely as proved earlier. See that such a paper corresponds to a paper in the
set Ti,1 with zero bids. After this paper, the remaining papers with zero bids, which by definition belong to Ti,1 ∪Ti,3,
are shown with ties broken in favor of the paper with the higher similarity score. Since each paper in Di has a higher
similarity score than each paper inDci , we conclude that BID shows the remaining papers in Ti,1 after the paper shown
in the highest position.
Consequently, the papers in Ti,1 are shown among the positions {1, . . . , Ni,1} by both OPT and BID conditioned
on the event Ei. This allows us to simplify (79) and get that
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
(2s − 1)E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,2
(γpir (pi
OPT
i (j))− γr(piBIDi (j)))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (80)
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As we just showed, conditioned on the event Ei, OPT shows the papers in Ti,2 in an arbitrary order immediately
after the papers in Ti,1 to each reviewer i ∈ F . This means that the papers in Ti,2 are shown among the position set
{`i, . . . , `i +Ni,2 − 1} by OPT to each reviewer i ∈ F conditioned on Ei.
In contrast, BID shows the papers in Ti,2 after the papers in Ti,1 ∪ Ti,3, but before the papers in Ti,4. Indeed, the
papers in Ti,3 each have zero bids and the papers in Ti,2 each have one bid, so by definition of the policy, BID shows
the papers in Ti,3 ahead of the papers in Ti,2. Furthermore, by definition of the sets, the similarity score of each paper
in Ti,2 is greater than the similarity score of each paper in Ti,4, which combined with the tie-breaking mechanism of
BID ensures that papers in Ti,2 are shown ahead of the papers in Ti,4 even though the number of bids are equal. This
means that the papers in Ti,2 are shown among the position set {`i +Ni,3, . . . , `i +Ni,2 +Ni,3 − 1} by BID to each
reviewer i ∈ F conditioned on Ei.
From this set of facts and continuing from (80), we obtain
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[
(2s − 1)
∑
i∈F
E
[ `i+Ni,2−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (81)
Minimizing over i ∈ F in (81) and using the definition |F| = bmq/4c, we get the bound
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[
(2s − 1)(bmq/4c) min
i∈F
E
[ `i+Ni,2−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (82)
Moreover, for every m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2, it holds that
bmq/4c = mq/4− (mq mod 4)/4 ≥ mq/8, (83)
and by definition of the noiseless community model
2s − 1 ≥ 20.01 − 1 ≥ 1/150. (84)
Combining (82), (83), and (84), we have
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] ≥
( λ
1200
)
E
[
min
i∈F
E
[ `i+Ni,2−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (85)
Toward the goal of bounding the right-hand side of (85), we now work on verifying the following claim.
Claim 1. For each reviewer i ∈ F and conditioned on the event Ei,
Ni,3 ≥ mq − q −m− bmq/4c+Ni,2 + 1 ≥ Ni,2 ≥ 1. (86)
Recall that Ni,3 denotes the number of papers in Dci with zero bids upon the arrival of reviewer i ∈ F . By definition,
the number of papers in Dci is mq − q. To bound Ni,3, we need to bound the maximum number of papers Dci that
could have been bid on previously upon the arrival of the reviewer. Observe that upon the arrival of the reviewer, there
could be at most (bmq/4c − 1)− (Ni,2 − 1) reviewers from F that previously arrived and bid on a paper in Dci . This
follows from the fact that |F| = bmq/4c and each reviewer bids on at most one paper almost surely from the structure
of the bidding function given in (66), so the total number of bids from this set of reviewers previously is at most
(bmq/4c − 1). Furthermore, of the (bmq/4c − 1) bids from the reviewer set F , the number of bids on papers which
are in Di instead of Dci is given by (Ni,2 − 1) since prior to the arrival of the reviewer a paper in Di had to be bid on
by definition of the reviewer set F . Finally, at most (m− 1) papers in Dci are bid on before the arrival of the reviewer
from previous reviewers which do not belong to F since there are m blocks in the similarity matrix. Accordingly, the
number of papers with a bid in Dci is at most (m− 1) + (bmq/4c − 1)− (Ni,2 − 1). We conclude that the number of
papers in Dci without a bid given by Ni,3 for any reviewer i ∈ F conditioned on Ei is bounded below as follows
Ni,3 ≥ mq − q −m− bmq/4c+Ni,2 + 1. (87)
We now show
mq − q −m− bmq/4c+Ni,2 + 1 ≥ Ni,2. (88)
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To see (88), observe that
mq − q −m− bmq/4c+ 1 ≥ mq − q −m−mq/4 + 1 = 3mq/4− q −m+ 1. (89)
The quantity (3mq/4− q −m+ 1) is increasing in m and q for m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2. Using this fact, we get that for every
m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2,
3mq/4− q −m+ 1 ≥ 0. (90)
Combining (89) and (90) immediately implies that (88) holds. Finally, Ni,2 ≥ 1 for each reviewer i ∈ F conditioned
on the event Ei by definition of the reviewer set, which proves the final inequality of (86).
Using the result from (86), we now prove the following claim to bound the right-hand side of (85).
Claim 2. Conditioned on the event Ei, for each reviewer i ∈ F it must be that
`i+Ni,2−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3)) ≥
(2
5
)( 1
log22(mq)
)
. (91)
To begin, for any i ∈ F conditioned on the event Ei we get that
`i+Ni,2−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3)) ≥
`i+Ni,2−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +mq − q −m− bmq/4c+Ni,2 + 1)). (92)
The inequality in (92) relies upon the facts that `i ≥ 1 for each reviewer i ∈ F by definition and the function γpir as
given in (69) is decreasing on the domain R>0. As a result of each property, we can invoke the lower bound on Ni,3
from (86) to get the stated bound in (92). Moreover, `i + Ni,2 − 1 = |Di| = q by definition for any i ∈ F given the
event Ei, so an equivalent form of the bound in (92) is
`i+Ni,2−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3)) ≥
q∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +mq − q −m− bmq/4c+Ni,2 + 1)). (93)
Now, since `i ≥ 1 for each reviewer i ∈ F by definition, the function γpir as given in (69) is decreasing on the
domain R>0, and mq − q − m − bmq/4c + Ni,2 + 1 ≥ 1 from (86), we determine that each summand in (93) is
positive. Hence, to obtain a lower bound on (93), we take the maximum `i over each reviewer i ∈ F . Recall that
`i − 1 = Ni,1, which gives the total number of papers in Di without a bid by definition. For each reviewer i ∈ F ,
there must be at least one paper with a bid in Di by definition of the reviewer set given the event Ei. Then, using the
fact that |Di| = q, we get `i − 1 = Ni,1 ≤ q− 1 so that `i ≤ q for any reviewer i ∈ F given the event Ei. Hence, (93)
is lower bounded as follows:
`i+Ni,2−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3)) ≥ γpir (q)− γpir (mq −m− bmq/4c+Ni,2 + 1). (94)
Combining the fact thatNi,2 ≥ 1 for each reviewer i ∈ F conditioned on the event Ei by definition of the reviewer
set with (86), we obtain
mq −m− bmq/4c+Ni,2 + 1 ≥ mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2 ≥ q + 1. (95)
Since γpir as given in (69) is decreasing on the domain R>0, the inequality in (95) immediately implies
γpir (mq −m− bmq/4c+Ni,2 + 1) ≤ γpir (mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2). (96)
Then, combining (94) and (96) results in the bound
`i+Ni,2−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3)) ≥ γpir (q)− γpir (mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2). (97)
To bound (γpir (q)− γpir (mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2)), we need the following result proved in Section A.4.8.2.
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Lemma 9. Fix m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and let γpir (x) = 1/ log2(x+ 1). Then,
γpir (q)− γpir (mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2) ≥
(2
5
)( 1
log22(mq)
)
.
Applying Lemma 9 to (97), we arrive at the lower bound claimed in (91). Then, relating (91) back to (82), for
every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, the following bound holds
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] ≥
( 1
3000
)( λmq
log22(mq)
)
. (98)
Observe that the expectation in the right-hand side of (98) is dropped since it is not a random variable.
Completing the bound. Combining the bounds on the expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain between OPT and
BID given in (77) and (98), we find for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, λ ≥ 0,
E[GOPT − GBID] = E[GOPTp − GBIDp ] + λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ]
≥
( 1
3000
)( λmq
log22(q)
)
.
We conclude that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, BID is suboptimal by an
additive factor of at least cλmq/ log22(mq) for the noiseless community model.
A.4.7 Suboptimality of RAND
In this section, we show the suboptimality of RAND for the noiseless community model.
Intuition and RAND policy. The RAND algorithm selects a paper ordering uniformly at random from the set of
permutations of papers. For the given class of gain and bidding functions, this is problematic since to obtain a bid
from a reviewer, a paper from the block diagonal for the reviewer must be shown in the highest position. Since at
least half of the papers are not on the block diagonal of the similarity matrix for any reviewer, there is a significant
probability that RAND fails to induce a bid from each reviewer. This causes the algorithm to be suboptimal for the
expected paper-side gain.
Bounding the expected paper-side gain. Recall from (70) that the expected paper-side gain from any paper j ∈ [d]
is given by
E[γp(gj)] =
q∑
`=0
P
(
` =
∑
i∈Dj
1{piRANDi (j) = 1}
)
γp(`). (99)
To bound this quantity for a given paper, we need to characterize the distribution of the number of times the paper is
shown in the highest position to reviewers for which it is on the block diagonal.
The RAND algorithm selects a paper ordering uniformly at random from the set of paper permutations. This means
the probability of paper any paper j ∈ [d] being shown in the highest position to any reviewer i ∈ [n] is 1/mq since
there are d = mq papers. Consequently, the number of times paper j ∈ [d] is shown in the highest position to reviewers
in the set Dj follows a binomial distribution with q trials, since the cardinality of Dj is q, and a success probability of
1/mq. This means the expected paper-side gain from any paper j ∈ [d] given in (99) for RAND is equivalently
E[γp(gj)] =
q∑
`=0
(
q
`
)( 1
mq
)`(
1− 1
mq
)q−`
γp(`). (100)
To bound (100), we need the following lemma that bounds the expectation of the square root of a binomial random
variable with n trials and success probability p.
Lemma 10. Fix n ≥ 2 and p ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
√
k ≤ np(1− p)n−1
(
1−
√
2
2
)
+ np
(√2
2
)
.
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The proof of Lemma 10 is provided in Section A.4.8.3.
We can directly apply Lemma 10 to (100) since the given paper-side gain function is the square root function. The
number of trials is q ≥ 2 and the success probability is 1/mq, so for any paper j ∈ [d], we obtain
E[γp(gj)] =
q∑
`=0
(
q
`
)( 1
mq
)`(
1− 1
mq
)q−`
γp(`) ≤
( 1
m
)(
1− 1
mq
)q−1(
1−
√
2
2
)
+
√
2
2m
. (101)
The bound in the right-hand side of (101) is decreasing in m and q for m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2. This means for every m ≥ 2,
q ≥ 2, and any paper j ∈ [d],
E[γp(gj)] ≤ 6 +
√
2
16
.
To get a final bound on the expected paper-side gain of the algorithm, we sum the previous bound over the number of
papers and obtain
E[GRANDp ] =
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)] ≤
(6 +√2
16
)
mq. (102)
Combining (102) with the expected paper-side gain of the optimal policy which was shown to be mq in Section A.4.3,
this implies for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
E[GOPTp − GRANDp ] ≥ mq −
(6 +√2
16
)
mq. (103)
Bounding the expected reviewer-side gain. We compare the expected reviewer-side gain of the optimal algorithm
OPT and RAND. Previously in Section A.4.3 we showed that the optimal algorithm maximizes the expected reviewer-
side gain. This means that the expected reviewer-side gain of RAND cannot exceed that from the optimal policy OPT.
Consequently, for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0 we get the bound
λE[GOPTr − GRANDr ] ≥ 0. (104)
Completing the bound. Combining the bounds on the expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain between the
optimal algorithm OPT and RAND given in (103) and (104), for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, we get that
E[GOPT − GRAND] = E[GOPTp − GRANDp ] + λE[GOPTr − GRANDr ]
≥ mq −
(6 +√2
16
)
mq ≥ mq/2.
We conclude that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, RAND is suboptimal by
an additive factor of at least cmq for the noiseless community model.
A.4.8 Proofs of Lemmas 8–10
In this section, we present the proofs of technical lemmas stated in the primary proof of Theorem 3.
A.4.8.1 Proof of Lemma 8. In the proof of Corollary A.2 given in Section A.2, we showed in (17) that SUPER∗
with zero heuristic solves the problem
piSUPER
∗
i = arg max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
f(pii(j), Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j) (105)
in order to determine the ordering of papers piSUPER
∗
i to present to reviewer i ∈ [n] so that the immediate expected
gain is maximized conditioned on the history of bids from reviewers that arrived previously. Recalling that the bidding
function is f(pii(j), Si,j) = 1{pii(j) = 1}1{Si,j > s/2}, the optimization problem in (105) is equivalent to
piSUPER
∗
i = arg max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
1{pii(j) = 1}1{Si,j > s/2}(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j). (106)
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Observe that Di ∪ Dci = [d]. Moreover, if j ∈ Di, then Si,j > s/2 since Si,j = s by definition of the noiseless
community model similarity matrix and s ∈ [0.01, 1]. Analogously, if j ∈ Dci , then Si,j < s/2 since Si,j = 0 by
definition of the noiseless community model similarity matrix and s ∈ [0.01, 1]. This allows us to simplify (106) to
the following problem:
piSUPER
∗
i = arg max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈Di
1{pii(j) = 1}(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j). (107)
The given paper-side gain function γp is such that γp(gi−1,j+1)−γp(gi−1,j) is decreasing as a function of the number
of bids gi−1,j . As a result, the expected paper-side gain term from (107), which is given by∑
j∈Di
1{pii(j) = 1}(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)), (108)
is maximized by showing a paper j ∈ Di with the minimum number of bids in the highest position of the paper
ordering. Moreover, the given reviewer-side gain function γr from (68) is decreasing in the position pii(j) in which
a paper is shown and increasing in the similarity score Si,j . Consequently, the expected reviewer-side gain term
from (107), which is given by ∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j), (109)
is maximized by showing papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores. The similarity score is Si,j = s ∈
[0.01, 1] for papers inDi and the similarity score is Si,j = 0 for papers inDci by definition of the noiseless community
model. Accordingly, the expected reviewer-side gain term in (109) is maximized as long as each paper in Di is shown
earlier in the paper ordering than each paper in Dci .
Since the expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain terms of (107) given by (108) and (109) respectively can be
simultaneously maximized by showing any of the papers with the minimum number of bids among Di in the highest
position, followed by the remaining papers in Di in any arbitrary order, and then the papers in Dci in any arbitrary
order, we conclude this is the policy of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic.
A.4.8.2 Proof of Lemma 9. Recall that γpir = 1/ log2(x + 1). Moreover, fix m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2. Simplifying the
expression we seek to bound, we obtain
γpir (q)− γpir (mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2) =
1
log2(q + 1)
− 1
log2(mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2 + 1)
=
log2(mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2 + 1)− log2(q + 1)
log2(mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2 + 1) log2(q + 1)
. (110)
We now lower bound the numerator of the right-hand side of (110). For any fixed m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2,
log2(mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2 + 1)− log2(q + 1) ≥ log2(2q − bq/2c+ 1)− log2(q + 1). (111)
To see why, observe that mq − m − bmq/4c is non-decreasing as a function of m for m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2. The
non-decreasing property follows from the fact that
(m+ 1)q − (m+ 1)− b(m+ 1)q/4c = mq −m+ q − 1− bmq/4 + q/4c
≥ mq −m+ q − 1− (bmq/4c+ bq/4c+ 1)
= mq −m− bmq/4c+ q − bq/4c − 2
≥ mq −m− bmq/4c.
To get the final inequality, consider
q − bq/4c − 2 = q − q/4 + (q mod 4)/4− 2 = 3q/4 + (q mod 4)/4− 2 (112)
and notice that for q = 2, (112) is zero, and for q > 2, (112) is positive.
Now, see that log2(2q−bq/2c+ 1)− log2(q+ 1) is increasing as a function of q since 2q−bq/2c > q for q ≥ 2.
Accordingly, for every m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2,
log2(2q − bq/2c+ 1)− log2(q + 1) ≥ log2(4)− log2(3) ≥ 2/5. (113)
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To finish, we obtain a lower bound on (110) by finding an upper bound on the denominator in the right-hand side.
Observe that log2(mq−m− bmq/4c+ 2 + 1) ≤ log2(mq) since m+ bmq/4c ≥ 3 and log2(q+ 1) ≤ log2(mq) for
every m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2. Then, combined with (110), (111), and (113), we obtain the stated result of
γpir (q)− γpir (mq −m− bmq/4c+ 2) ≥
(2
5
)( 1
log22(mq)
)
.
A.4.8.3 Proof of Lemma 10. Given n ≥ 2 and p ∈ [0, 1], we need to prove the bound
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
√
k ≤ np(1− p)n−1
(
1−
√
2
2
)
+ np
(√2
2
)
.
To begin, observe that
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
√
k =
n∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
√
k. (114)
Then, since (
n
k
)
pk =
( n!
k!(n− k)!
)
pk =
(np
k
)( (n− 1)!
(k − 1)!(n− k)!
)
pk−1 =
(np
k
)(n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1,
we can simplify (114) to obtain
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
√
k = np
n∑
k=1
(√k
k
)(n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k. (115)
From the fact that
√
k
k ≤
√
2
2 for k ≥ 2, we bound (115) as follows:
np
n∑
k=1
(√k
k
)(n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k = np(1− p)n−1 + np
n∑
k=2
(√k
k
)(n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k
≤ np(1− p)n−1 + np
(√2
2
) n∑
k=2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k. (116)
Relating (116) back to (115), we get
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
√
k ≤ np(1− p)n−1 + np
(√2
2
) n∑
k=2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k. (117)
From addition and subtraction of np(1− p)n−1(√22 ) into the right-hand side of (117), we obtain
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
√
k ≤ np(1− p)n−1
(
1−
√
2
2
)
+ np
(√2
2
) n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k. (118)
Now, see that from an indexing manipulation
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k. (119)
Moreover, from the Binomial theorem,
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k = (p+ (1− p))n−1 = 1. (120)
Combining (118), (119), and (120) gives the final result of
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k
√
k ≤ np(1− p)n−1
(
1−
√
2
2
)
+ np
(√2
2
)
.
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 4: Noisy Community Model Result
In this proof, we show for the noisy community model that SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is near optimal and each of
the baselines is significantly suboptimal with respect to SUPER∗ with zero heuristic. The organization of this proof
is as follows. In Section A.5.1, we present notation and preliminary analysis that is needed throughout the proof. In
Section A.5.2, we analyze SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and compute the expected paper-side gain for the similarity
matrix class. We prove the suboptimality bounds for the SIM, BID, and RAND baselines with respect to SUPER∗ with
zero heuristic separately in Sections A.5.3, A.5.4, and A.5.5 respectively. We finish the proof in Section A.5.6 by
showing that SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is near optimal. Combining the results in each section of this proof gives the
stated result of the theorem. Proofs of technical lemmas needed only for this proof can be found in Section A.5.7. The
proofs of technical lemmas used in this proof, but introduced in the proof of Theorem 3, are given in Section A.4.8.
Finally, we remark that a number of methods for proving this result are similar to that from the proof of Theorem 3
and we point out in several places where this is the case as well as where the techniques differ.
A.5.1 Notation and Preliminaries
The notation and terminology in this proof follow that from the proof of Theorem 3 in Section A.4.1 since the gain and
bidding functions are shared between the results and the noisy community model is based on the noiseless community
model. The primary adjustment is that any reference to a similarity matrix S refers to that from the noisy community
model, which is generated by selecting some similarity matrix S′ from the noiseless community model as given
in in (7), and then adding noise in the manner described in (8). Recall that the noise in the similarity score for each
reviewer-paper pair (i, j) denoted by νi,j is drawn independently and uniformly from (0, ξ) where ξ ≤ (1+λ)−1e−emq
for the given trade-off parameter λ ≥ 0. We also follow the notation from the proof of Theorem 3 in Section A.4.1, in
terms of terminology of reviewers and papers on the block diagonal and keep the sets Di for all i ∈ [n] and Dj for all
j ∈ [d] from (63) and (64) defined in terms of the noiseless community model similarity matrix now given by S′.
In an analogous manner to the preliminaries section of the proof of Theorem 3, we present several characteristics
of the reviewer bidding behavior and the similarity scores that are needed throughout the proof. This set of rather
immediate results also enable a decomposition of the expected paper-side gain equivalent to that for the noiseless
community model from the proof of Theorem 3 given in (70).
We begin by showing if a paper is on the block diagonal for a reviewer, then it is bid on almost surely when shown
in the highest position of the paper ordering to the reviewer and almost never when it is not.
Lemma 11. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, if the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is on the block diagonal of the
noiseless community model matrix S′ so that i ∈ Dj and j ∈ Di, then in the noisy community model matrix Si,j > s/2.
Moreover, the paper j ∈ [d] is bid on by reviewer i ∈ [n] almost surely when piALGi (j) = 1 and almost never when
piALGi (j) 6= 1.
Proof of Lemma 11. If the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is on the block diagonal of the noiseless community model matrix
S′, then by definition S′i,j = s and Si,j = s− νi,j where the noise νi,j is drawn uniformly at random from the interval
(0, ξ). Moreover, recall that s ∈ [0.01, 1] and ξ ≤ (1 + λ)−1e−emq . Accordingly, for λ ≥ 0,m ≥ 2, and q ≥ 2, we
obtain
ξ ≤ (1 + λ)−1e−emq ≤ e−4e < 0.01/2 ≤ s/2. (121)
Since νi,j ∈ (0, ξ), we immediately get Si,j > s−ξ. Then applying (121), we conclude that Si,j > s/2. Finally, since
the probability of reviewer i bidding on paper j is given by the quantity f(piALGi (j), Si,j) = 1{piALGi (j) = 1}1{Si,j >
s/2}, the reviewer bids on the paper almost surely when piALGi (j) = 1 and almost never when piALGi (j) 6= 1.
We now show that if a paper is not on the block diagonal for a given reviewer, then the reviewer bids on the paper
almost never independent of the position the paper is shown.
Lemma 12. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, if the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is not on the block diagonal of
the noiseless community model matrix S′ so that i ∈ Dcj and j ∈ Dci , then in the noisy community model matrix
Si,j < s/2. Moreover, paper j ∈ [d] is bid on almost never by reviewer i ∈ [n] independent of piALGi (j).
Proof of Lemma 12. If the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is not on the block diagonal of the noiseless community model
matrix S′, then by definition S′i,j = 0 and Si,j = νi,j where the noise νi,j is drawn uniformly at random from the
interval (0, ξ). Since νi,j ∈ (0, ξ), we immediately get Si,j < ξ. Then applying (121), we conclude that Si,j < s/2.
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Finally, since the probability of reviewer i bidding on paper j is given by the quantity f(piALGi (j), Si,j) = 1{piALGi (j) =
1}1{Si,j > s/2}, the reviewer bids on the paper almost never independent of the position the paper is shown to the
reviewer given from piALGi (j).
Observe that Lemmas 11 and 12 imply that each reviewer bids on at most one paper almost surely. Moreover, they
can also be combined to determine that any paper on the block diagonal for a reviewer is guaranteed to have a higher
similarity score than any paper not on the block diagonal for the reviewer.
Lemma 13. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, if the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is on the block diagonal of the
noiseless community model matrix S′ so that i ∈ Dj and j ∈ Di, and the reviewer-paper pair (i, j′) is not on the
block diagonal of the noiseless community model matrix S′ so that i ∈ Dcj′ and j′ ∈ Dci , then in the noisy community
model matrix Si,j > Si,j′ .
We now apply the preceding results to show that the expected paper-side gain from a given paper j ∈ [d] only
depends on the positions it is shown to reviewers i ∈ [n] by some algorithm ALG for which the reviewer-paper pair
(i, j) is on the block diagonal of the similarity matrix. The expected paper-side gain for any paper j ∈ [d] simplifies
to be
E[γp(gj)] = E
[
γp
( ∑
i∈[n]
Bi,j
)]
= E
[
γp
( ∑
i∈Dj
Bi,j
)]
=
q∑
`=0
P
(
` =
∑
i∈Dj
1{piALGi (j) = 1}
)
γp(`). (122)
The above equation follows from Lemma 12, which indicates that the the bid from any reviewer i ∈ Dcj is zero almost
surely independent of the position the paper is shown, and from Lemma 11, which guarantees any reviewer i ∈ Dj bids
on the paper j ∈ [d] almost surely if piALGi (j) = 1 and almost never if piALGi (j) 6= 1. As mentioned at the beginning of
this section, this decomposition of the expected paper-side gain for the noisy community model in (122) is equivalent
to that for the noiseless community model given in (70).
A.5.2 Analyzing SUPER∗ with Zero Heuristic
In this section, we present a preliminary analysis of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic for the noisy community model
similarity matrix class with the given gain and bidding functions. We begin by characterizing the behavior of SUPER∗
with zero heuristic. Following deriving the policy, the expected paper-side gain of the algorithm is computed. The
analysis of the expected reviewer-side gain is deferred to the sections showing the suboptimality of the baselines with
respect to SUPER∗ with zero heuristic (specifically, see Sections A.5.3 and A.5.4). However, we do provide intuition
in this section for why the expected reviewer-side gain is nearly optimal.
Intuition and SUPER∗ with zero heuristic policy. The given bidding function is such that only the paper shown in
the highest position to a reviewer has a non-zero probability of being bid on. Intuitively Lemma 11 and Lemma 12
suggest that to optimize the expected paper-side gain, the algorithm should seek to show a paper on the block diagonal
for the reviewer in the highest position. Moreover, since the given paper-side gain function exhibits diminishing returns
in the number of bids, showing the paper on the block diagonal with fewest bids maximizes the immediate expected
paper-side gain.
The given reviewer-side gain function is decreasing in the position a paper is shown and increasing in the similarity
score of the paper. This indicates that to maximize the immediate expected reviewer-side gain, papers should be shown
in a decreasing order of the similarity scores to the reviewer. For the given noisy community model similarity class,
the similarity scores of papers on the block diagonal for a given reviewer are significantly higher than the similarity
scores of papers off the block diagonal for the given reviewer as was formalized in Lemma 13. Furthermore, the noise
is bounded in a small interval. Consequently, the similarity scores for papers on the block diagonal for a reviewer are
nearly identical and the similarity scores for papers off the block diagonal for a reviewer are also nearly identical. This
suggests that as long as papers on the block diagonal are shown ahead of papers off the block diagonal for a reviewer,
then the expected reviewer-side gain from a given reviewer should be close to the maximum that can be obtained.
The high-level view of the objective the algorithm is optimizing indicates that the immediate expected paper-side
gain can be maximized with minimal cost to the immediate expected reviewer-side gain. This can be achieved by
showing the paper on the block diagonal for the reviewer with the minimum number of bids in the highest position
and the remaining papers in a decreasing order of the similarity scores. The following lemma formalizes the intuition
that has been given.
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Lemma 14. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, when reviewer i ∈ [n] arrives, if there is a paper in Di with zero
bids and each paper in Di has at most one bid, then SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows the reviewer the paper with
the maximum similarity score among the papers without a bid in Di at the highest position followed by the remaining
papers in a decreasing order of the similarity scores.
The proof of Lemma 14 is provided in Section A.5.7.1. It turns out that the conditions of Lemma 14, namely the
existence of a paper in Di with zero bids and each paper in Di having at most one bid upon the arrival of reviewer
i ∈ [n], are met using SUPER∗ with zero heuristic almost surely. We now formally characterize this statement and
then compute the expected paper-side gain of the algorithm.
Computing the expected paper-side gain. Consider a group of q reviewers denoted by R for which Di = Di′
for every pair of reviewers i, i′ ∈ R, meaning that the papers on the block diagonal for the reviewers are equivalent.
Observe that from the structure of the noisy community model, for every reviewer i ∈ R, it also holds that Di ⊂ Dci′′
for all i′′ ∈ Rc, meaning that the papers on the block diagonal for each reviewer in R are off the block diagonal for
all reviewers inRc. Moreover, there are m such blocks of reviewers analogous to the given groupR.
Upon the initial arrival of a reviewer i fromR, from Lemma 12 each paper in Di has zero bids almost surely since
they are off the block diagonal for all reviewers that arrived previously. From Lemma 14, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic
shows this reviewer the paper in Di with the maximum similarity score in the highest position of the paper ordering.
Lemma 11 guarantees that this paper is bid on by the reviewer almost surely and the rest of the papers in Di are bid
on almost never by the reviewer.
We now consider the next arrival of a reviewer i′ from R and note that Di′ = Di by definition of this set of
reviewers. Between the arrivals of reviewers i and i′, none of the papers in Di′ obtain any more bids almost surely
since again from Lemma 12 any paper that is off the block diagonal for a reviewer is bid on almost never independent
of the position the paper is shown. This means each paper in Di′ has zero bids almost surely except for the paper
that has a bid from reviewer i almost surely. Accordingly, we apply Lemma 14 to determine that SUPER∗ with zero
heuristic shows this reviewer the paper with the maximum similarity score among the papers without a bid within Di′
in the highest position of the paper ordering. Then, Lemma 11 guarantees that this paper is bid on by the reviewer
almost surely and the rest of the papers in Di′ are bid on almost never by the reviewer.
Repeatedly applying this argument, upon the final arrival of a reviewer i′′ from R, each paper in Di′′ has exactly
one bid except for one paper that remains without a bid almost surely. We note again that by definition of this set of
reviewers Di′′ = Di. From Lemma 14, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows the final paper without a bid within Di′′
in the highest position of the paper ordering and Lemma 11 ensures that this paper is bid on by the reviewer almost
surely and the rest of the papers in Di′ are bid on almost never by the reviewer.
Following the arrival of reviewer i′′, the papers in Di never appear on the block diagonal for a reviewer again
and finish with exactly one bid almost surely after each being shown in the highest position of the paper ordering
exactly once to some reviewer for which they are on the block diagonal almost surely. The line of reasoning applied
to the group of reviewers R can be duplicated for each of the m blocks of reviewers which share papers on the block
diagonal. In doing so, it immediately follows from the decomposition in (122) that the expected paper-side gain of
SUPER∗ with zero heuristic for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, is given by
E[GSUPER∗p ] =
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)] =
∑
j∈[d]
γp(1) = mq. (123)
Identically as in the derivation of the optimal expected paper-side gain for the noiseless community model given in
Section A.4.3, this is the optimal expected paper-side gain that can be obtained since each reviewer bids on at most
one paper almost surely and the given paper-side gain function is strictly concave so evenly distributing the bids over
the papers maximizes the expected paper-side gain.
Properties of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic for the noisy community model similarity matrix. Since the conditions
of Lemma 14 are satisfied for each reviewer almost surely, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows each reviewer i ∈ [n]
the paper with the maximum similarity score among the papers without a bid in Di followed by the remaining papers
in a decreasing order of the similarity scores. This fact leads to several properties of the algorithm for this similarity
matrix class. From Lemma 13, Si,j > Si,j′ for j ∈ Di, j′ ∈ Dci . This means the paper with the maximum similarity
score among the papers without a bid in Di is equivalently the paper with the maximum similarity score among the
papers without a bid. This results in the following property of the algorithm.
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Property 1. SUPER∗ with zero heuristic presents the paper with the maximum similarity score among the papers
without a bid in the highest position of the paper ordering and the remaining papers in a decreasing order of the
similarity scores to each reviewer i ∈ [n] almost surely.
Similarly, using Lemma 13, we can determine that the algorithm shows each paper that is on the block diagonal of
the similarity matrix for the reviewer ahead of each paper off the block diagonal.
Property 2. SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows every paper inDi ahead of every paper inDci to each reviewer i ∈ [n]
almost surely.
The final property that again follows from Lemma 13 is that the algorithm shows the papers off the block diagonal
in a decreasing order of the similarity scores.
Property 3. SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows papers among Dci in a decreasing order of the similarity scores to
each reviewer i ∈ [n] almost surely.
The properties of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic provided are going to assist the comparison of the expected reviewer-
side gain with that from the baselines and the optimal policy. As discussed previously, intuitively Property 2 should
guarantee that the algorithm obtains near-optimal expected reviewer-side gain since the noise in the similarity scores
is bounded in a small interval and the similarity scores of papers on the block diagonal are much higher than that for
papers off the block diagonal for a reviewer.
A.5.3 Suboptimality of SIM
In this section, we analyze SIM for the noisy community model similarity matrix class with the given gain and bidding
functions.
Intuition and SIM policy. The SIM algorithm presents papers in a decreasing order of the similarity scores. This
approach maximizes the expected reviewer-side gain since the given reviewer-side gain function is decreasing in the
position a paper is shown and increasing in the similarity score of the paper. However, for the noisy community model
similarity matrix class, the algorithm is suboptimal for the combined objective since the expected paper-side gain
is far from optimal. As shown in the analysis of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic, to maximize the expected paper-side
gain, each paper should only be shown in the highest position of the paper ordering to a reviewer once almost surely.
Moreover, this must be when the paper is on the block diagonal for a reviewer so that it obtains a bid almost surely. The
problem with SIM for this similarity matrix class is that it is oblivious to the number of bids on papers. As a result, the
algorithm may show a paper in the highest position of the paper ordering to a reviewer that has only marginally higher
similarity score, but many more bids, than another option. While this may result in a scarce amount more gain from
the reviewer-side objective, we show it is costly in terms of the paper-side objective. We formalize this by showing
SIM is significantly suboptimal for the expected paper-side gain, and that it only achieves a marginal amount more
expected reviewer-side gain than SUPER∗ with zero heuristic.
Bounding the expected paper-side gain. Recall from (122) that the expected paper-side gain from any paper j ∈ [d]
is given by
E[γp(gj)] =
q∑
`=0
P
(
` =
∑
i∈Dj
1{piSIMi (j) = 1}
)
γp(`). (124)
To bound this quantity for a given paper, we need to characterize the distribution of the number of times the paper is
shown in the highest position of the paper ordering to reviewers for which it is on the block diagonal.
Toward this goal, let us consider any reviewer i ∈ [n] and the probability of each paper being shown in the highest
position of the paper ordering for the reviewer. For the given reviewer, the set of papers on the block diagonal is given
by Di and this set has cardinality q. Moreover, from Lemma 13, Si,j > Si,j′ for j ∈ Di, j′ ∈ Dci . This result says the
similarity score of any paper on the block diagonal for the reviewer is greater than the similarity score of any paper off
the block diagonal for the reviewer.
The SIM algorithm shows papers in a decreasing order of the similarity scores, which combined with Lemma 13,
guarantees that the probability of any paper j ∈ Dci being shown in the highest position of the paper ordering is zero.
For any paper j ∈ Di, the similarity score is given by Si,j = s − νi,j . The noise νi,j for each reviewer-paper pair
(i, j) is drawn independently and uniformly at random from a bounded interval. This implies that the probability of
any paper j ∈ Di being shown in the highest position to the reviewer is 1/q since there are q papers in the set.
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Recall that Dj for any paper j ∈ [d] denotes the reviewers i ∈ [n] for which the reviewer-paper pair (i, j) is on the
block diagonal of the similarity matrix. From the preceding reasoning, the probability of paper j ∈ [d] being shown in
the highest position to each reviewer i ∈ Dj is 1/q. Consequently, the number of times paper j ∈ [d] is shown in the
highest position to reviewers in the set Dj follows a Binomial distribution with q trials since the cardinality of Dj is q
and a success probability of 1/q. This means the expected paper-side gain from any paper j ∈ [d] given in (124) for
SIM, is equivalently expressed as
E[γp(gj)] =
q∑
`=0
(
q
`
)(1
q
)`(
1− 1
q
)q−`
γp(`). (125)
To bound (125), we can directly apply Lemma 10, which bounds the expectation of the square root of a binomial
random variable, and obtain
E[γp(gj)] =
q∑
`=0
(
q
`
)(1
q
)`(
1− 1
q
)q−`
γp(`) ≤
(
1− 1
q
)q−1(
1−
√
2
2
)
+
√
2
2
. (126)
The bound in (126) is decreasing in q for q ≥ 2. This means for every q ≥ 2 and any paper j ∈ [d],
E[γp(gj)] ≤ 2 +
√
2
4
.
To get the expected paper-side gain of the algorithm, we sum this bound over the number of papers and obtain
E[GSIMp ] =
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)] ≤
(2 +√2
4
)
mq. (127)
Combining (127) with the expected paper-side gain of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic from (123), this implies for every
m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗p − GSIMp ] ≥ mq −
(2 +√2
4
)
mq. (128)
Bounding the expected reviewer-side gain. We now turn our attention to comparing the expected reviewer-side
gain of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and SIM. We need to bound
λE[GSUPER∗r − GSIMr ] = λE
[ ∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
SUPER∗
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piSIMi (j), Si,j))
]
. (129)
Toward doing so, recall Property 2, which says SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows every paper in Di ahead of every
paper in Dci to each reviewer i ∈ [n] almost surely. Moreover, Property 3 says the papers among Dci are shown in
decreasing order of the similarity scores to each reviewer i ∈ [n] almost surely. In comparison, SIM shows papers in
decreasing order of the similarity scores to each reviewer i ∈ [n]. From Lemma 13, the similarity scores of papers
in Di are greater than the similarity scores of papers in Dci for each reviewer i ∈ [n]. Combining this fact with
the policy of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and SIM, we can see that the algorithms show the papers among Dci in
identical positions almost surely. This means the reviewer-side gain from this set of papers is equivalent for each of
the algorithms almost surely.
Since the noise is bounded in a small interval, we expect that the ordering among papers in Di would not impact
the expected reviewer-side gain significantly as long as they are shown before the papers in Dci . The following result
formalizes this intuition and provides a bound.
Lemma 15. Let pi`i denote the paper ordering that presents papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores. More-
over, denote by pi`
′
i any paper ordering that shows each paper in Di ahead of each paper in Dci and papers among Dci
in a decreasing order of the similarity scores. Then, under the assumptions of Theorem 4, the following bound holds
for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0:
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(
γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j)
) ≥ −qe−emq log(4).
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The proof of Lemma 15 is provided in Section A.5.7.2.
The result of Lemma 15 immediately applies to (129) for each reviewer conditioned on the almost sure events given
the characteristics of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and SIM mentioned earlier and since it holds for any realization of
the noise in the similarity scores. Combining (129) with Lemma 15 and noting that there are n = mq reviewers, we
obtain for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
λE[GSUPER∗r − GSIMr ] = λE
[ ∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
SUPER∗
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piSIMi (j), Si,j))
]
≥ −mq2e−emq log(4). (130)
Finally, see that for every m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2,
−mq2e−emq log(4) ≥ −8e−4e log(4) ≥ −0.0001 (131)
since −mq2e−emq log(4) is negative and increasing as a function of m and q for m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2. From (130)
and (131), we get that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
λE[GSUPER∗r − GSIMr ] ≥ −0.0001. (132)
Completing the bound. Combining the bounds on the expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain between SUPER∗
with zero heuristic and SIM given in (128) and (132), we get that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗ − GSIM] = E[GSUPER∗p − GSIMp ] + λE[GSUPER
∗
r − GSIMr ]
≥ mq −
(2 +√2
4
)
mq − 0.0001
≥ mq/10.
We conclude that there is a constant c > 0 such that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic
obtains an additive factor of at least cmq more expected gain than SIM in the noisy community model.
A.5.4 Suboptimality of BID
We now analyze BID for the noisy community model with the given gain and bidding functions. We remark that
much of the analysis in this section follows very similarly to that for BID given in Section A.4.6 from the proof of
Theorem 3 regarding the noiseless community model since the reviewer bidding behavior is identical in the noisy
community model as characterized by Lemmas 11, 12, and 13. The primary adjustments are in the analysis of the
expected reviewer-side gain with respect to SUPER∗ with zero heuristic.
Bounding the expected paper-side gain. For any given reviewer i ∈ [n], the q papers inDi are each inDi′ for q−1
other reviewers i′ ∈ [n] and also in Dci′′ for each of the remaining reviewers i′′ ∈ [n]. For any reviewer i ∈ [n], any
paper j ∈ Dci is bid on almost never from Lemma 12 and any paper j ∈ Di is only bid on with non-zero probability
if shown in the highest position to the reviewer from Lemma 11. This means that upon the arrival of each reviewer
i ∈ [n], there is a paper inDi with zero bids that has not been shown in the highest position to any reviewer previously
almost surely. Furthermore, from Lemma 13, the similarity score of any paper in Di is greater than the similarity
score of any paper in Dci for each reviewer i ∈ [n]. Therefore, BID shows a paper in Di with zero bids in the highest
position to each reviewer i ∈ [n] almost surely since papers are shown in increasing order of the number of bids and
ties are broken in favor of the paper with the higher similarity score. Lemma 11 guarantees that if a paper in Di is
shown in the highest position of the paper ordering to reviewer i ∈ [n], then it is bid on by the reviewer almost surely.
Consequently, each paper j ∈ [d] is shown exactly once almost surely in the highest position to some reviewer to some
reviewer i ∈ Dj . It then follows from the decomposition in (122) that the expected paper-side gain of BID for every
m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, is given by
E[GBIDp ] =
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)] =
∑
j∈[d]
γp(1) = mq.
From the expected paper-side gain of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic given in (123), we conclude that for every
m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗p ]− E[GBIDp ] = 0. (133)
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Before moving on to the expected reviewer-side gain, we point out that SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and BID show
the same paper in the highest position to each reviewer almost surely as direct result of Lemma 14, the definition of
the BID policy, and the derivations of the expected paper-side gain for each algorithm.
Property 4. SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and BID show the same paper in the highest position of the paper ordering
to each reviewer almost surely.
As we now show, the suboptimality of BID stems from the fact that after the paper shown in the highest position,
the remaining papers are presented in increasing order of the number of bids, whereas SUPER∗ with zero heuristic
shows the remaining papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores.
Bounding the expected reviewer-side gain. We now focus on showing SUPER∗ with zero heuristic obtains signif-
icantly more expected reviewer-side gain than BID. This requires deriving a suitable lower bound on the following
expression:
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] = λE
[ ∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
SUPER∗
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j), Si,j))
]
. (134)
Let us begin by defining a “good event” for any reviewer and paper under which if the paper has probability zero of
being bid on then it is not bid on and if the paper has probability one of being bid on then it is bid on. Formally, for
any reviewer k ∈ [n], paper j ∈ [d], and paper ordering piALGk given by an algorithm ALG, we define
EALGk,j ={piALGk (j) = 1, Sk,j > s/2,Bk,j = 1} ∪ {piALGk (j) 6= 1,Bk,j = 0} ∪ {Sk,j < s/2,Bk,j = 0}.
Moreover, for each reviewer i ∈ [n], define the following event Ei = ∪i−1k=1 ∪dj=1 {ESUPER
∗
k,j ∪ EBIDk,j } which says the
good event held for each reviewer that arrived previously for every paper and observe that the complement of this
event occurs on a measure zero space by the structure of the bidding function given in (66). Consequently, from the
law of total expectation, an equivalent form of (134) is given by
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] = λE
[ ∑
i∈[n]
E
[ ∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
SUPER∗
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j), Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (135)
From Property 4, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and BID show the same paper in the highest position of the paper
ordering to any reviewer i ∈ [n] given the event Ei. Moreover, from Property 1, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic presents
the remainder of the papers in a decreasing order of the similarity scores given the event Ei. This implies that for
each reviewer i ∈ [n], SUPER∗ with zero heuristic obtains at least as much reviewer-side gain as BID given the event
Ei since the reviewer-side gain function is increasing in the similarity score and decreasing in the position a paper is
shown. Define F as the initial set of bmq/4c reviewers for which upon arrival of such a reviewer i ∈ F at least one
paper on the block diagonal for the reviewer given by Di has received a bid previously, where we recall that SUPER∗
with zero heuristic and BID each obtain exactly one bid from each reviewer and on each paper almost surely as proved
in the analysis of the expected paper-side gains. From (135) and the fact that SUPER∗ with zero heuristic obtains at
least as much expected reviewer-side gain as BID from each reviewer given the event E , we obtain
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
SUPER∗
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j), Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (136)
We now separate papers into relevant groups defined upon arrival for each reviewer i ∈ F . Let Ti,1 be the set of
papers containing only the paper that each algorithm shows in the highest position that has zero bids and belongs to
the set Di. Let Ti,2 denote the remaining set of papers in Di with zero bids and Ti,3 be the set of papers in Di with
one bid. Denote by Ti,4 the set of papers in Dci with zero bids and Ti,5 as the papers in Dci with one bid. Moreover,
we let Ni,k = |Ti,k| for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} denote the number of papers in each set and define `i = Ni,1 + Ni,2 + 1.
Accordingly, (136) is equivalently
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,1∪Ti,2∪Ti,3∪Ti,4∪Ti,5
(γr(pi
SUPER∗
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j), Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (137)
From Property 4, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and BID show the same paper in the highest position of the paper
ordering to each reviewer i ∈ [n] given Ei. This allows us to simplify (137) and get that
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,2∪Ti,3∪Ti,4∪Ti,5
(γr(pi
SUPER∗
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j), Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (138)
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Given event Ei, SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows papers among Ti,2 ∪ Ti,3 in decreasing order of the similarity
scores followed by papers among Ti,4 ∪ Ti,5 in decreasing order of the similarity scores consequent of Properties 1, 2,
and 3.
Now consider an algorithm ALG that shows papers from Ti,k ahead of papers from Ti,k+1 for each k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Moreover, let this algorithm present papers among each group Ti,k for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in decreasing order of the
similarity scores. The given reviewer-side gain function is decreasing in the position a paper is shown and increasing
in the similarity score. This means the expected reviewer-side gain from any reviewer is maximized by showing
papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores. Consequently, the expected reviewer-side gain of SUPER∗ with
zero heuristic from each reviewer is at least as much as that from ALG. This fact leads to a lower bound on (138) of
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,2∪Ti,3∪Ti,4∪Ti,5
(γr(pi
ALG
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j), Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]] (139)
where now Ei = ∪i−1k=1 ∪dj=1 {EALGk,j ∪ EBIDk,j }.
The BID policy shows papers in Ti,2 ∪ Ti,4 ahead of papers in Ti,3 ∪ Ti,5. Moreover, papers in Ti,2 are shown
ahead of papers in Ti,4 and papers in Ti,3 ahead of papers in Ti,5. Papers among each group Ti,k for k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}
are shown in decreasing order of the similarity scores. This characterization of the BID policy follows from definition,
since papers are shown in increasing order of the number of bids with ties broken by the similarity scores. Recall
that the similarity scores of papers in Ti,2 ∪ Ti,3 are greater than the similarity scores of papers in Ti,4 ∪ Ti,5 from
Lemma 13. It is now clear that ALG and BID show papers among Ti,2 ∪ Ti,5 in identical positions given the event Ei.
Combining this fact with (139), we get that
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,3∪Ti,4
(γr(pi
ALG
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j), Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (140)
We now separate the sum over papers in Ti,3 from the sums over papers in Ti,4 in (140) to obtain
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,3
(γr(pi
ALG
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j), Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]
+
∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,4
(γr(pi
ALG
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j), Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (141)
The ALG policy shows papers in Ti,3 followed by papers in Ti,4, with each group of papers being presented in de-
creasing order of the similarity scores to each reviewer given the event Ei. In contrast, the BID policy shows papers in
Ti,4 followed by papers in Ti,3, with each group of papers being presented in decreasing order of the similarity scores.
This means that BID shows each paper in Ti,3 later in the paper ordering by Ni,4 positions compared to ALG to each
reviewer given Ei. Analogously, ALG shows each paper in Ti,4 later in the paper ordering by Ni,3 positions compared
to BID to each reviewer given Ei. This set of facts and continuing from (137), leads to the bound
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,3
(γr(pi
ALG
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piALGi (j) +Ni,4, Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]
−
∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,4
(γr(pi
BID
i (j), Si,j)− γr(piBIDi (j) +Ni,3, Si,j))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (142)
From the decomposed form of the reviewer-side gain function in (69), an equivalent form of (142) is
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,3
(2Si,j − 1)(γpir (piALGi (j))− γpir (piALGi (j) +Ni,4))
∣∣∣Ei]
−
∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,4
(2Si,j − 1)(γpir (piBIDi (j))− γpir (piBIDi (j) +Ni,3))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (143)
The similarity scores of papers in Ti,3 are given by Si,j = s − νi,j and the similarity score of papers in Ti,4 are
Si,j = νi,j . Recall that the noise is bounded in the interval (0, ξ). Combining this with the fact that the function γpir
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from (69) is decreasing on the domain R>0, we bound (143) as follows
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[
(2s−ξ − 1)
∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,3
(γpir (pi
ALG
i (j))− γpir (piALGi (j) +Ni,4))
∣∣∣Ei]
− (2ξ − 1)
∑
i∈F
E
[ ∑
j∈Ti,4
(γpir (pi
BID
i (j))− γpir (piBIDi (j) +Ni,3))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (144)
Now recall that ALG shows the papers in Ti,3 after the papers in Ti,1 ∪ Ti,2. Similarly, BID shows the papers in Ti,4
after the papers in Ti,1 ∪ Ti,2. Recall that `i = Ni,1 +Ni,2 + 1. From this notation and (144), we obtain
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[
(2s−ξ − 1)
∑
i∈F
E
[ `i+Ni,3−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,4))
∣∣∣Ei]
− (2ξ − 1)
∑
i∈F
E
[ `i+Ni,4−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3))
∣∣∣Ei]].
(145)
Following the exact techniques to prove Claim 1 in Section A.4.6 for the expected reviewer-side gain analysis of
BID in the noiseless community model, we get that for each reviewer i ∈ F and conditioned on the event Ei,
Ni,4 ≥ mq − q −m− bmq/4c+Ni,3 + 1 ≥ Ni,3 ≥ 1. (146)
Now, toward the goal of bounding (145), we perform the following indexing manipulations:
`i+Ni,4−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,3)) =
`i+Ni,4−1∑
j=`i
γpir (j)−
`i+Ni,3+Ni,4−1∑
j=`i+Ni,3
γpir (j)
=
`i+Ni,3−1∑
j=`i
γpir (j)−
`i+Ni,3+Ni,4−1∑
j=`i+Ni,4
γpir (j) (147)
=
`i+Ni,3−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,4)). (148)
To obtain (147), we used the fact from (146) that Ni,4 ≥ Ni,3 for any reviewer i ∈ F given the event Ei.
Then from (144) and (148), we get
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[
(2s−ξ − 2s)
∑
i∈F
E
[ `i+Ni,3−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,4))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (149)
Minimizing over i ∈ F in (149) and using the definition |F| = bmq/4c, we have
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] ≥ λE
[
(2s − 1)(bmq/4c) min
i∈F
E
[ `i+Ni,3−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,4))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (150)
Moreover, for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, it holds that
bmq/4c = mq/4− (mq mod 4)/4 ≥ mq/8. (151)
By definition of the noisy community model and the given bound on ξ, for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, we get
2s−ξ − 2ξ = 2s−(1+λ)−1e−emq − 2(1+λ)−1e−emq ≥ 20.01−e−4e − 2e−4e ≥ 1/150. (152)
Combining (150), (151), and (152), we have
λE[GSUPER∗r − GBIDr ] ≥
( λ
1200
)
E
[
min
i∈F
E
[ `i+Ni,3−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,4))
∣∣∣Ei]]. (153)
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Then, applying exactly the same techniques to prove Claim 2 in Section A.4.6 for the expected reviewer-side gain
analysis of BID in the noiseless community model, for every i ∈ F conditioned on the event Ei, we have
min
i∈F
`i+Ni,3−1∑
j=`i
(γpir (j)− γpir (j +Ni,4)) ≥
(2
5
)( 1
log22(mq)
)
. (154)
Finally, combining (154) with (153), for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, the following bound holds
λE[GOPTr − GBIDr ] ≥
( 1
3000
)( λmq
log22(mq)
)
. (155)
Observe that the expectation in the right-hand side of (155) is dropped since it is not a random variable.
Completing the bound. Combining the bounds on the expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain between SUPER∗
with zero heuristic and BID given in (133) and (155), we find for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗ − GBID] = E[GSUPER∗p − GBIDp ] + λE[GSUPER
∗
r − GBIDr ]
≥
( 1
3000
)( λmq
log22(mq)
)
.
We conclude that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, SUPER∗ with zero
heuristic obtains an additive factor of at least cλmq/ log22(mq) more expected gain than BID for the noisy community
model.
A.5.5 Suboptimality of RAND
In this section, we analyze RAND for the noisy community model similarity class with the given gain and bidding
functions. A significant amount of the analysis in this section follows identically to that from analyzing RAND in the
noiseless community model from Section A.4.7 and the reason for the suboptimal behavior is identical.
Bounding the expected paper-side gain. Recall from (122) that the expected paper-side gain from any paper j ∈ [d]
is given by
E[γp(gj)] =
q∑
`=0
P
(
` =
∑
i∈Dj
1{piRANDi (j) = 1}
)
γp(`). (156)
We remark that the decomposition of the expected paper-side gain from any paper given in (156) for RAND in the noisy
community model is identical to that given in (99) for RAND in the noiseless community model. Since the RAND policy
is independent of the similarity scores and the reviewer bids, the distribution of the number of times a paper is shown
in the highest position to reviewers for which it is on the block diagonal is identical in the noisy community model as
it is in the noiseless community model. Accordingly, we directly bound the expected paper-side gain of RAND in the
noisy community model using the bound from (102) derived in Section A.4.7 for RAND in the noiseless community
model. Then, combining with the expected paper-side gain of SUPER∗ with zero heuristic from (123), we get that for
every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗p − GRANDp ] ≥ mq −
(6 +√2
16
)
mq. (157)
Bounding the expected reviewer-side gain. We now need to compare the expected reviewer-side gain of SUPER∗
with zero heuristic and RAND. The SIM algorithm obtains the maximum expected reviewer-side gain that can be
achieved since the reviewer-side gain function is increasing in the similarity score and decreasing in the position a
paper is shown. Consequently, the bound on the expected reviewer-side gain from (132) between SUPER∗ with zero
heuristic and SIM applies to RAND. Using the bound from (132), we get that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
λE[GSUPER∗r − GRANDr ] ≥ −0.0001. (158)
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Completing the bound. Combining the bounds on the expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain between SUPER∗
with zero heuristic and RAND given in (157) and (158), for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗ − GRAND] = E[GSUPER∗p − GRANDp ] + λE[GSUPER
∗
r − GRANDr ]
≥ mq −
(6 +√2
16
)
mq − 0.0001 ≥ mq/2.
We conclude that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0, SUPER∗ with zero
heuristic obtains an additive factor of at least cmq more expected gain than RAND in the noisy community model.
A.5.6 Near-Optimality of SUPER∗ with Zero Heuristic
In this section, we show that SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is nearly optimal. We let OPT denote the optimal algorithm
for the expected gain.
Bounding the expected paper-side gain. As explained in Section A.5.2, the expected paper-side gain of SUPER∗
with zero heuristic is the maximum that can be achieved. Indeed, this is consequent of the facts that each reviewer bids
on at most one paper almost surely and the given paper-side gain function is strictly concave so evenly distributing the
bids over the papers maximizes the expected paper-side gain. We conclude that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗p ]− E[GOPTp ] ≥ 0. (159)
Bounding the expected reviewer-side gain. The SIM algorithm obtains the maximum expected reviewer-side gain
that can be achieved since the reviewer-side gain function as given in (68) is increasing in the similarity score and
decreasing in the position a paper is shown, which means showing papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores
to each reviewer maximizes the expected reviewer-side gain. Consequently, the bound on the expected reviewer-side
gain from (132) between SUPER∗ with zero heuristic and SIM applies to the optimal algorithm. Using the bound
from (132), we get that for m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
λE[GSUPER∗r − GOPTr ] ≥ −0.0001. (160)
Completing the bound. Combining the bounds on the expected paper-side and reviewer-side gain between SUPER∗
with zero heuristic and OPT given in (159) and (160), we get that for every m ≥ 2, q ≥ 2, and λ ≥ 0,
E[GSUPER∗ − GOPT] = E[GSUPER∗p − GOPTp ] + λE[GSUPER
∗
r − GOPTr ] ≥ −0.0001.
We conclude SUPER∗ with zero heuristic is always within at least an additive factor of 0.0001 of the optimal in the
noisy community model.
A.5.7 Proofs of Lemmas 14–15
In this section, we present the proofs of technical lemmas invoked in the primary proof of Theorem 4.
A.5.7.1 Proof of Lemma 14. In the proof of Corollary A.2 given in Section A.2, we showed in (17) that SUPER∗
with zero heuristic solves the problem
piSUPER
∗
i = arg max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
f(pii(j), Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j) (161)
in order to determine the ordering of papers piSUPER
∗
i to present to reviewer i ∈ [n] so that the immediate expected
gain is maximized conditioned on the history of bids from reviewers that arrived previously. Recalling that the bidding
function is f(pii(j), Si,j) = 1{pii(j) = 1}1{Si,j > s/2}, the optimization problem in (161) is equivalent to
piSUPER
∗
i = arg max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
1{pii(j) = 1}1{Si,j > s/2}(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j). (162)
Observe that Di ∪ Dci = [d]. Moreover, if j ∈ Di, then Si,j > s/2 from Lemma 11. Analogously, if j ∈ Dci , then
Si,j < s/2 from Lemma 12. This allows us to simplify (162) to the following problem:
piSUPER
∗
i = arg max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈Di
1{pii(j) = 1}(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j). (163)
61
Given the assumption that there is a paper in Di with zero bids and each paper in Di has at most one bid, we need
to prove SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows the paper with the maximum similarity score among the papers without
a bid in Di followed by the remaining papers in a decreasing order of the similarity scores. To do so, we analyze
the solution to (163) when the paper with the maximum similarity score has zero bids and when the paper with the
maximum similarity score has one bid. For each scenario, we show SUPER∗ with zero heuristic presents the paper
with the maximum similarity score among the papers without a bid in the highest position and the remaining papers
in a decreasing order of the similarity scores. This is equivalent to the stated result we seek to prove since from
Lemma 13, Si,j > Si,j′ for j ∈ Di, j′ ∈ Dci , which guarantees the paper with the maximum similarity score belongs
to the set Di and the paper with the maximum similarity score among the papers without a bid belongs to the set Di.
Before analyzing each scenario, we recall some key properties of the functions in the optimization problem given
in (163) under the assumptions. The given paper-side gain function γp is such that the quantity γp(gi−1,j + 1) −
γp(gi−1,j) is decreasing as a function of the number of bids gi−1,j . As a result, the expected paper-side gain term
from (163), which is given by ∑
j∈Di
1{pii(j) = 1}(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)), (164)
is maximized by showing the paper j ∈ Di with the minimum number of bids in the highest position of the paper
ordering. Moreover, the given reviewer-side gain function γr from (68) is decreasing in the position pii(j) in which
a paper is shown and increasing in the similarity score Si,j . Consequently, the expected reviewer-side gain term
from (163), which is given by ∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j), (165)
is maximized by showing papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores.
Solution when the paper with the maximum similarity score has zero bids. If the paper with the maximum
similarity score has zero bids, then the solution to (163) is to present the papers in decreasing order of the similarity
scores. To see why this solution is optimal, observe that it maximizes each component of (163) given in (164) and (165)
since the paper with the maximum similarity score has the minimum number of bids among the set Di and papers are
in decreasing order of the similarity scores. This solution is equivalent to presenting the paper with the maximum
similarity score among the papers without a bid in the highest position and the remaining papers in a decreasing order
of the similarity scores since the paper with the maximum similarity score has zero bids.
Solution when the paper with the maximum similarity score has one bid. To determine the solution to (163)
when the paper with the maximum similarity score has one bid, we consider groups of candidate solutions. We group
potential solutions into the set of paper orderings that show a paper with at least one bid in the highest position (group
1) and the set of paper orderings that show a paper without a bid in the highest position (group 2). For each group of
paper orderings, we find the solution that maximizes the objective of the optimization problem in (163). To resolve
which is optimal, we compare the objective values of the solutions from each group.
Analyzing Group 1. For this group, the solution is constrained to the set of paper orderings that show a paper
with at least one bid in the highest position. The solution among this group that maximizes the objective of (163) is to
show papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores. We call this candidate solution pi`i .
The candidate solution pi`i can be seen to be optimal among the group since it maximizes (164) subject to the
constraint of the group and it maximizes (165). Indeed, solution pi`i maximizes (164) subject to the constraint of
the group since the paper with the maximum similarity score has the minimum number of bids among the papers in
Di with at least one bid. Moreover, solution pi`i maximizes (165) since papers are shown in decreasing order of the
similarity scores.
Analyzing Group 2. For this group, the solution is constrained to the set of paper orderings that show a paper
without a bid in the highest position. The solution among this group that maximizes the objective of (163) is to show
the paper with the maximum similarity score among the papers with zero bids in the highest position and then present
the remaining papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores. We call this candidate solution pi`
′
i .
The candidate solution pi`
′
i can be seen to be optimal among the group since it maximizes (164) and it maxi-
mizes (165) subject to the constraint of the group as we now show. From assumption, there is at least one paper in Di
with zero bids. The similarity score of any paper in Di is greater than the similarity score of any paper in Dci from
Lemma 13. This implies that the paper with the maximum similarity score among the papers with zero bids is in Di.
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Therefore, we conclude solution pi`
′
i maximizes (164) since the paper with the maximum similarity score among the
papers with zero bids is in Di and it has the minimum number of bids among the papers in Di. Moreover, solution
pi`
′
i maximizes (165) subject to the constraint of the group since the paper with maximum similarity among the set of
papers with zero bids is shown in the highest position and the remaining papers are shown in decreasing order of the
similarity scores.
Comparing candidate solutions pi`i and pi`
′
i . We now compare the objective of (163) for the candidate solutions
pi`i and pi
`′
i . Our goal is to show the objective given pi
`′
i is greater than the objective given pi
`
i . This is to say, we wish
to show the following quantity is positive∑
j∈Di
(
1{pi`′i (j) = 1} − 1{pi`i (j) = 1}
)
(γp(gi−1,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
(
γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j)
)
.
(166)
To simplify notation, let the quantity in (166) be denoted by C. Since pi`i shows a paper in Di with one bid in the
highest position and pi`
′
i shows a paper in Di with zero bids in the highest position, we obtain
C = (γp(1)− γp(0))− (γp(2)− γp(1)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
(
γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j)
)
.
Since pi`i presents papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores and pi
`′
i shows the papers in Dci in a decreasing
order of the similarity scores after the papers in Di, we can apply Lemma 15 to get
C ≥ (γp(1)− γp(0))− (γp(2)− γp(1))− qe−emq log(4). (167)
Observe that −qe−emq log(4) is negative and an increasing as a function of m and q on the domain m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2.
This means for every m ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2,
−qe−emq log(4) ≥ −2e−4e log(4) ≥ −0.01. (168)
Moreover, for the given paper-side gain function,
(γp(1)− γp(0))− (γp(2)− γp(1)) = 2−
√
2 (169)
Combining (167), (168), and (169), we obtain
C ≥ 2−
√
2− 0.01 > 0.
Since C > 0, we can conclude the objective of (163) given pi`′i is greater than the objective of (163) given pi`i . This
means that the solution when the paper with the maximum similarity score has one bid is to show the paper with the
maximum similarity score among the papers with zero bids in the highest position and then present the remaining
papers in decreasing order of the similarity scores.
Combining the solutions. We have now derived the solution to (163) when the paper with the maximum similarity
score has not obtained a bid previously and when the paper with the maximum similarity score has obtained exactly
one bid previously. For each scenario, we showed SUPER∗ with zero heuristic presents the paper with the maximum
similarity score among the papers without a bid in the highest position and the remaining papers in a decreasing order
of the similarity scores. This allows us to conclude that if there is a paper in Di with zero bids and each paper in Di
has at most one bid, then SUPER∗ with zero heuristic shows the paper with the maximum similarity score among the
papers without a bid in Di followed by the remaining papers in a decreasing order of the similarity scores.
A.5.7.2 Proof of Lemma 15. From the stated result, pi`i denotes the paper ordering that presents papers in decreas-
ing order of the similarity scores. Recall thatDi denotes the set of papers on the block diagonal of the similarity matrix
for any reviewer i ∈ [n]. Moreover, pi`′i is any paper ordering that shows each paper in Di ahead of each paper in Dci
and papers among Dci in a decreasing order of the similarity scores. Given this information, we need to bound
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j)).
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Each paper ordering pi`i and pi
`′
i shows the papers in Dci in a decreasing order of the similarity scores after the
papers in Di since from Lemma 13, Si,j > Si,j′ for j ∈ Di, j′ ∈ Dci . This means papers in Dci are shown in identical
positions by each paper ordering, so we get
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j) = λ
∑
j∈Di
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j)).
Equivalently, from the decomposed form of the given reviewer-side gain function from (68),
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j) = λ
∑
j∈Di
(2Si,j − 1)γpir (pi`
′
i (j))− λ
∑
j∈Di
(2Si,j − 1)γpir (pi`i (j)).
By definition, the similarity score of each paper j ∈ Di is given by Si,j = s − νi,j . Moreover, νi,j is bounded in
(0, ξ), so s− ξ < s− νi,j < s. This fact leads to the lower bound
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j) ≥ λ(2s−ξ − 1)
∑
j∈Di
γpir (pi
`′
i (j))− λ(2s − 1)
∑
j∈Di
γpir (pi
`
i (j)).
Each paper ordering pi`i and pi
`′
i shows the papers inDi in some order among the set of positions {1, . . . , q} since there
are q papers in Di by definition and each paper in Di is shown ahead of each paper in Dci . From this observation, we
obtain
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j) ≥ λ(2s−ξ − 2s)
∑
j∈[q]
γpir (j),
which is equivalently
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j) ≥ λ(2s−ξ − 2s)
∑
j∈[q]
1
log2(j + 1)
from the definition of γpir given in (69). Since λ(2
s−ξ − 2s) ≤ 0 and 1/ log2(j + 1) ≤ 1 for each j ∈ [q], we obtain
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j) ≥ λq(2s−ξ − 2s).
Recall that ξ ≤ (1 + λ)−1e−emq , which means
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j) ≥ λq(2s−(1+λ)
−1e−emq − 2s).
Now, see that λ(2s−(1+λ)
−1e−emq − 2s) is non-positive and a decreasing function of λ and s on the domain λ ≥ 0 and
s ≥ 0.01. This means for every λ ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0.01, the following relation holds
λ(2s−(1+λ)
−1e−emq − 2s) ≥ λ(21−(1+λ)−1e−emq − 2)
≥ lim
λ′→∞
λ′(21−(1+λ
′)−1e−emq − 2)
= −e−emq log(4).
Consequently, we conclude
λ
∑
j∈[d]
(γr(pi
`′
i (j), Si,j)− γr(pi`i (j), Si,j) ≥ −qe−emq log(4).
B Additional Results
In this section, we formally state and prove a pair of results that were mentioned informally in the main paper. We
characterize the time complexity per-reviewer of the SUPER∗ algorithm for the general model and for a selected set of
gain and bidding functions that admit a computationally efficient solution. Moreover, we show that SUPER∗ with any
heuristic is globally optimal given a linear paper-side gain. This result is a corollary of the fact that SUPER∗ is locally
optimal as shown in Theorem 1.
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B.1 Time Complexity of SUPER∗
The following proposition characterizes the time complexity of the SUPER∗ algorithm for each reviewer given the
evaluations of the heuristic for the general form and a relevant class of gain and bidding functions that admits a
computational efficient solution.
Proposition 1. SUPER∗ has a time complexity of O(d3) per-reviewer given the evaluations of the heuristic function.
The time complexity of SUPER∗ improves to O(d log(d)) given a bidding function that can be decomposed into the
form f(pii(j), Si,j) = fpi(pii(j))fS(Si,j) where fpi : [d] → [0, 1] is non-increasing and fS : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is
non-decreasing, along with a reviewer-side gain function that can be decomposed into the form γr(pii(j), Si,j) =
fpi(pii(j))γ
S
r (Si,j) where γ
S
r : [0, 1]→ R≥0 is non-decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 1. We partition this proof by first examining the time complexity under the general model and
then after which we consider the time complexity for the special case.
General time complexity. We begin by showing the time complexity of SUPER∗ for a reviewer given the heuristic
evaluations under the general class of gain and bidding functions. The general form of the SUPER∗ algorithm calls
Algorithm 2 upon the arrival of a reviewer to determine the ordering of papers to show the reviewer. The optimization
problem in Algorithm 2 is in the form of the linear assignment problem. It is well known that the Hungarian algorithm
can solve for the optimal solution of a linear assignment problem with a time complexity of O(d3) (see, e.g., Chapter
8 in Lawler, 1976). As a result, SUPER∗ has a time complexity of O(d3) for the general class of gain and bidding
functions under consideration for each reviewer given the evaluations of the heuristic function.
Special case time complexity. In the proof of Theorem 1, we showed that the optimal paper ordering to present the
final reviewer could be obtained by solving the linear program given in (13) with the weights from (14). The general
version of SUPER∗ determines the ordering of papers to present any reviewer by calling Algorithm 2, which solves the
linear program given in (13) using the weights from (15). We now show an equivalence between that solution method
and a sorting algorithm for the class of gain and bidding functions given in the claim.
Prior to deriving the linear program in (13) as a method to obtain the optimal solution for the final reviewer in the
proof of Theorem 1, we showed in (12) that the optimization problem for the final reviewer was of the form
max
pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
f(pin(j), Sn,j)(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pin(j), Sn,j).
Given the function forms f(pin(j), Sn,j) = fpi(pin(j))fS(Sn,j) where fpi : [d] → [0, 1] is non-increasing and fS :
[0, 1] → [0, 1] is non-decreasing, and γr(pin(j), Sn,j) = fpi(pin(j))γSr (Sn,j) where γSr : [0, 1] → R≥0 is non-
decreasing, the problem can be reformulated as
max
pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
αn,jf
pi(pin(j)) (170)
where
αn,j = f
S(Sn,j)(γp(gn−1,j + 1)− γp(gn−1,j)) + λγSr (Sn,j) ∀ j ∈ [d].
Consequently, for the class of gain and bidding functions given in the claim, an equivalent form of the general SUPER∗
algorithm that calls Algorithm 2 to determine the ordering of papers to show any reviewer i ∈ [n] instead solves the
problem in (170) using weights
αi,j = f
S(Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + hi,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j + hi,j)) + λγSr (Si,j) ∀ j ∈ [d]. (171)
The optimal solution to a problem of the form in (170) is simply to present the papers in decreasing order of their
corresponding values of αi,j since the function fpi is non-increasing. The sorting procedure requires a time complexity
of just O(d log(d)). Since Algorithm 3 solves the problem in (170) using the weights in (171), we conclude that the
per-reviewer time complexity of SUPER∗ for the given class of gain and bidding functions and given the evaluations
of the heuristic is O(d log(d)).
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B.2 SUPER∗ Optimality for Linear Paper-Side Gain
In this section, we show that SUPER∗ with any heuristic is optimal when the paper-side gain function is linear. This
property of the algorithm follows rather directly from the local optimality result in Theorem 1 since for this type of
paper-side gain function, the global optimization problem is decoupled between each reviewer.
Proposition 2. SUPER∗, with any heuristic, is optimal when the paper-side gain function is linear.
Proof of Proposition 2. The optimization objective over the set of reviewers is defined as
max
pi1,...,pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
E[γp(gj)] + λ
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
E[γr(pii(j), Si,j)],
where the expectation is taken over the randomness in the bids made by the reviewers. Under a linear paper-side gain
function, the problem is equivalently formulated as
max
pi1,...,pin∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
E
[ ∑
i∈[n]
Bi,j
]
+ λ
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j),
where Bi,j denotes the random bid of reviewer i on paper j and the expectation on the reviewer-side gain went away
since it is deterministic given a paper ordering for any reviewer. Using the structure of the bidding model, we can
simplify the expectation over the paper-side gain to obtain the objective function
max
pi1,...,pin∈Πd
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
f(pii(j), Si,j) + λ
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j).
The paper-side and reviewer-side gains are now decoupled between the ordering presented to each reviewer. Conse-
quently, the optimal paper-ordering to present to each reviewer i ∈ [n] is given by the solution to the optimization
problem
max
pii∈Πd.
∑
j∈[d]
f(pii(j), Si,j) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j). (172)
The SUPER∗ algorithm solves the following problem to determine the ordering of papers to present each reviewer
i ∈ [n]:
max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
f(pii(j), Si,j)(γp(gi−1,j + hi,j + 1)− γp(gi−1,j + hi,j)) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j).
Under a linear paper-side gain, the optimization problem the SUPER∗ algorithm solves for each reviewer simplifies to
the problem
max
pii∈Πd
∑
j∈[d]
f(pii(j), Si,j) + λ
∑
j∈[d]
γr(pii(j), Si,j)
since the number of bids and the heuristic cancels. We showed in the proof of Proposition 1 that the SUPER∗ algorithm
solves this problem efficiently, and exactly. Since the problem is equivalent to that in (172) which gives the optimal
solution for each reviewer, the SUPER∗ algorithm is optimal with a linear paper-side gain function.
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